April 21, 2022

The Honorable Alex Lee  
California State Capitol  
Sacramento, CA 95814

RE: Proposed bill AB 1819 to prohibit campaign spending by foreign-influenced corporations

Dear Assembly Member Lee,

I write in support of AB 1819, a bill to prohibit political spending by foreign-influenced corporations in California. We attach a memorandum to further explain our support of this bill.

I am Senior Counsel at Free Speech For People, a national nonpartisan non-profit organization, that works to renew our democracy and to limit the influence of money in our elections. We have helped develop legislation to limit corporate political spending by partially-foreign-owned (foreign-influenced) corporations. Specifically, we helped develop a law passed by Seattle, Washington in 2020; a bill that passed the New York Senate earlier this year; a bill introduced in December 2021 into the U.S. House of Representatives by Rep. Jamie Raskin; and similar legislation introduced into several state and city legislatures.

We also incorporate by reference written testimony prepared by Professor John C. Coates IV, Harvard Law School (and former General Counsel of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) and Professor Larry Tribe, the Carl M. Loeb University Professor and Professor of Constitutional Law Emeritus at Harvard University and Harvard Law School. Professor Coates and Professor Tribe are separately submitting their written testimony in support of California AB 1819, recently introduced in the Assembly.

If you have any questions, we would be happy to discuss.

Sincerely,

Courtney Hostetler, Senior Counsel  
Ron Fein, Legal Director  
John Bonifaz, President  
Ben Clements, Board Chair and Senior Legal Advisor  
Free Speech For People
I. General and legal background

Under well-established federal law, recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is illegal for a foreign government, business, or individual to spend any amount of money at all to influence federal, state, or local elections.¹ This existing provision does not turn on whether the foreign national comes from a country that is friend or foe, nor the amount of money involved. Rather, as then-Judge (now Justice) Brett Kavanaugh wrote in the seminal decision upholding this law:

It is fundamental to the definition of our national political community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic self-government. It follows, therefore, that the United States has a compelling interest for purposes of First Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.²

Federal law, however, leaves a gap that has been opened even further since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision invalidated laws that banned corporate political spending.³ While the existing federal statute prohibits a foreign-registered corporation from spending money on federal, state, or local elections, federal law does not address the issue of political spending by U.S. corporations that are partially owned by foreign investors. That is the topic here.

The Citizens United decision three times described the corporations to which its decision applied as “associations of citizens.”⁴ On the topic of corporations partly owned by foreign investors, the Supreme Court simply noted “[w]e need not reach the question” because the law before it applied to all corporations.⁵ As a result, federal law currently does not prevent a corporation that is partly owned by foreign investors from making contributions to super PACs, independent expenditures,

¹ 52 U.S.C. § 30121.
⁴ Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354, 356. Many scholars have criticized the Court’s understanding of the corporate entity as an association. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 451 (2019). However misguided, this account reflects the reasoning that the Court has adopted in extending constitutional rights to corporations.
⁵ Id. at 362.
expenditures on ballot measure campaigns, or even (in states where it is otherwise legal) contributing directly to candidates.

Since 2010, neither Congress nor the beleaguered Federal Election Commission have done anything. However, as Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School and Federal Election Commissioner Ellen Weintraub have written, California does not need to wait for federal action to protect its state and local elections from foreign influence. The goal of this bill is to plug the loophole allowing corporations partly or wholly owned by foreign interests to influence elections.

This threat is real. For example, Uber has shown an increasing appetite for political spending in a variety of contexts. In California, the company spent some $58 million on Proposition 22, which successfully overturned worker protections for Uber drivers. The company is currently preparing to spend millions on a similar ballot measure in Massachusetts. Although Uber started in California, the Saudi government made an enormous (and critical) early investment, and even now owns several percent of the company’s stock, long after the company has gone public. Fellow Proposition 22 major spenders, such as DoorDash and Lyft, are also substantially owned by foreign investors from countries including the United Kingdom, Japan, Malaysia, China, and elsewhere.

Similarly, in October 2016, Airbnb responded to the New York Legislature’s growing interest in regulating the homestay industry by arming a super PAC with $10 million to influence New York’s legislative races. Airbnb received crucial early funding from, and was at that time partly owned by, Moscow-based (and Kremlin-
linked) DST Global. Investment by foreign sovereign wealth funds, like Saudi Arabia’s, is expected to increase exponentially as oil-rich Middle Eastern states seek to diversify their investment portfolios.

