

April 21, 2022

The Honorable Alex Lee  
California State Capitol  
Sacramento, CA 95814

RE: Proposed bill AB 1819 re: political spending by foreign-influenced corporations

Dear Assembly Member Lee,

I am writing to express my support for the proposed bill AB 1819 regarding political spending by foreign-influenced corporations in California. The proposal would be a critical tool for uncovering foreign influences in our elections. Unlike many commentators, my background is not in constitutional law. What I may add to this debate is corporate law knowledge – both from study as an academic and perhaps more importantly from extensive practical experience, sketched below. Drawing on that experience, below I explain how investors holding even just one percent of corporate equity can influence corporate governance, and how in corporations could – practically and at reasonable expense – obtain responsive information about the foreign national status of shareholders, as would be required by the law.

### **Background**

I am the John F. Cogan Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School, where I also serve as Special Advisor for Planning, Chair of the Committee on Executive Education and Online Learning, and Research Director of the Center on the Legal Profession. Before joining Harvard, I was a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in financial institutions and M&A. At HLS and at Harvard Business School, he teaches corporate governance, M&A, finance, and related topics, and I am a Fellow of the American College of Governance Counsel. I have testified before Congress and provided consulting services to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Department of Treasury, the New York Stock Exchange, and participants in the financial markets, including hedge funds, investment banks, and private equity funds. In 2021 I served as General Counsel and Acting Director of the

Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In June 2016, I testified by invitation at a forum on “Corporate Political Spending and Foreign Influence” at the Federal Election Commission.

### **Foreign corporate spending in American elections**

Since the Supreme Court’s 2010 *Citizens United* decision invalidated restrictions on corporate political spending,<sup>1</sup> the possibility that American elections could be influenced by foreign interests via corporations has attracted considerable public and policymaker interest. Foreign governments, foreign-based companies, and people who are neither U.S. citizens nor permanent residents are currently barred by federal law from contributing or spending money in connection with federal, state, or local elections.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, *Citizens United* created a loophole to this ban: these foreign entities can invest money through U.S.-based corporations that can – as a result of the decision – then spend unlimited amounts of money in American elections.

The policy interest in regulating foreign influence need not rest on the idea that foreign investors are tied to hostile governments that are actively trying to undermine the democracy or economy of the United States, although there is now evidence that Russia sought to do just that in the last presidential election, and is expected to try to do so again in future elections. In addition, it may separately rest on the observation that foreign nationals (even those in countries that are staunch U.S. allies) are simply not part of the U.S. polity. Democratic self-governance presumes a coherent and defined population to engage in that activity. Foreign nationals have a different set of interests than their U.S. counterparts, as regards a range of policies, such as defense, environmental regulation, and infrastructure. Few dispute the idea that a given government may properly seek to limit foreign influence over, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, “activities ‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.’”<sup>3</sup> There is nothing particularly surprising or pernicious about this fact. Foreign and domestic interests predictably diverge.

Depending on the degree of their influence, foreign governments (or their

---

<sup>1</sup> *Citizens United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

<sup>2</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a). This prohibition was upheld by a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in 2012. *See Bluman v. FEC*, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).

<sup>3</sup> *Bluman v. FEC*, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (D.D.C. 2011)(quoting *Bernal v. Fainter*, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)), *aff’d*, 132 S.Ct. 1087 (2012).

agents, such as sovereign wealth funds), foreign corporations, or other foreign investors might be able to leverage ownership stakes in U.S. corporations to affect corporate governance. Through that channel, they could influence corporate political activity in a manner inconsistent with democratic self-government, or at least out of alignment with the interests of U.S. voters.

Every country regulates some types of foreign and domestic business activities differently. In many domains of the American economy, long-standing statutes, regulations, and legal traditions treat foreign companies or foreign-influenced companies differently than domestic companies. The United States has specific foreign restrictions across a number of different industries. In shipping, aircraft, telecom, and financial services, laws governing all of these industries limit or regulate foreign ownership or control. Some ban foreign ownership completely, and, for some, foreign ownership or control triggers special government approval procedures.

