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**From:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 9:04 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney  
**Subject:** Accepted: EVS 6030 and 6110 - Conference Call with ES&S and Examiners

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Subject:** Additional Examiner Questions  
**Date:** Wednesday, September 2, 2020 8:52:55 AM

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Susan,

Brian had a couple of follow-up questions.

1. His first question was about the hash validation process. I sent him the files you provided both on exam day and as part of the package I received last week. The first part of the file paths listed below are the subfolders that I created to organize those files in our system after importing them from the USB drives you provided me (e.g. "EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/"), and I mentioned that fact to Brian. Here is his question:

I'm working through the hash verification process, and there are some items I'm still missing as well as some items I need further clarification on. In particular, I am missing the verification documents for 6.1.1.0.

Navigating through the folders, I can find what appear to be verification scripts and trusted hashes for 6.1.1.0, but they are not organized within a verification package similar to 6.0.3.0. For reference, the verification package for 6.0.3.0 was delivered to us under the path:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/Verification Docs and Scripts/ESSSYS\_6'0'3'0\_D\_VerificationPack/

The scripts and trusted hashes I can find for 6.1.1.0 are under paths similar to:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH DS200

I just want to make sure that those scripts and trusted hashes for 6.1.1.0 are the same ones that jurisdictions would receive as part of their verification package.

I also want to understand the origin of the trusted hashes for the EMS (i.e. how/when they were created), and that I am using the correct ones. For 6.0.3.0, there are two files that have "trusted" in the file name:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6030.txt  
EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/trusted\_hashes2.txt

and similarly for 6.1.10:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6110.txt  
EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/trusted\_hashes2.txt

2. His second question was about the installation process:

I would like ES&S provide some more background on the stick vs iono install hash discrepancy. In which document(s) does the VSTL acknowledge and accept the discrepancy? What documentation has been provided to customers related to the issue? Given that BMP files can be used to exploit systems [1], what applications read SYSLOAD.BMP and do those applications perform any actions to prevent an attack from a malicious BMP file?

[1] [https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/bmp\\_inspection\\_and\\_sanitization\\_guidance\\_v1\\_0-20171212.cfm](https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/bmp_inspection_and_sanitization_guidance_v1_0-20171212.cfm)

Please let me know when you've had an opportunity to review and respond to both of those questions and I will forward the responses back to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#); [Pearson, Steve](#); [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:51:49 PM

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Susan and Steve,

Can we set up a call sometime next week to discuss some issues raised by the examiners relating to the most recent exam? Christina and I have a few follow up questions that we'd like to discuss to get some clarification from you guys.

Is there a good time late Tuesday afternoon or on Thursday that would work for you all? Alternatively, we might be able to find some availability this weekend if we're unable to work out a time on either of those days.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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# Letter Report



To: Steve Pearson, Sue McKay – Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S)  
From: Wendy Owens - Pro V&V, Inc.  
CC: Jack Cobb, Stephen Han - Pro V&V, Inc.  
Date: October 1, 2020  
Subject: ES&S ExpressVote Hardware Version 1.0, Firmware Version 1.5.0.0 Update Process

---

Dear ES&S:

Pro V&V is providing this letter to report the results of the evaluation effort on the ES&S ExpressVote<sup>®</sup> hardware version 1.0, (ExpressVote HW1.0) firmware version 1.5.0.0 update process. An examination was performed to confirm that the update process utilized during the state evaluation contains identical executable files as those found in the trusted build and the process does not add any additional software to the ExpressVote HW1.0.

## Background

Pro V&V was contacted by ES&S to analyze an anomaly that occurred during a Texas state evaluation of the ExpressVote HW1.0 running firmware version 1.5.0.0. Pro V&V has also been in contact with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and Texas Secretary of State regarding this evaluation. During the evaluation, the “Update” process was attempted and a hash value mismatch error was displayed for the sysload.bmp file.

## Test Summary

Pro V&V compared the update disk image file to the prod\_release disk image file from the Trusted Build to ensure the update disk image file contained the same files from the Trusted Build. Pro V&V used the ExamDiff Pro application with the PESnoop 2.0 plug-in to compare all files. Three files were found to be in the update disk image that were not in the prod\_release disk image file. These files are listed below:

- InputOutputBoard.S19
- ScannerPrinterEngine.S19
- startup.exe

Pro V&V then compared the InputOutputBoard.S19 and ScannerPrinterEngine.S19 to the Trusted Build for EVS 6.0.0.0 where these artifacts were originally created. The SHA-256 hash values were the same as the files in the update disk image file. The startup.exe file was also hashed from EVS 6.0.0.0 and produced the following SHA-256 hash value:

startup.exe - 85f8d210ca9ad2433c4dbe154aee31f9d75968f908dc114e91adc26fd0f85731

Pro V&V then retrieved the sysload.bmp from EVS 5.2.2.0, as presented in Photograph 1.



Photograph 1: EVS 5.2.2.0 sysload.bmp

This file produces a SHA-256 value of the following:

sysload.bmp - b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3

The sysload.bmp file from EVS 6.0.2.0 was retrieved, as depicted in Photograph 2.



Photograph 2: EVS 6.0.2.0 sysload.bmp

This file produces a SHA-256 value of the following:

sysload.bmp - 07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12

In addition, Pro V&V upgraded a production EVS 5.2.2.0 ExpressVote HW1.0 device using an EVS 6.0.2.0 USB update image. Pro V&V followed the validation procedures detailed in the *Verification Procedure: ExpressVote Hardware 1.0* document to verify the hash values of all software on the device, noting the sysload.bmp verification was a mismatch. It was observed to have no impact on functionality.

After conducting this verification, Pro V&V loaded the EVS 6.0.2.0 prod\_release image onto an additional ExpressVote HW1.0 device via an Innodisk. Pro V&V then performed the same validation procedures outlined previously and noted there were no verification discrepancies.

### Conclusion

Based on the testing performed and the results obtained, it was verified that the only difference in the two products was the sysload.bmp file and no additional software was placed on the devices during the update process.

Should you require additional information or would like to discuss this matter further, please contact me at 256-713-1111.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Wendy Owens". The script is cursive and fluid.

Wendy Owens  
VSTL Program Manager

A solid black rectangular redaction box covering the contact information.

---

**Subject:** EVS 6030 and 6110 - Conference Call with ES&S and Examiners

**Start:** Tue 9/8/2020 1:00 PM

**End:** Tue 9/8/2020 1:30 PM

**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Organizer:** Charles Pinney

**Required Attendees:**

[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED];  
[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; Christina Adkins;  
[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

---

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**Texas Secretary of State**  
Ruth R. Hughes

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** EVS 6110 Documentation  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 2:26:41 PM  
**Attachments:** ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_Docs.zip

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Hi Chuck,

Attached please find a zip file containing the verification procedure documentation Brian requested during our call today. I will be sending a separate passcoded zip file that contains the verification pack containing the trusted hashes and call you to give you the passcode information once sent. Please forward both to Brian. Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  


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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** EVS 6110 Documentation  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 4:36:05 PM  
**Attachments:** EVS 6110 Docs\_zip.msg

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Hi Chuck,

Attached please find a zip folder that contains the EVS 6110 Verification Hash and Verification Script files from the event. Please forward to Brian per his request. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)

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**From:** [postmaster](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** EVS 6110 Docs\_zip

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### Attachment Notice

The following attachment was removed from the associated email message.

File Name
<b>EVS 6110 Docs.zip</b>
File Size
<b>2385181 Bytes</b>

Attachment management policies limit the types of attachments that are allowed to pass through the email infrastructure.