In the New York Times, Federal Election Commissioner Ellen Weintraub explained the problem, and pointed to a solution: “Throughout *Citizens United*, the court described corporations as ‘associations of citizens,’” she wrote. “States can require entities accepting political contributions from corporations in state and local races to make sure that those corporations are indeed associations of American citizens—and enforce the ban on foreign political spending against those that are not.”

As Weintraub noted, even partial foreign ownership of corporations calls into question whether *Citizens United*, which three times described corporations as “associations of citizens” and which expressly reserved questions related to foreign shareholders, would apply. Indeed, after deciding *Citizens United*, the Supreme Court in *Bluman v. Federal Election Commission* specifically upheld the federal ban on foreign nationals spending their own money in U.S. elections. In light of the Court’s post-*Citizens United* decision in *Bluman*, a restriction on political spending by corporations with foreign ownership at levels potentially capable of influencing

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10 According to one report, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund is expected to deploy $170 billion in investments over the next few years. Sarah Algethami, *What’s Next for Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund*, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, Oct. 21, 2018, [https://bloom.bg/2sQNJGF](https://bloom.bg/2sQNJGF).

11 Ellen Weintraub, *Taking on Citizens United*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2016, [http://nyti.ms/1SwK4gK](http://nyti.ms/1SwK4gK).


corporate governance can be upheld based on *Bluman* and as an exception to *Citizens United*.\(^\text{14}\)

II. **Foreign influence and ownership thresholds**

How much foreign investment renders a corporation’s political spending problematic for protection of democratic self-government? Arguably, any foreign ownership in companies that spend money to influence our elections is a threat to democratic self-government. In the most commonly accepted understanding, corporate shareholders are “the firm’s residual claimants.”\(^\text{15}\) As explained by the California Court of Appeal, “it is the shareholders who own a corporation, which is managed by the directors. In an economic sense, when a corporation is solvent, it is the shareholders who are the residual claimants of the corporation’s assets . . . .”\(^\text{16}\)

In practice, shareholders rarely have the opportunity to actually assert these residual claims. Yet there is a sense in which investors and corporate managers alike understand that the corporation’s assets “belong to” the shareholders.

\(^{14}\) A similar analysis would also apply to *First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which addressed limits on corporations spending in ballot question elections.

\(^{15}\) Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, *The End of History for Corporate Law*, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 449 (2001); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, *Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance*, 97 Nw. U.L. Rev. 439, 449 (2001) ( “[M]ost theories of the firm agree, shareholders own the residual claim on the corporation’s assets and earnings.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, *The Economic Structure of Corporate Law* 36-39 (1991) (arguing that shareholders are entitled to whatever assets remain after the company has met its obligations, and thus are the ultimate “residual claimant[s]” on a company’s assets). While different theories are sometimes offered in academic literature, this is the standard economic model of shareholders of a firm, and it has been widely adopted in judicial decisions. See, e.g., *RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Est. Cap.*, Inc., 827 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Stockholders and owners of other equity interests have residual claims in a business; they get whatever is left after everyone else is paid.”); In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 208 n.7 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised (June 14, 2018) (“Shareholders are the residual claimants of the estate,” and are entitled to whatever remains after satisfying creditors); In re Cent. Ill. Energy Coop., 561 B.R. 699, 708 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2016) (noting that directors have fiduciary duty to shareholders rather than creditors precisely because “shareholders hav[e] the residual claim to the corporation’s equity value”).

\(^{16}\) Berg & Berg Enter., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 892, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1039 (Cal. App. 2009); accord In re Bear Stearns Litig., 23 Misc. 3d 447, 474, 2008 WL 5220514 (N.Y. Sup. 2008) (shareholders are “residual beneficiaries of any increase in the company’s value” when it is solvent) (cleaned up).
That means that corporate political spending is drawn from shareholders’ money. As Justice Stevens noted in the *Citizens United* decision, “When corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a particular candidate for office, it is the shareholders, as the residual claimants, who are effectively footing the bill.” This point has often been raised from the perspective of shareholders who may not *want* corporate managers spending “their” money on various political causes. But here, we confront the mirror issue: corporate managers may spend money to influence U.S. elections out of funds that partly “belong to” foreign investors.