The same spirit of those bodies of law should inform regulation of election spending by foreign-influenced corporations. Since *Citizens United* opened the door for political activity by corporations, some corporations of which ownership or control is likely held in significant part by foreign entities have devoted considerable financial resources to influencing American elections.

In practice, the policy preferences of foreign-influenced corporations are sometimes clear from public sources. In May 2016, Uber and Lyft spent over \$9 million on a ballot initiative in Austin, Texas that would have overturned an ordinance passed by the Austin City Council requiring the companies' drivers to submit to fingerprint-based criminal background checks.<sup>4</sup> Weeks later, Uber disclosed that the Saudi Arabian government had invested \$3.5 billion in the company, giving the Kingdom over five percent ownership and a seat on its board of directors.<sup>5</sup> Also in 2016, the multinational "homestay" corporation Airbnb responded to the New York Legislature's growing interest in regulating

---

<sup>4</sup> Nolan Hicks, "Prop 1 campaign crosses \$9 million threshold," AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, May 9, 2016, <http://atxne.ws/29pbFBk>.

<sup>5</sup> See Elliot Hannon, "Saudi Arabia Makes Record \$3.5 Billion Investment in Uber," SLATE, June 1, 2016, <http://slate.me/1UvvM3x>. Uber also spent roughly \$600,000 on a 2015 voter referendum in Seattle. See Karen Weise, "This is How Uber Takes Over a City," BLOOMBERG, June 23, 2015, <http://bloom.bg/1Ln2MaN>.

the industry by arming a super PAC with \$11 million to influence New York's legislative races.<sup>6</sup> Airbnb – a privately held company – is partly owned by Moscow-based DST Global.<sup>7</sup>

In another striking example, APIC, a San Francisco-based company described as “controlled” and “100 percent owned” by Gordon Tang and Huaidan Chen -- two Chinese citizens with permanent residence in Singapore -- gave \$1.3 million to a super PAC that had supported Jeb Bush's run for president.<sup>8</sup> Though the story made headlines, it echoes similar, yet less publicized, efforts to influence high-profile state and national races. For example, in 2012, a Connecticut-based subsidiary of a Canadian insurance and investment corporation gave \$1 million to the pro-Mitt Romney super PAC Restore Our Future.<sup>9</sup> In 2013, a New Jersey-based subsidiary of a Chinese-owned business contributed \$120,000 directly to Terry McAuliffe's gubernatorial campaign in Virginia.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth Lovett, “Airbnb to spend \$10 on Super PAC to fund pre-Election day ads,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 11, 2016, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/airbnb-spend-10m-super-pac-fund-pre-election-day-ads-article-1.2825469>.

<sup>7</sup> See Dan Primack, “Yuri Milner adds \$1.7 billion to his VC war chest,” FORTUNE, Aug. 3, 2015, <http://fortune.com/2015/08/03/yuri-milner-adds-1-7-billion-to-his-vc-warchest/> (DST Global is Moscow based); Scott Austin, “Airbnb: From Y Combinator to \$112M Funding in Three Years,” The Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2011, <http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/07/25/airbnb-from-y-combinator-to-112m-funding-in-three-years/> (DST Global is a major investor in Airbnb).

<sup>8</sup> Jon Schwartz & Lee Fang, “The Citizens United Playbook,” THE INTERCEPT, Aug. 3, 2016, <http://bit.ly/2auW75p>.

<sup>9</sup> Michael Beckel, “Foreign-Owned Firm Gives \$1 Million to Romney Super-PAC,” MOTHER JONES, Oct. 5, 2012, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/canadian-foreign-donation-super-pac-restore-our-future>.