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Subject:** Examiner Question - Hash Validation  
**Date:** Tuesday, August 25, 2020 2:42:18 PM

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Susan,

Brian had a question about the hash validation and was wondering if you still had some of the export files from the exam. Here is his question:

I'm trying to run the hash verification process as documented, but it doesn't look like they provided the full set of system exports. For example, in Section 4.3.3 of the DS200 Verification Procedure, the reader is instructed to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since I don't have the physical media to mount in the way the instructions recommend, what I had done in the past was to emulate the environment on my own computer. A lot of that involved inspecting the verification scripts themselves to see where the data gets copied locally. The documentation within DS200-LoadExportFiles.sh says that it is looking for:

[REDACTED]

However, there are no .bz2 files among the data that Susan provided. I believe what we received from ES&S was an intermediate product, i.e. the hashes generated from the raw system exports. However, I would like to run the process end-to-end. Can you reach out to them to see if they still have those raw system exports?

Please let me know if you have any questions. Once I receive your response I will forward it back to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:50:08 AM  
**Attachments:** ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_DS450.pdf  
ATT00001.htm  
ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_ETOUCH.pdf  
ATT00002.htm  
ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_EVOTE\_HW1"0.pdf  
ATT00003.htm  
ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_EVOTEXL.pdf  
ATT00004.htm

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Resending

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Parmer, Susan" <[REDACTED]>  
**Date:** September 21, 2020 at 8:28:00 AM CDT  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** "Pearson, Steve" <[REDACTED]>, "Hallett, Tim" <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

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**From:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**To:** ["Pearson, Steve"](#)  
**Cc:** [Keith Ingram](#); [Adam Bitter](#); ["Parmer, Susan"](#)  
**Subject:** Letter  
**Date:** Thursday, September 24, 2020 2:39:26 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
ESS 6020 Letter - FINAL.pdf  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

---

Steve,

Please see the attached letter. Let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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# The State of Texas



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Phone: 512-463-5650  
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TTY: 7-1-1  
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Ruth R. Hughes  
Secretary of State

September 24, 2020

Steve Pearson  
Senior Vice President, Certification  
Election Systems & Software  
11208 John Galt Blvd.  
Omaha, Nebraska 68137

Dear Mr. Pearson:

In the course of the certification exam for EVS 6.0.3.0, one of the independent examiners from our office observed an issue resulting from an installation method that had not been certified by the EAC or by our office.

According to the observations of the examiners and the responses provided by your team, this issue only occurred in ExpressVote 1.0 devices, and only in situations where the installation was performed using the "stick update" method rather than the "full Inno install" method. ExpressVote 2.1 devices and other components of the system were not affected, and ExpressVote 1.0 devices that had the system installed using the full Inno install method were also not affected by this issue. Though the issue was isolated to this specific hardware when the installation was performed using this stick update method, our examiner noted that this issue could create a potential security vulnerability as a proper software validation could not occur. Our examiner recommended that installations of this system only be performed using the full Inno install method, so as to prevent this issue from occurring on those ExpressVote 1.0 devices.

In the course of our discussions with the examiners and your team regarding this issue, you also noted that this installation method had been used for the EVS 6.0.2.0 system, and that the same issue would present itself on ExpressVote 1.0 devices installed with EVS 6.0.2.0 using the stick update installation method. You have since confirmed that this installation method was not presented to the Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") as part of the certification for EVS 6.0.2.0.

Our office requested that you identify the counties where this uncertified installation method was used for the EVS 6.0.2.0 system on their ExpressVote 1.0 devices, and you identified 18 Texas counties that currently use that system and for whom that installation method was used on those devices. While there is no indication that utilizing the uncertified installation method has resulted in any performance or security issues with the affected devices, it is inconsistent with how EVS 6.0.2.0 was certified and must be remediated.

As we emphasized during our call with you and your team yesterday, it is critical that ES&S act swiftly to address this issue. We appreciate your commitment to an expeditious resolution in advance of the November 3, 2020 election.

Thank you for agreeing to contact the counties immediately and committing to remedying this issue with their cooperation by the end of next week. While we recognize that a reinstallation process may delay the counties' ability to complete their ballot programming and logic and accuracy testing in the timeframes that they had originally envisioned, this process is necessary to ensure that the affected devices are used in a manner certified by the EAC and the Secretary of State's office. To that end, we were pleased to hear that ES&S was already developing a detailed plan for coordinating with the affected counties and completing the reinstallations in this timeframe.

You also agreed to provide our office with a list of the 18 counties and a description of your remediation efforts with each of those counties. In addition, by September 28, 2020, you need to notify us of the counties that will be completing the remediation process before the November 3, 2020 election.

Additionally, you have agreed to have a third-party perform a forensic analysis of the issues described and to provide a report detailing their findings to our office. This report must be submitted to our office by September 28, 2020.

When you contact the affected counties, you must also provide them with a copy of this letter.

We appreciate your efforts to resolve this situation. If you need anything from our office to help support the counties as they complete the reinstallation process, please let us know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Keith Ingram', with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Keith Ingram  
Director of Elections

**From:** [Mona Harrington](#)  
**To:** [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); [Linda Lamone](#); [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); [Kai Schon](#); [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); [King, Brad](#); [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); [Keith Ingram](#); [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); [Mark Goins](#); [Michael](#); [Amanda](#); [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [Amy Cohen](#); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); [Wayne Thorley](#); [Lori Augino](#); [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); [Reynolds, Leslie](#)  
**Cc:** [Kevin Rayburn](#); [Jerome](#)  
**Subject:** Notification to States- ES&S update and proposed plan  
**Date:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 6:35:03 PM  
**Attachments:** ESS ExpressVote 1.0 Trusted Build State LetterMH.pdf

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Please let me know if you have any concerns with the proposed plan. Also don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Respectfully Yours,

Mona Harrington

Mona Harrington

Executive Director

[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)

Mobile: (202)641-1346

United States Election Assistance Commission

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**U. S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION**  
**VOTING SYSTEM TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAM**  
1335 East West Highway, Suite 4300  
Silver Spring, MD 20910

October 1, 2020

**Sent via e-mail**

**Re: ExpressVote 1.0 Trusted Build**

Dear State Election Directors,

On September 23, 2020, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was notified by the Texas Secretary of State's (SOS) office that they discovered a hash value discrepancy with a voting system they were examining for certification, ES&S EVS 6.0.3.0. This hash value discrepancy was discovered on ExpressVote 1.0 when the Texas SOS staff exported the software files from the installation USB drive and the installation files from the trusted build and imported them into a 3<sup>rd</sup> party software tool, Ubuntu, which compared the two hash values and displayed the mismatched hash value.

It's important to note in this case that the states and their jurisdictions wouldn't have seen an automated hash value error displayed on the screen as there are two separate load processes, which makes it impossible to allow for the system to compare the two hashes and display an error message. Discovering the hash value discrepancy would require a manual process of comparison by reviewing the hash value from the Inno disk (inside the unit) which loads the entirety of the installation (all files), to the hash value from the USB drive (as it only loads the firmware).

Texas SOS representatives and ES&S representatives determined this validation error existed in EVS 6.0.2.0 as well. Both versions are certified by the EAC to VVSG 1.0 and EVS 6.0.2.0 is currently deployed in 43 counties in Texas. 18 of the 43 counties use a configuration of EVS 6.0.2.0 that includes the ExpressVote 1.0.

As part of EAC certification, manufacturers are required to submit system identification tools and procedures that use hashes to prove that the applications installed on a voting system exactly match the certified versions. ES&S explained that only one file was causing the hash validation error, a bitmap image file (SYSLOAD.BMP) with a copyright date that displays on the ExpressVote while booting up. ES&S further explained that the issue occurs only if a USB update method is used to update the version of the ExpressVote unit from a previous version. The reason the update method causes the issue is due to the fact that the USB drive is a quick installation method that is designed to ONLY update firmware, and because the bitmap file is not part of the firmware, the installation via the USB drive method didn't replace the bitmap file and left the old bitmap file on the system resulting in the hash discrepancy.