On this understanding, *any* amount of foreign investment in a corporation means that management’s political expenditures come from a pool of partly foreign money. Seen that way, a corporation spending money in U.S. elections no longer qualifies as an “association of citizens” if *any* of the money in its coffers “belongs to” foreign investors—in other words, when it has any foreign shareholders at all. Indeed, polling indicates that 73% of Americans—including majorities of both Democrats and Republicans—would support banning corporate political spending by corporations with *any* foreign ownership.

But we need not reach that far. At ownership thresholds well above zero, an investor may exert *influence*—explicit or implicit—over corporate decision-making. Even if a company was founded in the United States and keeps its main offices here, companies are responsive to their shareholders, and significant foreign ownership affects corporate decision-making. As the former CEO of U.S.-based ExxonMobil Corp. stated, “I’m not a U.S. company and I don’t make decisions based on what’s good for the U.S.” There is no evidence that political spending is magically exempt from this general rule.

To someone not deeply versed in corporate governance, it may seem that the right threshold for the point at which a foreign investor (or any investor) can exert influence is just over 50%. That is, after all, the threshold for winning a race

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19 By analogy, in the class-action context, some courts hold that a class cannot be certified if even a single member cannot bring the claim. See *Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG*, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (“no class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing”).
between two candidates, or controlling a two-party legislature. But corporations are not legislatures. A better analogy might be a chamber with many millions of uncoordinated potential voters, most of whom rarely vote and who may be, for one reason or another, effectively prevented from voting. In that type of environment, a disciplined owner (or ownership bloc) of 1% can be tremendously influential.

As explained in more detail in written testimony submitted by Professor John Coates of Harvard Law School, and in a recent report by the Center for American Progress, the thresholds in this bill—1% of stock owned by a single foreign investor, or 5% owned by multiple foreign investors—reflect levels of ownership that are widely agreed (including by entities such as the Business Roundtable) to be high enough to influence corporate governance. Corporate governance law gives substantial formal power to minority shareholders at these levels, and this spills out into even greater unofficial influence. For this reason, since the passage of Seattle’s 2020 law, newer bills—currently pending in states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, and in the U.S. Congress—generally follow the Seattle model.

Federal securities law provides powerful tools of corporate influence to investors at these levels. Seattle’s 1% threshold was grounded in a long-standing rule of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding eligibility of shareholders to submit proposals for a shareholder vote—a threshold that in September 2020 the SEC voted to eliminate after concluding that the 1% threshold was, if anything, too high. For a large multinational corporation, an investor that owns 1% of shares might well be the largest single stockholder; it would generally land among the top

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22 See Michael Sozan, Ctr. for American Progress, Ending Foreign-Influenced Corporate Spending in U.S. Elections (Nov. 21, 2019), https://ampr.gs/2QIiNQT.

23 The long-standing rule of the SEC provided that owning one percent of a company’s shares allows an owner to submit shareholder proposals, which creates substantial leverage. See Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,240, 70,241 (Nov. 4, 2020). In September 2020, the SEC voted to eliminate this threshold, and rely solely on absolute-dollar ownership thresholds that correspond to far less than 1% of stock value, because it is fairly uncommon for even a major, active institutional investor to own 1% of the stock of a publicly traded company. The amended rule became effective January 4, 2021. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-220; SEC, Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,458 (Dec. 4, 2019) (proposed rule). In other words, recent advances in corporate governance law suggest that the 1% threshold may, if anything, be higher than appropriate to capture investor influence. That said, 1% remains appropriate for this purpose.
ten. Conversely, as the SEC has acknowledged, many of the investors most active in influencing corporate governance own well below 1% of equity. Of course, this does not mean that every investor who owns 1% of shares will always influence corporate governance, but rather that the business community generally recognizes that this level of ownership presents that opportunity, and—for a foreign investor in the context of corporate political spending—that risk.