<sup>10</sup> John Schwartz, “Va. Gov. Terry McAuliffe Took \$120K from a Chinese Billionaire—but the Crime Is That It Was Legal,” THE INTERCEPT, June 1, 2016, <http://bit.ly/1XPvuXN>.

Ballot initiatives have been particularly strong magnets for spending by multinational corporations. American Electric Power, Limited Brands, and Nationwide Insurance spent a combined \$275,000 against a municipal initiative aimed at reconfiguring the Columbus City Council.<sup>11</sup> In 2012, a Los Angeles County ballot measure, the “Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act,” attracted over \$325,000 from two companies tied to a Luxembourg corporation that ran adult webpages.<sup>12</sup> The company’s then-CEO was a German national.<sup>13</sup> That same year, a statewide ballot initiative in California that would have required all foods containing genetically modified organisms to be labeled as such attracted \$45 million in spending by multinationals such as Monsanto and DuPont.<sup>14</sup> Opponents of the measure spent five times more than its supporters, and ultimately defeated it by a 53-47 margin.<sup>15</sup>

Of course, not all politically active corporations are owned or controlled in significant part by foreign entities. Many privately held companies are owned directly by one or a small number of U.S. citizens. Among U.S. public companies, foreign ownership varies. I have carefully researched foreign ownership of large U.S. companies (see the short paper attached as an appendix to this letter) finding that, among publicly traded corporations in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index, one in eleven (~9 percent) has a foreign institutional investor with more than five percent of the company’s voting shares. (Five percent was chosen for the study because it is the threshold at which federal securities law requires public disclosure of large stockholdings of US public companies.<sup>16</sup>)

---

<sup>11</sup> Lucas Sullivan, “Follow the money flowing to ward initiative campaigns in Columbus,” THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 22, 2016, <http://bit.ly/2ahlSpq>.

<sup>12</sup> See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, “How a Foreign Pornographer Tried to Win a U.S. Election,” THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Nov. 6, 2015, <http://bit.ly/29pesu2>.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

<sup>14</sup> Suzanne Goldenberg, “Prop 37: food companies spend \$45m to defeat California GM label bill,” THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 2012, <http://bit.ly/29I3SE7>.

<sup>15</sup> *Id.*

But other corporations may have foreign ownership at substantial levels that would make unaffiliated foreign investors capable of exerting influence on the corporate political spending, even at levels below five percent of total stock. One such method is by presenting proposals for a vote by the shareholders. Any investor who can present a shareholder proposal (either alone, or by working with a group of other investors) has substantial leverage. Indeed, in recent proxy seasons, the New York City Pension Fund, despite owning less than one percent of outstanding shares in the target companies, led successful shareholder proposal campaigns regarding proxy access.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, this type of influence is not limited to actually presenting shareholder proposals; the ability to do so creates indirect means of influence, such as *threatening* a shareholder proposal, and it means that, in many cases, an investor at that level can get upper management, including the CEO, on the phone.

Until September 2020, under a federal law known as Rule 14a-8, the threshold for presenting a shareholder proposal at a publicly-traded company was owning either 1% of voting shares or \$2,000 in market value.<sup>18</sup> In the years prior to its amendment, political debate about how to revise the law centered around the question of whether raise or eliminate the \$2,000 qualification or whether to *lower* the ownership requirements. Virtually *no one* questioned that owning *at least* 1% of voting shares should continue to qualify an investor for this method of influence. Rather, the debate concerned whether that threshold is too *high*,

---

<sup>16</sup> Under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended by the Williams Act), any person or group of persons who acquire beneficial ownership of more than five percent of the voting class of the equity of a corporation that is listed or otherwise required to register as a “public” company under that law, must, within ten days, report that acquisition to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) via Schedule 13D (or, in some cases, Schedule 13G). *See* 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, 240.13d-101.

<sup>17</sup> See Paula Loop, “The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Feb. 1, 2018, <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-shareholder-activism/>.