Texas contracted with the voting system test laboratory (VSTL) Pro V&V to verify ES&S' claim that the SYSLOAD.BMP file was the only change to the certified trusted build. Pro V&V performed a source code comparison of the EVS 6.0.2.0 update image disk file and the EVS 6.0.2.0 production release disk image file. Pro V&V confirmed that the only change was a bitmap file. Pro V&V upgraded an ExpressVote from EVS 5.2.2.0 to EVS 6.0.2.0, received a hash mismatch message as expected, and

performed functional testing on the upgraded ExpressVote. Pro V&V concluded that the hash mismatch error does not impact the functionality of the ExpressVote. Pro V&V's test report is attached to this letter.

Initially, we were under the impression that only EVS 6.0.2.0 systems in Texas were impacted. We requesting information from ES&S to better understand the scope and to date have received information that the states listed in Table 1 have at least one jurisdiction that may be affected. Please note that this information is current as of October 1, 2020. We will provide updated information as soon as it is received.

**Table 1**

<b>State</b>	<b># of Units</b>	<b>Status</b>
AL	105	Potentially affected
AR	2072	Potentially affected
AZ	496	Potentially affected
DC	102	Affected
FL	2893	Potentially affected
IA	532	Potentially affected
ID	346	Potentially affected
IN	731	Potentially affected
KS	1742	Potentially affected
KY	400	Affected
MD	3501	Likely unaffected
MI	548	Potentially affected
MO	538	Potentially affected
OH	168	Potentially affected
TN	671	Potentially affected
WA	3	Potentially affected
WI	667	Potentially affected
WY	20	Potentially affected

On September 29, 2020, we sent the following request to ES&S:

“In order to be in compliance with our Testing and Certification Program, we are requesting the following information. We may request additional information, and expect that you will disclose any other information that would assist us in understanding the scope of impact of any ES&S voting system regarding compliance with EAC certification.

1. The total number of jurisdictions throughout the United States affected including the jurisdiction name, contact information, and a list of affected devices including the system version information as well as serial numbers in each jurisdiction and when the installation occurred by ES&S personnel.

2. A detailed document providing a timeline of when this issue was first known and what ES&S is doing to remediate the issue.
3. All communication with the VSTLs regarding this issue.
4. An advisory notice specifying each EAC-certified voting system that uses the ExpressVote 1.0 and the ExpressVote's certified hashes and the mismatched hashes generated from the "update" file that has been installed on fielded devices.
5. All communication to the affected jurisdictions must represent the real facts regarding the circumstances.
6. Submit all documentation that supports your position regarding what you feel occurred.
7. A detailed document describing why ES&S disagrees with some of the statements the Texas Secretary of State's office made in their letter to ES&S dated September 24, 2020.
8. ES&S' plan to install EAC-certified software on the affected ExpressVotes in Texas.
9. ES&S' plan to install EAC-certified software on affected ExpressVotes as requested by jurisdictions.
10. ES&S' planned resolution, including a documented procedure, to ensure that this does not occur again.
11. ES&S' communication plan and any other documentation (timeline, FAQs) that will be distributed to the affected jurisdictions for review and approval by the EAC.
12. ES&S will communicate directly with the Executive Director or her designated representative and will cease to contact EAC employees throughout the duration of this investigation.

Finally, according to Section 5.15.4 of the Testing and Certification Program Manual, a manufacturer has 15 days from receipt of this letter to comply with the recommended corrective actions. However, due to the urgent nature of this issue and its impact on fielded, EAC-certified voting system 35 days before the 2020 General Election, we are requesting this information by close of business on October 1, 2020. We anticipate you immediately provide a written advisory of the situation to the states and localities impacted by this issue. We are requesting you utilize additional personnel and expend whatever resources necessary to install to provide an appropriate validated hash on identified EAC certified voting systems, resolving the issue upon request of the states. The EAC anticipates that we will review and re-test the software with incorrect hash validation in our accredited laboratories in the coming days and weeks. We anticipate your cooperation with this matter and working with the states and localities using the identified systems.

ES&S needs to be prepared to cooperate with the labs and EAC to provide complete test reports on each of the builds of different versions among the states that have an incorrect hash validation - so we have a complete record of testing results that confirms there is not any impact to accuracy, functionality, use, etc.

Failure to comply will result in the EAC taking immediate required action as it deems appropriate as the system no longer complies with its original certification, including but not limited to initiating decertification actions and/or suspension of manufacturer registration.

We are taking this matter very seriously and understand that ES&S does as well and appreciate a prompt response given the nature of this issue."

We will request that ES&S submit all update image files and voting system configurations to VSTLs for examination via our de minimis change process. Table 2 displays all affected EVS voting systems, firmware versions, and hash values of the production trusted build.

**Table 2**

<b>EVS Release</b>	<b>FW Version</b>	<b>Copyright YRS</b>	<b>Hash Value</b>
FL EVS 4500v4	1.2.3.0	2011 - 2013	f67dbc52fe9c5e65ad786740ca07388e864fc00aaabcb6e0169b44c485356101
EVS 5200 EVS 5300 EVS 5303 IL EVS 5300 EVS 5201 EVS 5202 EVS 5203 EVS 5204	1.4.0.0	2011 - 2014	e173f1a084bb5fac2e19962aeb4f6ecd529e30cc9b0a64411cda80e4b4089686
EVS 5210 EVS 5310	1.4.1.0	2011 - 2015	de99ddc620c6260e5e4dd4d26486b82f8a5c2297fc5169b31607b61563f974de
EVS 5211	1.4.1.1	2011 - 2016	b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3
EVS 5220 EVS 5320	1.4.1.2	2011 - 2016	b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3
EVS 5321 EVS 5230 EVS 5330	1.4.1.6	2011 - 2017	ff4c1b668dbda1e7b23ba41547c62b53385afc836fd60717bc04739d9383b2aa
EVS 5240 EVS 5340 EVS 5241 EVS5341	1.4.1.7	2011 - 2018	07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12
FL EVS 4520v1	1.4.2.0	2011 - 2015	de99ddc620c6260e5e4dd4d26486b82f8a5c2297fc5169b31607b61563f974de
FL EVS 4530v1	1.4.3.0	2011 - 2017	ff4c1b668dbda1e7b23ba41547c62b53385afc836fd60717bc04739d9383b2aa
FL EVS 4530v2	1.4.3.1	2011 - 2018	07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12
EVS 6000 EVS 6010 EVS 6020 EVS 6030	1.5.0.0	2011 - 2018	07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12
EVS 6021 EVS 6030	1.5.1.0	2011 - 2018	07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12
EVS 6040 EVS 6043	1.5.2.0	2011 - 2018	07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12

EVS 6040 AZ	1.5.2.1	2011 - 2019	e39d71e88398beb836ee95973be1daec2bdbe091619891d8026fbf a15ae1798e
EVS 6050 EVS 6051	1.5.3.0	2011 - 2019	e39d71e88398beb836ee95973be1daec2bdbe091619891d8026fbf a15ae1798e

## Proposed Plan

We are asking ES&S to place all affected versions with the labs as a de minimus change. According to Section 3.4.2. of the EAC's Testing and Certification Manual, a de minimis change is defined as a change to a certified voting system's hardware, software, TDP, or data, the nature of which will not materially alter the system's reliability, functionality, capability, or operation. Under no circumstance shall a change be considered de minimis if it has reasonable and identifiable potential to impact the system's performance and compliance with the applicable voting Standard.

The bitmap file is "minor in nature and effect" and qualifies under section 3.4.1 for a change order.

The VSTLS will perform a thorough review of all source code in all affected versions and the EAC will receive reports on all versions.

The de minimus process will allow for election officials to have full assurance that the labs have thoroughly reviewed and compared all affected versions to the trusted build as part of the de minimus review.

We are requesting this effort be performed in an expedited manner and within a two week time frame. We will share our findings with you and keep you updated throughout the process.