In other cases, no single foreign investor holds 1% or more of corporate equity, but multiple foreign investors own a substantial aggregate stake. To pick one example, at the moment of this writing (it may change later, of course, due to market trades), Amazon does not have any 1% foreign investors, but at least 8.3% of its equity (and possibly much more) is owned by foreign investors. While presumably foreign investors as a class are not all perfectly aligned on all issues, they can be assumed to share certain common interests and positions that may, in some cases, differ from those of U.S. shareholders—certainly when it comes to matters of California public policy. As the Center for American Progress has noted:

Foreign interests can easily diverge from U.S. interests, for example, in the areas of tax, trade, investment, and labor law. Corporate directors and managers view themselves as accountable to their shareholders, including foreign shareholders. As the former CEO of U.S.-based Exxon Mobil Corp. starkly stated, “I'm not a U.S. company and I don't make decisions based on what's good for the U.S.”

Neither corporate law nor empirical research provide a bright-line threshold at which this type of aggregate foreign interest begins to affect corporate decision-making, but anecdotally it appears that CEOs do take note of this aggregate foreign interest.

24 See id. at 66,646 & n.58 (noting that “[t]he vast majority of investors that submit shareholder proposals do not meet a 1 percent ownership threshold,” including major institutional investors such as California and New York public employee pension funds).
25 See Amazon.com, CNBC, https://cnb.cx/2JShvAt (visited Oct. 20, 2021) (ownership tab). As of the date of writing, at least one foreign investor (Norges Bank) holds 0.9% but no foreign investor is known to hold 1.0% or more. Aggregate ownership data, however, shows 7.4% in Europe (including Russia) and 0.9% in Asia. In fact, the total aggregate foreign ownership could be much higher, as the summary data show only 57.4% of shares owned in North America. CNBC obtains its geographic ownership concentration data from Thomson Reuters, which in turn obtains it from Refinitiv, a provider of financial markets data that has access to some non-public sources.
26 Michael Sozan, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Ending Foreign-Influenced Corporate Spending in U.S. Elections (Nov. 21, 2019), at 19, https://ampr.gs/2QfiNQT.
ownership and that at a certain point it affects their decision-making. The Seattle model legislation selects a 5% aggregate foreign ownership threshold. Under federal securities law, 5% is the threshold that Congress has already chosen as the level at which a single investor or group of investors working together can have an influence so significant that the law requires disclosure not only of the stake, but also the residence and citizenship of the investors, the source of the funds, and even in some cases information about the investors’ associates. In this case, while it may not be appropriate to treat unrelated foreign investors as a single bloc for all purposes, it is appropriate to do so in the context of analyzing how corporate management conceive decision-making regarding political spending in U.S. elections.

Obviously, some companies do not have substantial foreign ownership. Even of those that do, many probably do not spend corporate money on California elections. Such companies either would not be covered at all (if they did not meet the threshold) or would not experience any practical impact (if they do not spend corporate money for political purposes).

The point here is not that FICs do not have connections to California, nor that foreign investment in local companies should be discouraged, nor that the foreign owners of these companies are necessarily known to be exerting influence over the companies’ decisions about corporate political spending, nor that they would do so nefariously to undermine democratic elections. Rather, the point is simply that Citizens United accorded corporations the right to spend money in our elections on the theory that corporations are “associations of citizens.” But for companies of this type, that theory does not apply. Enough shares are owned or controlled by a foreign owner that the corporation’s spending is at least, in part, drawn from money that “belongs to” that foreign entity—and furthermore, the entity could exert influence over how the corporation spends money from the corporate treasury to influence candidate elections.

Finally, to reiterate, the bill does not limit in any way how employees, executives, or shareholders of these companies may spend their own money—just how the foreign-influenced business entities’ potentially vast corporate treasuries may be deployed to influence California’s electoral democracy.

III. Frequently asked questions

Does this bill affect individual immigrants?
No. The bill regulates corporate political spending by business entities.

What types of companies are covered?
The bill uses the term “corporation” for convenience, but defines it broadly to include a for-profit corporation, company, limited liability company, limited partnership, business trust, business association, or other similar for-profit business entity.

Has the policy been endorsed by leading scholars and experts?
The model legislation has been endorsed by Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School and Professor Adam Winkler of the University of California Law School, experts in constitutional law; Professor John C. Coates IV of Harvard Law School (also a former General Counsel and Director of the Division of Corporate Finance at the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission) and Professor Brian Quinn of Boston College School of Law, experts in corporate law and governance; and Federal Election Commissioner Ellen Weintraub, expert in election law.28

Does the bill have bipartisan support?
A 2019 national poll of 2,633 voters showed that 73%—including majorities of both Democrats and Republicans—would support banning corporate political spending by corporations with any foreign ownership.29 Even after polled individuals were deliberately exposed to partisan framing and opposition messages, voters continued to support the policy 58-24 overall; Trump voters supported it 52-30 and Clinton voters supported it 68-20.