<sup>18</sup> 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(b) (2019), *available at* <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/cfr/2019/>.

and whether investors who own *less than 1%* should be able to present shareholder proposals.

For example, one of the first bills proposed in 2017 in the U.S. House of Representatives was the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, which proposed to eliminate the \$2,000 market value threshold, but retain the 1% ownership threshold.<sup>19</sup> In committee markup debate over the CHOICE Act, then-Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-Tex.) explained that “we have something fairly reasonable and that is, you know, if you are going to put forward these proposals, have some real significant skin in the game. And what we say is 1 percent. One percent to put forward a shareholder proposal.”<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, as part of those same political discussions, the Business Roundtable, a group of chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations formed to promote pro-business public policy, proposed a threshold *below 1%* for shareholder proposals:

For proposals related to topics other than director elections, a truly reasonable standard could be to use a sliding scale based on the market capitalization of the company, with a required ownership percentage of **0.15 percent for proposals submitted to the largest companies and up to 1 percent for proposals submitted to smaller companies.** Additionally, if a proposal were submitted by a group or by a proponent acting by proxy, the ownership percentage sliding scale could be increased to up to 3 percent.<sup>21</sup>

In other words, the Business Roundtable recognized that investors can *and should* have significant influence over corporate decisionmaking at ownership levels between 0.15% to 1%, or 3% for groups of investors.

---

<sup>19</sup> See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10 (115th Cong.), § 844.  
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/10/>.

<sup>20</sup> House Financial Services Committee, remarks of Rep. Jeb Hensarling, May 3, 2017.

<sup>21</sup> Business Roundtable, “Responsible Shareholder Engagement & Long-Term Value Creation,”  
<https://www.businessroundtable.org/archive/resources/responsible-shareholder-engagement-long-term-value-creation> (emphasis added).

In December 2019, the federal Securities and Exchange Commission formally proposed to revise Rule 14a-8 to not just lower but *eliminate* the 1% threshold for presenting shareholder proposals.<sup>22</sup> The SEC adopted the revised rule in September 2020.<sup>23</sup> As the SEC explained:

We also propose to eliminate the current 1 percent ownership threshold, which historically has not been utilized. *The vast majority of investors that submit shareholder proposals do not meet a 1 percent ownership threshold. In addition, we understand that the types of investors that hold 1 percent or more of a company's shares generally do not use Rule 14a-8 as a tool for communicating with boards and management.*<sup>24</sup>

In support of these points, the SEC cited statements from some of the world's largest and most influential pension fund investors, including the California State Teachers' Retirement System and the New York City Comptroller—both of which have led successful shareholder campaigns and are considered quite influential in corporate governance—that “[w]hile one percent may sound like a small amount, even a large investor like the \$200 billion CalSTRS fund does not own one percent of publicly traded companies,” and “[d]espite being among the largest pension investors in the world, [New York City funds] rarely hold more than 0.5% of any individual company, and most often hold less.”<sup>25</sup> In other words, for a publicly-traded corporation, one percent is in fact a very large ownership stake, and some of the largest and most influential-in-governance investors rarely if ever hold that much.

By the same token, the SEC cited an observation from its 2018 “Roundtable on the Proxy Process”<sup>26</sup> with which few of those with experience in corporate governance would disagree:

Large institutional investors—the Blackrocks and State Streets and Vanguard of the world—do not need the shareholder proposal rule process to get the attention of management or the board of directors.

---

<sup>22</sup> See SEC, *Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8*, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,458 (Dec. 4, 2019). The SEC’s proposed rule would also modify the absolute-dollar-value thresholds, which are not relevant here.

<sup>23</sup> 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(b).

<sup>24</sup> *Id.* at 66,646 (emphasis added).

<sup>25</sup> *Id.* n.58.

<sup>26</sup> I was a panelist at this roundtable.