In weighing the merits, we believe this is the most optimal solution given the non-substantive impact of the bitmap file issue that is causing the hash mismatch. This process will also allow for verification that the bitmap file is in fact the only change and will result in compliance with EAC's certification program.

This effort doesn't impact the state's/jurisdiction's ability to request ES&S to perform a clean full installation which would also resolve the hash value issue. Given the short time window left until the election, we wanted to implement a solution that resolves the issue for all while simultaneously allowing you to focus on all the hard work you are doing to run safe and secure elections.

Finally, this proposed plan is based on the information the EAC has right now. Should we learn new material information, we will modify the plan and take whatever steps are appropriate.

Sincerely,

*Mona Harrington*

Mona Harrington, Executive Director

cc:

Kevin Rayburn, General Counsel

Jerome Lovato Director, Voting System Testing and Certification

**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Additional Examiner Questions  
**Date:** Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:51:28 PM  
**Attachments:** [Verification Scripts&Trusted Hash Files.zip](#)

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Hi Chuck,

Hope your week is going well. Please forward my answers ([below in blue](#)) to Brian along with the attached .zip file. Hopefully this answers all his questions. Let me know if you need anything else. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

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**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 02, 2020 8:53 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Subject:** Additional Examiner Questions

Susan,

Brian had a couple of follow-up questions.

1. His first question was about the hash validation process. I sent him the files you provided both on exam day and as part of the package I received last week. The first part of the file paths listed below are the subfolders that I created to organize those files in our system after importing them from the USB drives you provided me (e.g. "EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/"), and I mentioned that fact to Brian. Here is his question:

I'm working through the hash verification process, and there are some items I'm still missing as well as some items I need further clarification on. In particular, I am missing the verification documents for [6110](#).

[Brian – If you are repeating the hash verification process for all of the hardware in both releases using Ubuntu and by following the procedures outlined in the Verification Procedure Guides for each piece of equipment, you should have all the files needed to complete this process now that I've provided all the FW Exports \(which were in the package sent via UPS to Chuck last week\).](#)

[If using Beyond Compare or similar utility for comparison, the Trusted Hash provided by the](#)

VSTL is located in the “[FINAL EXAM HASH XXXXX](#)” folder (where XXXXX is the specific piece of hardware, i.e. DS200, DS450, DS850...) and the Hash pulled from the specific piece of hardware is located in the “[output](#)” folder in that same location and labeled by serial number (i.e., DS200-DS0316370341\_Hash.txt).

Navigating through the folders, I can find what appear to be verification scripts and trusted hashes for [6.1.1.0](#), but they are not organized within a verification package similar to [6.0.3.0](#). For reference, the verification package for [6.0.3.0](#) was delivered to us under the path:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/Verification Docs and Scripts/ESSSYS\_6'0'3'0\_D\_VerificationPack/

The scripts and trusted hashes I can find for [6.1.1.0](#) are under paths similar to:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH DS200

I just want to make sure that those scripts and trusted hashes for [6.1.1.0](#) are the same ones that jurisdictions would receive as part of their verification package.

Brian – It is my understanding that Chuck created his own file path names for organizational purposes so they may not match what is actually sent to the TX jurisdictions. The jurisdictions receive the ESSSYS\_6.1.1.1\_D\_VerificationPack.zip file which contains four folders: 1. Election Definitions 2. EMS SecureSetup 3. Trusted Hash Files 4. Verification Scripts. I’m attaching folders 3 & 4 to this email as those are the documents you need for the hash verification process.

I also want to understand the origin of the trusted hashes for the EMS (i.e. how/when they were created), and that I am using the correct ones. For [6.0.3.0](#), there are two files that have "trusted" in the file name:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6030.txt

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/trusted\_hashes2.txt

and similarly for 6.1.1.0:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6110.txt

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/trusted\_hashes2.txt

Brian – The trusted hash for the EMS was created on Friday at the exam. (A jurisdiction would create the Trusted Hash once the certified software has been loaded to the specific laptop or server). The details concerning the process to generate the Trusted Hash File is located in [Appendix A Creating the EMS Trusted Hash File of the Verification Procedure: Election Management System](#) document.

The "Trusted Hash" created in Appendix A of that document is titled "TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6030.txt" for EVS 6.0.3.0 and "TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6110.txt" for EVS 6.1.1.0. Both of these files are located in the "output" folder from the Scripting USB files for the relevant EMS (i.e. EVS 6.0.3.0 and EVS 6.1.1.0). I had labeled those folders "FINAL EXAM HASH EMS" and within that folder there is a "final" folder and an "output" folder.

The "Verification Hash" is also copied to the "output" folder from the Scripting USB files and is titled "VerificationHash-EMS-client5580-6030.txt" or "VerificationHash-EMS-client5580-6110.txt" depending on the release.

Within the "final" folder there is a folder labeled "client5580-6030" (or "client5580-6110") and within that folder you will find the three files generated from the verification process: `ess_dynamic_final.txt`; `ess_static_final.txt`; and `non_ess_final.txt`. For both releases none of those files had any content, which, in accordance with Section 3.4 Analyzing Results, shows the verification process was successful and the Trusted Hash matched the Verification Hash.

## 2. His second question was about the installation process:

I would like ES&S provide some more background on the stick vs inno install hash discrepancy. In which document(s) does the VSTL acknowledge and accept the discrepancy? What documentation has been provided to customers related to the issue? Given that BMP files can be used to exploit systems [1], what applications read SYSLOAD.BMP and do those applications perform any actions to prevent an attack from a malicious BMP file?

[1] [https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/bmp\\_inspection\\_and\\_sanitization\\_guidance\\_v1\\_0-20171212.cfm](https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/bmp_inspection_and_sanitization_guidance_v1_0-20171212.cfm)

Brian –There is no specific written documentation on this that I can provide, but, during the verification testing phase, the mis-match was recognized and acknowledged and contributed to the copyright year image not being included as a standard file in that release, and as I stated in my previous response, this issue was addressed in later versions. Accordingly, when the ExpressVote 1.0 units are updated with an update stick in the EVS 6.0.3.0 release, the file mismatch will always occur; however, is still considered a match if this is the specific and only file that comes up as a mismatch during verification. If a Full inno install is done on the ExpressVote 1.0 in the EVS 6.0.3.0 release, it will have the SYSLOAD.BMP file and the verification hash will always match.

In regard to how we have communicated this with our customers, ES&S Account Managers have discussed the above with all Texas jurisdictions when performing their hash verification using EVS 6.0.2.0 with a stick update for the ExpressVote 1.0 units.

In regard to your final question, the `sysload.bmp` image is only accessed by the bootloader, and it is the ES&S image with our copyright dates shown. It is used on boot, by the Operating System and the update process doesn't touch the OS files or files used by it (i.e. `sysload.bmp`) so there is little concern with regard to the possibility of a malicious attack resulting from the

upgrade process. Any other modification to that file would also produce a mis-match and be flagged by the export process, providing the information needed to verify the file and detect an external attack.

Please let me know when you've had an opportunity to review and respond to both of those questions and I will forward the responses back to the examiners.

**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Additional Examiner Questions  
**Date:** Thursday, September 3, 2020 9:12:08 AM

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Susan,

Thank you for providing those responses. I did receive the attachment as well, and provided that along with the responses to Brian and the other examiners.

I will let you know if they have any additional questions. Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions for me.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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*The information contained in this email is intended to provide advice and assistance in election matters per §31.004 of the Texas Election Code. It is not intended to serve as a legal opinion for any matter. Please review the law yourself, and consult with an attorney when your legal rights are involved.*

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**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:27 PM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Additional Examiner Questions

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[REDACTED]

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EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6030 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/trusted\_hashes2.txt

and similarly for 6.1.10:

EVS 6030 and 6110 - Exam Reports and Logs/Exam Reports and Logs/EVS 6110 Hashes/FINAL EXAM HASH EMS/output/TrustedHash-EMS-client5580-6110.txt  
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In which document(s) does the VSTL acknowledge and accept the discrepancy? What documentation has been provided to customers related to the issue? Given that BMP files can be used to exploit systems [1], what applications read SYSLOAD.BMP and do those applications perform any actions to prevent an attack from a malicious BMP file?