Does the bill prevent corruption?
The Supreme Court currently recognizes two distinct public interests in regulating the amounts and sources of money in politics: (1) preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, and (2) protecting democratic self-government against foreign influence. This bill focuses on the latter.

As Judge Kavanaugh explained in Bluman, the public “has a compelling interest for purposes of First Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic self-government, and in thereby

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preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.”\textsuperscript{30} The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has confirmed that this interest applies to state elections as well.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Is the bill “narrowly tailored” to protecting democratic self-government?} Yes. The public interest in protecting democratic self-government from foreign influence is particularly strong, and supports a wide range of restrictions ranging from investment in communications facilities to municipal public employment.\textsuperscript{32} In the specific context of political spending, the facts of the \textit{Bluman} decision are worth noting. The lead plaintiff wanted to contribute to three candidates (subject to dollar limits that in theory minimize the risk of \textit{corruption}) and “to print flyers . . . and to distribute them in Central Park.”\textsuperscript{33} All these were banned by the federal statute, and the court upheld the ban on all of them.

In other words, in a context where the risk of corruption was essentially nil, the court found that the interest in protecting democratic self-government from foreign influence is so strong that a law that prohibits \textit{printing flyers and posting them in a park} is narrowly tailored to that interest. Given that, a ban on corporate political spending—with the potential for far greater influence on elections than one individual printing flyers—by corporations with substantial foreign ownership, at levels known from corporate governance literature to bring the potential for investor influence, is also narrowly tailored to the same interest.

\textbf{Does this bill go further than the federal statute at issue in Bluman?} Yes; that is the point. The federal statute prevents foreign entities from spending money directly in federal, state, or local elections.\textsuperscript{34} The proposed bill applies to companies where those same foreign entities own substantial investments.

\textbf{Has any court decided how much foreign ownership of a corporation renders a corporation “foreign” for purposes of First Amendment analysis?} No. That issue was not before the Supreme Court in \textit{Citizens United}, and the Court expressly decided \textit{not} to decide that question.\textsuperscript{35} The majority opinion did make a passing reference to corporations “funded predominately by foreign shareholders” as

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\item\textsuperscript{31} United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2019).
\item\textsuperscript{32} \textit{See Bluman}, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (collecting Supreme Court cases upholding limits on noncitizen employment in a wide variety of local positions); 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (banning issuance of broadcast or common carrier license to companies under minority foreign ownership).
\item\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} at 285.
\item\textsuperscript{34} 52 U.S.C. § 30121, formerly codified as 2 U.S.C. § 441e.
\item\textsuperscript{35} \textit{See Citizens United}, 558 U.S. at 362.
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the type of issue that the decision was not addressing. This is what lawyers call “dictum”—something mentioned in a judicial opinion that is not part of its holding. Similarly, in Bluman, Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “[b]ecause this case concerns individuals, we have no occasion to analyze the circumstances under which a corporation may be considered a foreign corporation for purposes of First Amendment analysis.”

For purposes of political spending, the question of how much foreign ownership is “too much” has not yet been decided by any court.

The analysis in the main part of the above memorandum shows how arguably any foreign ownership renders the entire pool of corporate funds foreign. However, the bill focuses more narrowly on corporations where foreign holdings exceed thresholds, established from empirical corporate governance research, where investors can exert influence on executives’ decisions.

Notably, the Seattle Clean Campaigns Act (the model upon which this bill is based) has been in effect since February 2020, including the vigorously contested 2021 citywide election featuring an expensive mayoral race, yet none of the many multinational corporations in Seattle have been impelled to challenge it.

**Do corporations know who their shareholders are?**

Managers of privately held corporations may know the identity of all shareholders at all times. Managers of publicly traded corporations do not know moment to moment, but can obtain a complete list of shareholders and number of shares owned for any particular “record date.” They do this on a regular basis for routine corporate purposes, such as the corporate annual meeting. For more detail, see the letter from Professor John C. Coates IV of Harvard Law School, a former General Counsel and Director of the Division of Corporate Finance at the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission.