There's not a corporate secretary or investor relations department in the country that would not return their call within 24 hours.<sup>27</sup>

The point here is not that foreign investors will use the shareholder proposal process to influence corporate political spending. Rather, the point is that the SEC itself recognizes that one percent ownership is large enough that investors with that level of ownership don't even need that process; they typically can easily get executive-suite management on the phone, and through that direct "engagement" have an influence on corporate managers, strategy, and decision-making.

Whatever happens with the SEC rulemaking, California can rely on the general agreement among major capital investors, corporate management, and governance experts that one percent ownership confers substantial influence over corporate governance.

### **Regulating foreign corporate spending**

California can simultaneously welcome foreign investment without exposing itself to the risk of foreign money influencing its elections. The proposed law addresses this issue through a requirement that prohibits a corporation from spending certain types of money in city elections if it is a "foreign-influenced corporation" – a definition based, in part, on the extent of foreign ownership of corporate stock.<sup>28</sup> The proposed bill is a reasonable response to an increasingly localized problem, and is constitutional under the Court's decision in *Citizens United*. The remainder of this letter details how this certification requirement could operate.

### **The mechanics of the bill's foreign-influenced-corporation requirements**

#### 1. Ownership of corporate stock

To begin, as a general matter, corporate stock may be "owned" in three different forms. First, many companies that have one or a relatively small

---

<sup>27</sup> SEC, *Transcript of the Roundtable on the Proxy Process* (Nov. 15, 2018), available at <https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf>, at 150 (comments of Brandon Rees, Deputy Director of Corporations & Capital Markets, AFL-CIO).

<sup>28</sup> The types of prohibited spending for foreign-influenced corporations are independent expenditures or contributions to independent expenditure PACs (often called super PACs). Other forms of corporate political activity, such as lobbying or operating a corporate PAC, are not restricted.

number of shareholders hold paper stock certificates. Among larger, stock exchange listed companies, with numerous owners, such direct ownership is rare, and increasingly so. At such companies, shares are more commonly held in “street name” through a broker (e.g., Fidelity or Charles Schwab). In these instances, the name on the stock certificate is actually the broker, but the broker keeps track in a database of how many shares belong to each client. Clients who hold shares in street name are “beneficial owners” under SEC rules, can direct brokers how to vote or sell shares, and can participate in corporate governance.

Most shares of large, listed companies, however, are now held by separate legal entities, such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds. As an economic matter, these entities hold stock on behalf of their clients or beneficiaries. However, as a legal matter, the investment entities themselves are the owners of the stock, and they do not pass through to beneficiaries either the right to vote or the right to sell the shares of the stock that the entity purchases. Individuals whose wealth is invested through these types of institutional investments cannot exercise voting rights associated with the shares. Instead, those rights are exercised by the management of the institutions.

## 2. Determining shareholders

Most corporate stock is not traded on public markets. As of 2012, more than five million corporations filed U.S. income tax returns. Only about 4,000 corporations were listed on a U.S. stock exchange – less than 0.1 percent of corporations that filed tax returns. Of the rest, many are owned by a single shareholder, or are beneficially owned by up to 500 individual owners. (SEC rules generally require public registration and disclosure for companies with more than 500 owners and \$10 million in assets.) Companies without public markets are still large and have substantial numbers of shareholders. Examples include Cargill, with revenues exceeding \$130 billion and over 200 shareholders, and Mars, with revenues exceeding \$33 billion and over 45 shareholders. Because shares of such companies do not trade freely in the public markets, such companies generally can and do track the identity of their shareholders directly.

For corporations listed on public markets, shares trade in significant volume—thousands of shares per day. Since public company shareholders change daily, even hourly, perfect real-time knowledge of the extent of foreign ownership or influence is not possible. However, publicly traded corporations have the ability to ascertain the exact ownership of their shares as of any arbitrary “record

date.” In fact, this happens at least annually, because companies are required by corporate law to have annual shareholder meetings, for which they must set a record date to determine which shareholders are eligible to attend and vote at the meeting. In fact, record dates are set and shareholder lists are created more frequently than that at many public companies, to allow for votes on off-cycle events, such as a merger proposal or charter amendments, which are brought to a vote at special meetings, or to determine recipients of dividends. Furthermore, at any point during the year, a qualifying shareholder can demand a shareholder list to solicit proxies, or a third party may demand a list to make a tender offer for shares.