[1] [https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/bmp\\_inspection\\_and\\_sanitization\\_guidance\\_v1\\_0-20171212.cfm](https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/bmp_inspection_and_sanitization_guidance_v1_0-20171212.cfm)

Brian –There is no specific written documentation on this that I can provide, but, during the verification testing phase, the mis-match was recognized and acknowledged and contributed to the copyright year image not being included as a standard file [in that release](#), and as I stated in my previous response, this issue was addressed in later versions. Accordingly, when the ExpressVote 1.0 units are updated [with an update stick](#) in the EVS 6.0.3.0 release, the file mismatch will always occur; however, is still considered a match if this is the [specific and only](#) file that comes up as a mismatch during verification. If a Full inno install is done on the ExpressVote 1.0 in the EVS 6.0.3.0 release, it will have the SYSLOAD.BMP file and the verification hash will always match.

In regard to how we have communicated this with our customers, ES&S Account Managers have discussed the above with all Texas jurisdictions when performing their hash verification using EVS 6.0.2.0 with a stick update for the ExpressVote 1.0 units.

In regard to your final question, the sysload.bmp image is only accessed by the bootloader, and it is the ES&S image with our copyright dates shown. It is used on boot, by the Operating System and the update process doesn't touch the OS files or files used by it (i.e. sysload.bmp) so there is little concern with regard to the possibility of a malicious attack resulting from the upgrade process. Any other modification to that file would also produce a mis-match and be flagged by the export process, providing the information needed to verify the file and detect an external attack.

Please let me know when you've had an opportunity to review and respond to both of those questions and I will forward the responses back to the examiners.

**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#); [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Bcc:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 1:31:07 PM

---

This is the advisory Christina was referring to during the call: <https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2019-23.shtml>

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:36 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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That's helpful. Thanks Chuck. Appreciate your quick response.

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan,

The main issue we will need to discuss today is the hash validation issues associated with EVS 6020 and 6030. Brian's last few questions illustrate the basic issues that we'll be discussing as part of that so you may want to refer back to those questions and responses.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**  
Attorney -- Elections Division  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701  
[1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)  
[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov/elections](http://www.sos.texas.gov/elections)



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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:17 AM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

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O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>;

Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan and Steve,

Can we set up a call sometime next week to discuss some issues raised by the examiners relating to the most recent exam? Christina and I have a few follow up questions that we'd like to discuss to get some clarification from you guys.

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Alternatively, we might be able to find some availability this weekend if we're unable to work out a time on either of those days.

Thanks,

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:36:41 AM

---

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That's helpful. Thanks Chuck. Appreciate your quick response.

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](tel:4029381305) | [F: 402 970-1275](tel:4029701275) | [C: 712-310-2586](tel:7123102586)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:17 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
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O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>  
Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan and Steve,

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Cc:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:30:27 AM

---

Susan,

The main issue we will need to discuss today is the hash validation issues associated with EVS 6020 and 6030. Brian's last few questions illustrate the basic issues that we'll be discussing as part of that so you may want to refer back to those questions and responses.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division  
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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:17 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>;  
Christina Adkins <CADkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan and Steve,

Can we set up a call sometime next week to discuss some issues raised by the examiners relating to the most recent exam? Christina and I have a few follow up questions that we'd like to discuss to get some clarification from you guys.

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Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:17:24 AM

---

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O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>

Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#); [Pearson, Steve](#); [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Cc:** [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Monday, September 7, 2020 2:40:49 PM

---

Susan,

That time will work for us and for the examiners. I just sent you, Steve, and Tim an invite to a Microsoft Teams meeting with Christina and I along with the examiners.

Let me know if you have any issues accessing that meeting invite, otherwise we will talk to you all on the call tomorrow.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 5:30 PM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>; Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Hallett, Tim <[tjhallett@essvote.com](mailto:tjhallett@essvote.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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Hi Chuck,

We will make time on Tuesday as we would like to get all final questions answered at the earliest opportunity so that the examiners may be able to complete their reports in a timely manner. How about Tuesday at 1 p.m.? Please send out a Teams invite if this time works for you, Christina and the examiners. Thanks!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Pearson, Steve [REDACTED];  
Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan and Steve,

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#); [Pearson, Steve](#); [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Cc:** [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Friday, September 4, 2020 5:31:12 PM

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We will make time on Tuesday as we would like to get all final questions answered at the earliest opportunity so that the examiners may be able to complete their reports in a timely manner. How about Tuesday at 1 p.m.? Please send out a Teams invite if this time works for you, Christina and the examiners. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]  
Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan and Steve,

Can we set up a call sometime next week to discuss some issues raised by the examiners relating to the most recent exam? Christina and I have a few follow up questions that we'd like to discuss to get some clarification from you guys.

Is there a good time late Tuesday afternoon or on Thursday that would work for you all?  
Alternatively, we might be able to find some availability this weekend if we're unable to work out a time on either of those days.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#); [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 2:49:38 PM

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Thank you Chuck!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 1:31 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Pearson, Steve [REDACTED];  
Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

This is the advisory Christina was referring to during the call: <https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2019-23.shtml>

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:36 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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That's helpful. Thanks Chuck. Appreciate your quick response.

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan,

The main issue we will need to discuss today is the hash validation issues associated with EVS 6020 and 6030. Brian's last few questions illustrate the basic issues that we'll be discussing as part of that so you may want to refer back to those questions and responses.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 11:17 AM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

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Good morning Chuck. Are any of the "issues" the examiners want to discuss related to anything I may need additional resources on the call for? I would really like to get all questions answered and hope this discussion answers all questions so if you feel any of the issues they are planning on asking about are over my head, I'd like to make sure I have someone that can speak to it on the call and not have to schedule another call later in the week. Can you provide any additional details on any of these things?

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Friday, September 4, 2020 4:52 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Pearson, Steve [REDACTED];

Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Call on EVS 6030 and 6110

Susan and Steve,

Can we set up a call sometime next week to discuss some issues raised by the examiners relating to the most recent exam? Christina and I have a few follow up questions that we'd like to discuss to get some clarification from you guys.

Is there a good time late Tuesday afternoon or on Thursday that would work for you all? Alternatively, we might be able to find some availability this weekend if we're unable to work out a time on either of those days.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Subject:** Re: EVS 6110 Documentation  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 5:02:20 PM

---

Susan,

I received both attachments and have sent them to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701  
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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 4:39 PM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: EVS 6110 Documentation

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Our IT group is pushing the attachment through (as our mimecast keeps removing the attachment) so please confirm one you have received both zip files I sent you this afternoon. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](tel:4029381305) | [F: 402 970-1275](tel:4029701275) | [C: 712-310-2586](tel:7123102586)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 8, 2020 4:36 PM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** EVS 6110 Documentation

Hi Chuck,

Attached please find a zip folder that contains the EVS 6110 Verification Hash and Verification Script files from the event. Please forward to Brian per his request. Thanks!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Examiner Question - Hash Validation  
**Date:** Wednesday, August 26, 2020 9:03:35 AM

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Those exports will arrive at your office by 10:30 am tomorrow. Please deliver them to Brian promptly upon delivery. Thanks!

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 26, 2020, at 8:46 AM, Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]> wrote:

Good Morning Chuck,

I can provide those raw system exports and will overnight the actual USBs containing those exports so you have them by tomorrow morning as they are too large to send via email. This will allow Brian to run the process end-to-end as he is requesting; however, that is the process I ran at the event on Friday and the files I provided at that time are the files the examiners needed to verify the firmware loaded on the hardware used during the exam matched the trusted hash provided by ProV&V. Please forward the exports to Brian once you receive them tomorrow morning so he can replicate and verify the processes I ran on Friday.

Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 25, 2020 2:42 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Examiner Question - Hash Validation

Susan,

Brian had a question about the hash validation and was wondering if you still had some of the export files from the exam. Here is his question:

I'm trying to run the hash verification process as documented, but it doesn't look like they provided the full set of system exports. For example, in Section 4.3.3 of the DS200 Verification Procedure, the reader is instructed

Since

I don't have the physical media to mount in the way the instructions recommend, what I had done in the past was to emulate the environment on my own computer. A lot of that involved inspecting the verification scripts themselves to see where the data gets copied locally. The documentation within [DS200-LoadExportFiles.sh](#) says that it is looking for:

However, there are no .bz2 files among the data that Susan provided. I believe what we received from ES&S was an intermediate product, i.e. the hashes generated from the raw system exports. However, I would like to run the process end-to-end. Can you reach out to them to see if they still have those raw system exports?

Please let me know if you have any questions. Once I receive your response I will forward it back to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Question - Hash Validation  
**Date:** Wednesday, August 26, 2020 8:47:15 AM

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Good Morning Chuck,

I can provide those raw system exports and will overnight the actual USBs containing those exports so you have them by tomorrow morning as they are too large to send via email. This will allow Brian to run the process end-to-end as he is requesting; however, that is the process I ran at the event on Friday and the files I provided at that time are the files the examiners needed to verify the firmware loaded on the hardware used during the exam matched the trusted hash provided by ProV&V. Please forward the exports to Brian once you receive them tomorrow morning so he can replicate and verify the processes I ran on Friday.

Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 25, 2020 2:42 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Examiner Question - Hash Validation

Susan,

Brian had a question about the hash validation and was wondering if you still had some of the export files from the exam. Here is his question:

I'm trying to run the hash verification process as documented, but it doesn't look like they provided the full set of system exports. For example, in Section 4.3.3 of the DS200 Verification Procedure, the reader is instructed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since I don't have the physical media to mount in the way the instructions recommend, what I had done in the past was to emulate the environment on my own computer. A lot of that involved inspecting the verification scripts themselves to see where the data gets copied locally. The documentation within [DS200-](#)

[LoadExportFiles.sh](#) says that it is looking for:



However, there are no .bz2 files among the data that Susan provided. I believe what we received from ES&S was an intermediate product, i.e. the hashes generated from the raw system exports. However, I would like to run the process end-to-end. Can you reach out to them to see if they still have those raw system exports?

Please let me know if you have any questions. Once I receive your response I will forward it back to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Examiner Question - Hash Validation  
**Date:** Wednesday, August 26, 2020 9:09:58 AM

---

Susan,

That will work, and I will forward them to Brian once I receive them.

FYI, I will be travelling and working remotely starting this weekend through the first half of September, so if possible I would prefer digital transmission of any other files that we need to relay to the examiners. If physical copies are the only available option, then I can make arrangements to have someone else in my office handle the distribution, but a digital option would be preferable if possible so that I can ensure that those files are quickly distributed.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Sent:** Wednesday, August 26, 2020 9:03 AM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Re: Examiner Question - Hash Validation

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Those exports will arrive at your office by 10:30 am tomorrow. Please deliver them to Brian promptly upon delivery. Thanks!

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 26, 2020, at 8:46 AM, Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

wrote:

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Thanks!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 25, 2020 2:42 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Examiner Question - Hash Validation

Susan,

Brian had a question about the hash validation and was wondering if you still had some of the export files from the exam. Here is his question:

I'm trying to run the hash verification process as documented, but it doesn't look like they provided the full set of system exports. For example, in Section 4.3.3 of the DS200 Verification Procedure, the reader is instructed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] nce  
I don't have the physical media to mount in the way the instructions recommend, what I had done in the past was to emulate the environment on my own computer. A lot of that involved inspecting the verification scripts themselves to see where the data gets copied locally. The documentation within [DS200-LoadExportFiles.sh](#) says that it is looking for:

[REDACTED]



However, there are no .bz2 files among the data that Susan provided. I believe what we received from ES&S was an intermediate product, i.e. the hashes generated from the raw system exports. However, I would like to run the process end-to-end. Can you reach out to them to see if they still have those raw system exports?

Please let me know if you have any questions. Once I receive your response I will forward it back to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Question from Today's Exam  
**Date:** Monday, August 24, 2020 3:00:43 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

---

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Hi Chuck,

Thanks again for all your help last week. I wanted to follow up on those things that we discussed after the event on Friday.

With regard to Tom's question on whether or not the database formats (a.k.a. schemas) are identical for the EVS [6.0.3.0](#), EVS [6.1.1.0](#), and their immediate predecessors please forward the following response:

Schemas between EVS 6030 and EVS 6110, are not identical given the audio prompts are different as well as the fact that EVS 6030 is on a Windows 7 OS whereas EVS 6110 is on a Windows 10 OS. Although a change in operating system doesn't necessarily have much to do with the schemas, the general development between the versions on the different operating systems would cause the schemas of those two versions to change regularly.

However, EVS 6020 to EVS 6030 are identical and EVS 6100 to EVS 6110 are identical. We didn't update the audio prompts or change the databases version # between either of these releases. That's how or why we can use an EVS 6020 backup election and restore it into EVS 6030 and we can use an EVS 6100 backup election and restore it into EVS 6110.

I also wanted to give you a little additional information to provide to Brian when you send him the hash verifications I provided on Friday. As I mentioned all hashes pulled from the hardware matched the trusted hashes and when Brian runs his own comparison, all will match exactly with the exception of one.

The hash pulled from the EVS 6030 ExpressVote 1.0 pulls a SYSLOAD.BMP file (which is the bitmap that displays the copyright year and was NOT a standard file included in the updates of the earlier ExpressVote versions.) This was addressed in later versions but not in the earlier EVS 6020 version, so even when the VSTL tested and pulled the hash, they received the same mis-match on verification. The SYSLOAD.BMP file that is pulled is as follows:

SYSLOAD.BMP

No Match Found

File: SHA256(/part1/SYSLOAD.BMP)

Hash: b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3

Static file – when the ExpressVote 1.0 units are updated with the update stick, the above file mismatch will always occur. If a Full inno install is done, it will have the SYSLOAD.BMP file and the verification will match. As you know, we did the stick update at the event and not a full inno install. The VSTL noted this in EVS 6020 and EVS 6030 while running the Verifications during the testing phase on the ExpressVote 1.0 and considers it a match if this is the only file that comes up as a mismatch during verification.

Please let me know if any of the examiners have any additional questions. I will be on PTO the rest of the week but will respond to any emails I see come in from you so I can get a prompt response back to you on anything that may be needed.

Thanks for all your help! Have a great week!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, August 21, 2020 4:34 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Subject:** Examiner Question from Today's Exam

**Sensitivity:** Personal

Hey Susan,

Jim had a follow-up question from today's exam:

- Are the database formats (a.k.a. schemas) identical for the EVS [6.0.3.0](#), EVS [6.1.1.0](#), and their immediate predecessors?

Please let me know when you have a response and I will provide it to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

[1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov/elections](http://www.sos.texas.gov/elections)



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**From:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**To:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Examiner Question from Today's Exam  
**Date:** Monday, August 24, 2020 3:10:59 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

---

Susan,

Thanks for getting back to me with this. I will forward these to the examiners and I'll let you know if they have any other questions.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701  
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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, August 24, 2020 3:00 PM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Question from Today's Exam

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Hi Chuck,

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File: SHA256(/part1/SYSLOAD.BMP)

Hash: b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3

Static file – when the ExpressVote 1.0 units are updated with the update stick, the above file mismatch will always occur. If a Full inno install is done, it will have the SYSLOAD.BMP file and the verification will match. As you know, we did the stick update at the event and not a full inno install. The VSTL noted this in EVS 6020 and EVS 6030 while running the Verifications during the testing phase on the ExpressVote 1.0 and considers it a match if this is the only file that comes up as a mismatch during verification.