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36 *Bluman*, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 n.4.
How many companies would be covered by the bill?
Foreign investment in U.S. companies has increased dramatically in recent years: “from about 5% of all U.S. corporate equity (public and private) in 1982 to more than 20% in 2015.” By 2019, that figure had increased to 40%. However, foreign ownership is not evenly distributed. Analysis by the Center for American Progress found that the thresholds in this bill would cover 98% of the companies listed on the S&P 500 index, but only 28% of the firms listed on the Russell Microcap Index—among the smallest companies that are publicly traded.

It is much more difficult to obtain data regarding ownership of privately held companies. Intuition suggests that the vast majority of small local businesses have zero foreign ownership.

Does the bill violate the rights of U.S. investors?
No. Obviously, individual U.S. investors may spend unlimited amounts of their own money on elections.

The question might be framed as whether the bill restricts the ability of U.S. investors to spend their money through the vehicle of a corporation in which they share ownership with foreign investors. At the outset, the assumption embedded in this framework is somewhat unrealistic: few if any U.S. investors buy stock in a for-profit business entity with the expectation that, the corporation will engage in regulated political campaign spending. But even if so, any right to invest in a corporation with that expectation is limited by valid restrictions imposed on the other co-owners of the corporation, namely, foreign investors. Any impact on U.S. investors who have chosen to invest jointly with foreign investors is incidental to the primary purpose of preventing foreign influence.


41 See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 451, 451 (2019) (noting that for many American investors, corporate political spending “has no rational connection to their reason for investing”).
By analogy, in upholding a State Department order to shut down a foreign mission even though it had U.S. citizen and permanent resident employees, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted: “[The order] does not prevent [plaintiffs] from advocating the Palestinian cause, nor from expressing any thought or making any statement that they could have made before its issuance. The order prohibits [them] only from speaking in the capacity of a foreign mission of the PLO.”

Similarly, the U.S. investors can spend their money directly on political campaigns, or they can invest in a different corporation that is not foreign-influenced and which may spend treasury funds on political campaigns. If corporate political spending can be described as partly the speech of U.S. investors, then the bill prohibits them only from speaking in the capacity of investors in a foreign-influenced corporation.

Finally, the question could be framed as involving freedom of association for those U.S. investors who “associate” with foreign investors in a corporation. But a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, written by Justice Kavanaugh, held that U.S. citizens cannot “export” or extend their own constitutional rights to foreign entities. In *Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc.*, the Court considered a statute that imposed speech-related conditions on funding. After first holding that the conditions violated the First Amendment rights of U.S. funding recipients, the Court then rejected a constitutional challenge on behalf of the foreign entities with which those U.S. entities associated. The Court explained that U.S. entities “cannot export their own First Amendment rights” to the foreign entities with which they associate. The Court’s reasoning leads to the same result when U.S. entities associate with foreign nationals in the corporate form: the mere fact that U.S. citizens have the independent right to contribute and make expenditures does not mean that those rights will flow to any association they form.

What if a U.S. investor holds a majority or controlling share?
The danger of foreign participation remains. As corporate law expert Professor John Coates of Harvard Law School and his co-authors note:

A stylized and largely uncontested fact is that institutional shareholders—the most likely to be blockholders of U.S. public companies—are increasingly influential in the governance of those companies. Various changes in markets and regulation have increased the ability of such institutions to encourage, pressure or force boards to adopt policies and positions that twenty years ago would have been beyond their reach. Board members are spending increased amounts of time responding to and directly “engaging” with blockholders. While in

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43 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2088 (2020).
the past legal regimes tested “control” of foreign nationals at higher levels of ownership—majority voting power, or 25% blocks for example—those regimes may no longer catch the new forms of institutional influence.44

As it happens, federal communications law has been addressing a very similar issue for nearly 90 years. Since 1934, section 310 of the federal Communications Act has prohibited issuance of broadcast or common carrier licenses to companies with one-fifth foreign ownership.45 Obviously, that raises a similar issue: a company with one-fifth foreign ownership has four-fifths U.S. ownership. Yet, as Congress determined, the risks were too great even with a four-fifths U.S. owner.