Consequently, the ability to determine record stock ownership as of a given date is essential to the basic governance of corporations.

Few if any publicly traded corporations engage in the process of determining their record shareholders for a given record date themselves. They use an intermediary – most commonly, American Stock Transfer (AST) – that is dedicated to this function. Under state law, shareholders seeking to file a derivative suit or solicit shareholder support for a shareholder resolution or proxy contest can also obtain the list of shares using the same method. A corporation that needs the list of shareholders as of a specific date would engage AST to produce the list of shareholders as of that date. Under SEC rules, public companies also reach out beyond their record holders to the beneficial owners of broker- or bank-owned stock, and engage AST to contact banks, brokers or other intermediaries that are nominally record owners. Those firms, in turn, provide information about non-objecting beneficial owners to AST, which then compiles it and provides it to the corporation. Typically, banks, brokers and other intermediaries provide AST (and the corporation) with non-objecting client names, addresses, shares held, and purchase dates (which could be multiple blocks if a given shareholder bought multiple blocks of shares over time).

In addition to these basic corporate and securities law mechanisms, Section 13 of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any person or group of persons who acquire beneficial ownership of more than five percent of the voting class of a listed corporation’s equity to within ten days report that acquisition to the SEC on a Schedule 13D (or, in some cases, Schedule 13G).<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, 240.13d-101.

These acquisitions are, in turn, made public by the SEC, and available through the SEC's EDGAR online database.

### 3. Determining whether shareholders are "foreign owners"

The bill requires a corporation that plans to engage in political spending to ascertain whether it meets the threshold of "foreign-influenced corporation." As just described above, acquisitions of five percent or more of the stock of public U.S. companies must already be disclosed under SEC rules, including the identity of the purchaser's citizenship.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the information is already publicly available (and readily available on commonly used search web sites such as Yahoo Finance or MSN Finance) for five percent blockholders of public companies. For ownership at lower thresholds,<sup>31</sup> the information is not always publicly available, but can be ascertained. Outside of the blockholder context, for most purposes, corporations typically do not inquire into the citizenship or permanent residency status of shareholders. Many brokerage firms impose restrictions on non-citizens, or specifically limit their customers to citizens or permanent residents. A 2012 sampling of major brokers by financial markets reporter Matt Krantz found divergence in practices:

For instance, at Fidelity, the company says only U.S. citizens may open an account. . . . Over at TD Ameritrade, investors do not need to be a U.S. citizen to open an account. With that said, the stipulations and requirements vary dramatically based on the country the resident lives in and the potential customers' nationality, the company says. . . . Similarly at E-Trade, the brokerage has different rules based on the country. . . . The rules vary widely based on the nationality of the person wanting the account . . . . TradeKing requires investors, including U.S. citizens, to be U.S. residents to establish the account. It makes an exception for customers who are living abroad and have a valid U.S. military or government address. Investors who are not U.S. citizens, yet

---

<sup>30</sup> See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (item #6, requiring reporting of "Citizenship or place of organization").

<sup>31</sup> Obviously, if a corporation determines from publicly available information that it has a 5% foreign owner, then it already meets the definition of foreign-influenced corporation and the inquiry is over; there is no need to *further* ascertain whether it *also* has additional foreign owners at lower ownership levels.

reside legally in the U.S., may open an account if they have a Social Security number and aren't from 27 specific [prohibited] countries . . . .<sup>32</sup>

The process of ascertaining the foreign owner status of shareholders would be simple in many cases. If a publicly traded corporation asks American Stock Transfer to produce its list of shareholders (or just those shareholders who are foreign nationals), and AST in turn asks Fidelity, Fidelity's citizens-only customer policy would enable it to truthfully and simply answer that zero percent of the company's shares held through Fidelity are held by foreign nationals.