Please let me know if any of the examiners have any additional questions. I will be on PTO the rest of the week but will respond to any emails I see come in from you so I can get a prompt response back to you on anything that may be needed.

Thanks for all your help! Have a great week!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, August 21, 2020 4:34 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Examiner Question from Today's Exam  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

Hey Susan,

Jim had a follow-up question from today's exam:

- Are the database formats (a.k.a. schemas) identical for the EVS [6.0.3.0](#), EVS [6.1.1.0](#), and their immediate predecessors?

Please let me know when you have a response and I will provide it to the examiners.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:46:52 AM  
**Attachments:** ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_DS450.pdf  
ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_ETOUCH.pdf  
ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_EVOTE\_HW1"0.pdf  
ESSSYS\_6"1"1"0\_D\_VerProc\_EVOTEXL.pdf

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Good morning Chuck,

Attached please find the Verification Procedure docs for the equipment we did not bring to the exam but that was included in the EVS 6.1.1.0 release. Please forward these documents to Brian per his request.

I will forward my response to Tom's EVS 6.0.3.0 question in a separate email. Please let me know if you need anything else or have any additional questions. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 20, 2020 8:58 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[\[REDACTED\]](#)>  
**Subject:** Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

Susan,

I have a few last-minute questions and document requests from the examiners before they submit their 6110 reports on Monday.

Brian's is probably the more time sensitive request, and he is requesting the verification procedure documentation for the other hardware models that we did not physically look at for EVS 6110:

Apologies for not noticing this earlier. I only have [6.1.1.0](#) Verification Procedure docs for the DS200, DS850, ExpressVote 2.1, and EMS. While those were the only docs needed for me to run their verification procedure on the exam exports, I like to be able to reference the whole set of documents in my reports.

If they are able to send those docs to me before noon on monday, that would give me

time to finalize and submit my report before close of business.

Tom had a separate question that relates more to the 6030 issue we've been discussing. I mentioned it over the phone but I was hoping to get a written response that I could pass on to the examiners:

Why can't ES&S include the correct sysload.bmp on the upgrade stick? If it is part of the full installation, why can't it be part of the upgrade?

Tom's question is a little less urgent, but if there's any way you can get that documentation for Brian before noon tomorrow then that would be helpful for his report.

Please let me know if you have any questions for me.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:46:11 AM

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I sent that first. Did you receive the email and not the attachments? Or just didn't receive the email period?

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 21, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Susan,

I'll pass that explanation along to Tom and the examiners, thank you for getting that back to me.

Is there any chance you'll be able to provide that verification documentation that Brian requested before he submits his 6110 report later this afternoon? I know we're operating on tight timelines at this point but I just wanted to check on that.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701  
[1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1.800.252.VOTE) (8683)  
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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:35 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

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Hi Chuck,

With regard to Tom's question below specific to EVS [6.0.3.0](#), please forward the following explanation from our product engineers:

The update function on the unit wasn't designed to update the SYSLOAD bitmap, or any other OS file. This image file happens to be the only OS file that was modified in order to update the copyright date in the EVS [6.0.2.0](#) and EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release(s). As such, when you use the usb update, that bitmap file is not included on the update image and is resulting in the expected hash validation mis-match when compared to the full internal drive image.

Please let me know if you need any additional information. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 20, 2020 8:58 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

Susan,

I have a few last-minute questions and document requests from the examiners before they submit their 6110 reports on Monday.

Brian's is probably the more time sensitive request, and he is requesting the

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Tom's question is a little less urgent, but if there's any way you can get that documentation for Brian before noon tomorrow then that would be helpful for his report.

Please let me know if you have any questions for me.

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**Chuck Pinney**

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:35:29 AM

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[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
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[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 20, 2020 8:58 AM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[\[REDACTED\]](#)>  
**Subject:** Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

Susan,

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:48:54 AM

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Good deal. Thanks!

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 21, 2020, at 8:48 AM, Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

I just received it now. I'm guessing it took a little time to make it through our email servers with the attachments.

Thank you for getting those back to us so quickly. I'll let you know if they have any other urgent follow-up questions.

Chuck

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:45 AM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Re: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

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I sent that first. Did you receive the email and not the attachments? Or just didn't receive the email period?

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 21, 2020, at 8:41 AM, Charles Pinney

<CPinney@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Susan,

I'll pass that explanation along to Tom and the examiners, thank you for getting that back to me.

Is there any chance you'll be able to provide that verification documentation that Brian requested before he submits his 6110 report later this afternoon? I know we're operating on tight timelines at this point but I just wanted to check on that.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

[1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 8:35 AM

**To:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim  
[REDACTED] >

**Subject:** RE: Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

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Hi Chuck,

With regard to Tom's question below specific to EVS [6.0.3.0](#), please forward the following explanation from our product engineers:

The update function on the unit wasn't designed to update the SYSLOAD bitmap, or any other OS file. This image file happens to be the only OS file that was modified in order to update the copyright date in the EVS [6.0.2.0](#) and EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release(s). As such, when you use the usb update, that bitmap file is not included on the update image and is resulting in the expected hash validation mis-match when compared to the full internal drive image.

Please let me know if you need any additional information. Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Sunday, September 20, 2020 8:58 AM

**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Subject:** Examiner Questions / Document Requests for EVS 6110

Susan,

I have a few last-minute questions and document requests from the examiners before they submit their 6110 reports on Monday.

Brian's is probably the more time sensitive request, and he is requesting the verification procedure documentation for the other hardware models that we did not physically look at for EVS 6110:

Apologies for not noticing this earlier. I only have [6.11.0](#) Verification Procedure docs for the DS200, DS850, ExpressVote 2.1, and EMS. While those were the only docs needed for me to run their verification procedure on the exam exports, I like to be able to reference the whole set of documents in my reports.

If they are able to send those docs to me before noon on Monday, that would give me time to finalize and submit my report before close of business.

Tom had a separate question that relates more to the 6030 issue we've been discussing. I mentioned it over the phone but I was hoping to get a written response that I could pass on to the examiners:

Why can't ES&S include the correct sysload.bmp on the upgrade stick? If it is part of the full installation, why can't it be part of the upgrade?

Tom's question is a little less urgent, but if there's any way you can get that documentation for Brian before noon tomorrow then that would be helpful for his report.

Please let me know if you have any questions for me.

Thanks,

**Chuck Pinney**

Attorney -- Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas  
78701

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**From:** [Pearson, Steve](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Cc:** [Adam Bitter](#); [Parmer, Susan](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Letter  
**Date:** Friday, October 2, 2020 2:17:55 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

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Keith and Christina,

I wanted to inform you that ES&S has completed the ExpressVote HW v1.0 upgrades in the eighteen counties identified as you requested. All work was completed on Thursday with no issues. They should all be good to go for November.

Let us know if you have any additional questions.

Regards,

Steve Pearson

---

**From:** Pearson, Steve

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:36 PM

**To:** 'Christina Adkins' <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Adam Bitter <[ABitter@sos.texas.gov](mailto:ABitter@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** RE: Letter

**Sensitivity:** Personal

Keith and Christina,

Please see attached response to your recent letter. I do want to inform you the upgrade plan described in our response is in progress and on schedule to complete by end of week. Let me know if you have any questions.

Regards,

Steve

**Steve Pearson**

**Sr. Vice President, Certification**

**Election Systems & Software | 11208 John Galt Blvd | Omaha, NE 68137**

**Direct: 402-970-1225 | Cell: 402-212-4660 | [REDACTED]**

[www.essvote.com](http://www.essvote.com)

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Thursday, September 24, 2020 2:39 PM

**To:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>; Adam Bitter <[ABitter@sos.texas.gov](mailto:ABitter@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Letter

**Sensitivity:** Personal

Steve,

Please see the attached letter. Let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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**From:** [Pearson, Steve](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Cc:** [Adam Bitter](#); [Parmer, Susan](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Letter  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 12:35:43 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
Keith Ingram Response Letter 9.28.20.pdf  
ES&S ExpressVote HW v1.0 Texas Customer List.pdf  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

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Keith and Christina,

Please see attached response to your recent letter. I do want to inform you the upgrade plan described in our response is in progress and on schedule to complete by end of week. Let me know if you have any questions.

