



## **Today's Electronic Voting Machines: An Examination of the Use and Security of Ballot Marking Devices**

### **12:00pm ET– Welcome and Introduction**

[Susan Greenhalgh](#), Senior Advisor for Election Security, Free Speech For People

[Marilyn Marks](#), Executive Director, Coalition for Good Governance

Amid mounting evidence of vulnerabilities in electronic voting machines, and the growing focus on securing our elections, broad consensus has emerged among election officials, computer scientists, national security experts, election stakeholders and voters, that all votes should be recorded on a paper ballot. For years, that meant most voters would mark choices with a pen on a pre-printed paper ballot, and that voters that may be unable or uncomfortable hand-marking their ballot would use an assistive ballot marking device. Assistive ballot marking devices are essential to provide differently-abled voters the opportunity to mark a paper ballot privately and independently.

However, in the last few years voting system vendors have promoted the “universal-use” ballot marking device (BMD) voting model, in which all voters use an electronic device to access an electronic ballot image and record vote selections. The device then prints a paper ballot summary of the voters’ selections, in text and in a barcode. The ballot summary does not include the full ballot with all candidates and ballot questions. The ballot summary card is then scanned and the votes are tabulated.

Voting system vendors are promoting these systems as providing “paper ballots,” but does the ballot summary produced by a BMD provide the same security, transparency and auditability properties achieved with ballots marked primarily by hand? And how

does the universal-use ballot marking device model address other election management considerations like cost, logistics, administration, and legal compliance?

We will take a deep dive to answer these and other questions regarding the use of universal-use ballot marking devices.

**12:15pm ET – Do universal-use ballot marking devices provide the security, verifiability and auditability essential for trustworthy elections?**

The National Academies recently concluded that “there is no realistic mechanism to fully secure vote casting and tabulation computer systems from cyber threats”. Recognizing this threat, jurisdictions are increasingly adopting risk-limiting audits, which require paper ballots to verify the election outcome without relying on potentially hacked voting equipment. This panel will examine the growing range of security vulnerabilities and threats that elections face, including serious new risks posed by universal-use Ballot Marking Devices, and discuss whether universal-use BMDs and their ballot summary cards can provide the verifiability and auditability necessary to assure that election outcomes match the will of the voters, and how to use modern concepts of resilience to reduce reliance on untrustworthy voting system components.

Moderator: [Richard DeMillo](#), Chair, School of Cybersecurity and Privacy and Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Chair in Computing, Georgia Tech

Panelists: [J. Alex Halderman](#), Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, Director of the Center for Computer Security and Society, University of Michigan

[Benoit Montreuil](#) (tentative), Coca Cola Professor of Materials Handling and Director, Supply Chain and Logistics Institute, Georgia Tech

[Kevin Skoglund](#), co-founder Citizens for Better Elections

[Philip B. Stark](#), Associate Dean, Division of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Interim Regional Associate Dean, College of Chemistry and Division of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Professor of Statistics, University of California

## **2pm ET – Legal Consideration: How do universal-use Ballot Marking Devices protect or degrade voters’ rights?**

In 2019, a federal court issued a landmark decision in the lawsuit *Curling v. Raffensperger*, ruling that Georgia’s direct record electronic voting machines could not be used because they did not protect a voter’s constitutional right to have their vote securely and reliably recorded and counted. As computer security experts have warned that many of the same issues exist with ballot marking devices, citizens have sought to challenge the legality of the BMDs in Georgia, North Carolina and Pennsylvania. The attorneys arguing these cases will discuss the status of these suits, the legal arguments, and facts of the cases.

Moderator: [Penny Venetis](#), Clinical Professor of Law, Director of the International Human Rights Clinic, Rutgers University Law School

Panelists: [David Cross](#), Partner, Morrison, Foerster, lead counsel for Curling plaintiffs, *Curling v. Raffensperger*

[Courtney Hostetler](#), Senior Counsel, Free Speech For People, co-lead counsel, *NAACP NC v. North Carolina State Board of Elections*

[Rob McGuire](#), The Robert McGuire Law Firm, co-lead counsel for Coalition for Good Governance plaintiffs in *Curling v. Raffensperger*

## **3pm ET – Administration: What does it take to run elections on universal-use Ballot Marking Devices?**

Running elections is a complex and intricate operation, and election officials are often overburdened and under-resourced. How does the universal-use Ballot Marking Device model ease or complicate the election process? What administrative procedures are made more efficient or more difficult with the adoption of universal-use ballot marking devices? These election administration experts will discuss the effort and resources that are needed to run elections on universal-use ballot marking devices, including logistics, polling place conditions and contingency plans in the event of failure.

Moderator: [Kevin Skoglund](#), co-founder Citizens for Better Elections

[Marybeth Kuznik](#), Director of Elections, Armstrong County, Pennsylvania

[Marcia Ridley](#), former Election Supervisor, Spaulding County, Georgia

[Connie Schmidt](#), former Election Director, Johnson County, Kansas, retired

[Grace Wachlarowicz](#), former Election Director, Minneapolis, Minnesota, retired

## **4pm ET – The price tag: The cost of running elections on universal-use Ballot Marking Devices**

This panel explores the costs involved with running elections on universal-use Ballot Marking Devices for all voters. There has been robust debate - and conflicting information - on the true and accurate costs associated with adopting universal use BMDs. This panel features experts that have analyzed the costs of purchasing BMDs for all voters, as well as the ongoing and hidden costs involved with this election model. The panel will also provide comparisons to using pre-printed ballots and ballot-on-demand.

Moderator: [Dr. Virginia Martin](#), former Commissioner of Elections, Columbia County, NY

Panelists: [Chris Deluzio](#), Policy Director of the University of Pittsburgh Institute for Cyber Law, Policy, and Security (Pitt Cyber)

[Jeanne Dufort](#), Coalition for Good Governance

[Eddie Perez](#), *Global Director of Technology Development & Open Standards* for the OSET Institute

[Dr. T. Anthony Spearman](#), President, North Carolina State Chapter of the NAACP & Board Member, Guilford County, North Carolina Board of Elections

## **5pm ET – Closing remarks**

[Susan Greenhalgh](#), Senior Advisor for Election Security, Free Speech For People

[Marilyn Marks](#), Executive Director, Coalition for Good Governance