It makes little sense to say that a corporation with 75% U.S. ownership is too foreign-influenced to own a small local terrestrial radio station with limited reach, but not too foreign-influenced to spend tens of millions of dollars on statewide elections. Put another way, a U.S. investor that owns a very large percentage of a company but has foreign co-investors may be better suited choosing a different investment vehicle for buying radio stations or for spending money in elections.

We are only aware of one constitutional challenge to Section 310 in its nearly 90-year-history—the challenge concerned a slightly different point, but the court upheld the provision.46 The same logic would apply to this bill.

What if the corporation takes proactive steps to ensure that foreign investors have no influence on corporate decision-making regarding political spending?
The issue is generally not that foreign investors are directly participating in corporate decision-making regarding political spending. In major corporations, most investors do not participate in day-to-day operational decisions.

Rather, the issue is that corporate executives are fully aware of their major investors, act with a fiduciary duty towards those investors, and tend to avoid taking action that they anticipate will displease those major investors. Among other

46 See Moving Phones P’ship LP v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying rational basis review because “[t]he opportunity to own a broadcast or common carrier radio station is hardly a prerequisite to existence in a community”). Other courts have upheld related provisions of the same act that are even more restrictive than section 310. See, e.g., Campos v. FCC, 650 F.2d 890, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) (upholding against constitutional challenge a Communications Act provision barring even permanent residents from holding radio operator licenses).
considerations, major investors have multiple options for influencing corporate
governance writ large: they can submit shareholder proxy resolutions; they can
attempt to replace directors on the board, and demand a change in management; in
publicly traded corporations, they can dump their shares, decreasing the value of
executives’ stock options; etc. Investors do not need to literally be in the conference
room debating specific political expenditures to exert an influence, any more than
voters need to be in the conference room during legislative debates to exert an
influence on elected officials.

A similar question has repeatedly arisen in the context of the Communications Act,
where partly-foreign-owned entities have sought broadcast or common carrier
licenses, claiming that they had developed contractual or other internal measures to
insulate decision-making from foreign partners or investors. Courts have
consistently rejected such challenges.47

47 See Cellwave Tel. Servs. LP v. FCC., 30 F.3d 1533, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(rejecting argument that FCC should have granted license to partly-foreign-owned
partnership because “the alien partners had insulated themselves by contract from
any management role in the partnerships”); Moving Phones P’ship L.P. v. FCC, 998
F.2d 1051, 1055-57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).

Does the bill apply to non-profits?
The bill indirectly applies to non-profits that receive contributions from business
entities. To prevent circumvention, the bill provides that any “person” (entity) that
receives a contribution from a business entity can only spend those funds on
political spending if the business entity also provided a certification that it is not
foreign-influenced. In other words, if the business entity donor provides a
certification that it is not foreign-influenced, then the recipient may spend the
money on political spending to the extent otherwise permitted by law; if the
business entity donor does not provide such a certification, then the recipient may
only use the donation for other (non-political) spending. This makes it harder for
foreign-influenced business entities to “launder” political spending through non-
profits or other intermediaries.

The bill does not apply to a non-profit that receives a contribution directly from a
foreign national; that situation is already substantially addressed by federal law.48
The gap that the bill aims to plug pertains to foreign investors in U.S. corporations;
there is no directly analogous gap in the law for non-profits.


Does the bill apply to labor unions?
No. The noncitizen, non-permanent resident workers who may be members of U.S.
labor unions are qualitatively different from the foreign entities that invest in U.S.
corporations. Almost without exception, immigrant workers in U.S. labor unions are
physically located in the United States, where they enjoy *most* rights under the U.S. Constitution; activities related to democratic self-government (including political spending) are the exception. By contrast, with rare exceptions, foreign investors in U.S. corporations are physically located abroad. Under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in *Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society*, foreign entities located abroad have *no rights whatsoever* under the U.S. Constitution. This weaker constitutional status of foreign entities located abroad makes the law more constitutionally defensible when limited to foreign-influenced business entities.

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49 A major source of foreign national investors who actually reside in the United States is the EB-5 Immigrant Investors Visa Program. Under this program, approximately 10,000 visas per year are issued to foreign investors who invest at least $500,000 in American businesses. Notably, an EB-5 visa grants “conditional permanent residence.” Since 52 U.S.C. § 3012(b)(2) defines a “foreign national” as someone “who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an EB-5 investor might not be considered a “foreign national” under 52 U.S.C. § 30121.