Similarly, where stock is held by a non-human shareholder, such as another corporation, the "foreign" status of that corporation can be ascertained readily by examining its place of incorporation and principal place of business.

The proposed law counts stock owned by domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations the same as stock owned by foreign corporations. (In the terms of the law, either would be defined as a "foreign owner.") To the extent that a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation has the potential to influence U.S. portfolio companies in which it invests, it has the potential to do so at the foreign parent's bidding or with the foreign parent's approval.

However, the law does *not* require "piercing" through the beneficial ownership of institutional entities such as mutual funds. For the bill's purpose, corporate stock owned by a mutual fund is not corporate stock held by a foreign national, even if many of the mutual fund's customers are themselves foreign nationals, as long as the advisor to the fund is a U.S. entity (a fact that can be readily determined with public information). This is a reasonable approach, because customers of mutual funds cannot themselves directly participate in governance of the corporation actually spending money in a city election. Instead, it is the management of the advisory firm that plays that role.

#### 4. "Due inquiry"

Importantly, the law addresses any remaining possible difficulties that U.S. corporations might have in certifying as to whether they are foreign-influenced. As noted above, some brokerage firms allow foreign investors to buy stock of U.S. companies through them, and they may not report citizenship information

---

<sup>32</sup> Matt Krantz, USA TODAY, "U.S. online brokerage options are limited for foreigners," <http://usat.ly/KXpDan> (May 16, 2012).

about such customers to the corporations in which they invest. Thus, it may not be possible for every corporation to verify the U.S. or foreign national status of all of its shareholders with complete confidence. (Note, however, that the law does not actually require a corporation to verify *all* of its shareholders' statuses: Given the 5 percent, "aggregate" threshold, verifying that just over 95 percent of shareholders are not foreign owners would be sufficient.)

However, given this possibility, it is reasonable for the proposed law to impose a certification requirement that specifies that the chief executive officer of the corporation certify that the information is provided after "due inquiry." The "due inquiry" standard is familiar from securities law,<sup>33</sup> as well as from other areas of law with which corporate executives are acquainted.<sup>34</sup> It imposes only the customary obligation to make such reasonable inquiry as the corporation would do in any event. Thus, the law does not impose a meaningful additional information-gathering cost beyond what it would already be required to do under existing law.

## **Conclusion**

The law is a reasonable solution to the risk of foreign influence in local elections through corporate political spending. The law is constitutional under *Citizens United*, and reasonable from a corporate and securities law perspective. The law would only apply to corporations that spend money on independent expenditures or make contributions to candidates or "super PACs" in candidate elections. The law imposes no obligations on corporations that do not spend money on candidate elections. For those corporations that do engage in such spending, the requirement that corporations certify that they are not foreign-influenced is practicable and reasonable for both privately and publicly traded corporations, conditioned as it is on corporations engaging in

---

<sup>33</sup> See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(3).

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., *SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs, Inc.*, 127 F.3d 1462, 1464–65 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (in patent law, standard for whether infringement was "willful" is "whether the infringer, acting in good faith and upon due inquiry, had sound reason to believe that it had the right to act in the manner that was found to be infringing"); *Black Diamond Sportswear, Inc. v. Black Diamond Equip., Ltd.*, No. 06-3508-CV, 2007 WL 2914452, at \*3 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2007) ("A trademark owner is "chargeable with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon [due] inquiry.") (quoting *Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.*, 182 F. Supp. 350, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1960)) (alteration in original).

“due inquiry,” a standard that will not add material costs to the information-gathering and record-keeping in which corporations already engage.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

John C. Coates IV  
*John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics*  
Harvard Law School