Regards,

Steve

**Steve Pearson**

**Sr. Vice President, Certification**

**Election Systems & Software | 11208 John Galt Blvd | Omaha, NE 68137**

**Direct: 402-970-1225 | Cell: 402-212-4660 | [REDACTED]**

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---

**From:** Christina Adkins <CAkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, September 24, 2020 2:39 PM

**To:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED] >

**Cc:** Keith Ingram <KIngram@sos.texas.gov>; Adam Bitter <ABitter@sos.texas.gov>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Subject:** Letter

**Sensitivity:** Personal

Steve,

Please see the attached letter. Let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

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September 28, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL**

**KIngram@sos.texas.gov**

Keith Ingram

Director of Elections

Texas Secretary of State

Elections Division

P.O. Box 12060

Austin, TX 78711-2060

RE: EVS 6.0.2.0 ExpressVote HW v1.0 Units – Remediation Plan

Election Systems & Software, LLC (“ES&S”) respectfully submits its final remediation plan regarding all actions requested in your letter dated September 24, 2020. ES&S will complete a full reinstallation of the EVS 6.0.2.0 firmware on all ExpressVote HW v1.0 units in the affected counties to ensure the updated copyright splash screen bitmap file has been installed. Further, ES&S will engage an EAC accredited Voting System Test Lab (“VSTL”) to confirm that (1) the only file which was not included in the upgrade was the copyright splash screen bitmap file and (2) that the copyright splash screen bitmap file does not, in any way, impact the performance, security or accuracy of the ExpressVote unit.

Attached to this letter is a list of the 18 counties which we will perform a full reinstallation process for the EVS 6.0.2.0 ExpressVote HW v1.0 units located in each county. Please be advised that ES&S has contacted all 18 counties affected and will begin the reinstallation process in all 18 counties beginning Monday, September 28, 2020. ES&S has formed 6 teams, consisting of 22 technicians, who will cover the 717 ExpressVote HW v1.0 units located throughout those 18 counties and expects to complete the reinstallation process in all 18 counties by close of business on Friday, October 2, 2020.

In addition, ES&S has engaged the EAC accredited VSTL, Pro V&V, Inc., to perform an independent assessment confirming that the updated copyright splash screen bitmap file was the only file which was not included in the previous upgrade of the EVS 6.0.2.0 firmware on the ExpressVote 1.0 units as well as to confirm the updated copyright splash screen bitmap file does not, in any way, impact the performance, security or accuracy of the ExpressVote units. We are confident their assessment will be complete and their findings available for your review by the end of next week as well.

Finally, as requested, we will provide a copy of your September 24, 2020 letter to each of the 18 counties upon arrival.

If you have any questions regarding the above-referenced plan or need any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you for your continued efforts in assisting us in resolving this matter.



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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Steve M. Pearson', is written over a light blue horizontal line.

Steve M. Pearson

Sr. Vice President, Certification

Attachment: ES&S ExpressVote HW v1.0 Texas Customer List

cc: Christina Adkins (CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)

# State of Texas ExpressVote HW v1.0 Customer List

9/28/2020

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
1	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0116381226	1.5.0.0
2	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0116381241	1.5.0.0
3	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0116390002	1.5.0.0
4	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0116390250	1.5.0.0
5	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0116390377	1.5.0.0
6	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0116390396	1.5.0.0
7	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0117381435	1.5.0.0
8	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0117381450	1.5.0.0
9	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0117381456	1.5.0.0
10	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0117381494	1.5.0.0
11	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0117381503	1.5.0.0
12	Blanco County, Texas	Blanco	ExpressVote	EV0117381560	1.5.0.0
13	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360366	1.5.0.0
14	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360551	1.5.0.0
15	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360554	1.5.0.0
16	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360559	1.5.0.0
17	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360574	1.5.0.0
18	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360589	1.5.0.0
19	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360604	1.5.0.0
20	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360617	1.5.0.0
21	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360625	1.5.0.0
22	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360630	1.5.0.0
23	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360649	1.5.0.0
24	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360659	1.5.0.0
25	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360661	1.5.0.0
26	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360663	1.5.0.0
27	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360668	1.5.0.0
28	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360669	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
29	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360691	1.5.0.0
30	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360703	1.5.0.0
31	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360706	1.5.0.0
32	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360733	1.5.0.0
33	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360743	1.5.0.0
34	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360748	1.5.0.0
35	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360772	1.5.0.0
36	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360782	1.5.0.0
37	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360789	1.5.0.0
38	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360803	1.5.0.0
39	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360805	1.5.0.0
40	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360809	1.5.0.0
41	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360813	1.5.0.0
42	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360816	1.5.0.0
43	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360817	1.5.0.0
44	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0116360835	1.5.0.0
45	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117381440	1.5.0.0
46	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117381487	1.5.0.0
47	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390015	1.5.0.0
48	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390032	1.5.0.0
49	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390046	1.5.0.0
50	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390050	1.5.0.0
51	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390051	1.5.0.0
52	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390099	1.5.0.0
53	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390108	1.5.0.0
54	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390109	1.5.0.0
55	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117390131	1.5.0.0
56	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391063	1.5.0.0
57	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391064	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
58	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391065	1.5.0.0
59	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391067	1.5.0.0
60	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391071	1.5.0.0
61	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391072	1.5.0.0
62	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391073	1.5.0.0
63	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391077	1.5.0.0
64	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391078	1.5.0.0
65	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391081	1.5.0.0
66	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391082	1.5.0.0
67	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391083	1.5.0.0
68	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391087	1.5.0.0
69	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391091	1.5.0.0
70	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391097	1.5.0.0
71	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391104	1.5.0.0
72	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391107	1.5.0.0
73	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391110	1.5.0.0
74	Bowie County, Texas	Bowie	ExpressVote	EV0117391111	1.5.0.0
75	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116380975	1.5.0.0
76	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116380994	1.5.0.0
77	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116390066	1.5.0.0
78	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116390076	1.5.0.0
79	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116390165	1.5.0.0
80	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116390169	1.5.0.0
81	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116390189	1.5.0.0
82	Brewster County, Texas	Brewster	ExpressVote	EV0116390590	1.5.0.0
83	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390046	1.5.0.0
84	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390075	1.5.0.0
85	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390085	1.5.0.0
86	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390094	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
87	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390100	1.5.0.0
88	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390104	1.5.0.0
89	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390107	1.5.0.0
90	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390122	1.5.0.0
91	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390140	1.5.0.0
92	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390223	1.5.0.0
93	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390249	1.5.0.0
94	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390256	1.5.0.0
95	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390268	1.5.0.0
96	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390285	1.5.0.0
97	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390287	1.5.0.0
98	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390288	1.5.0.0
99	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390289	1.5.0.0
100	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390309	1.5.0.0
101	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390314	1.5.0.0
102	Carson County, Texas	Carson	ExpressVote	EV0116390319	1.5.0.0
103	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116360961	1.5.0.0
104	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370034	1.5.0.0
105	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370036	1.5.0.0
106	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370084	1.5.0.0
107	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370089	1.5.0.0
108	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370096	1.5.0.0
109	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370139	1.5.0.0
110	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370159	1.5.0.0
111	Childress County, Texas	Childress	ExpressVote	EV0116370215	1.5.0.0
112	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115350006	1.5.0.0
113	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115360411	1.5.0.0
114	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115361011	1.5.0.0
115	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115361072	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
116	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115370606	1.5.0.0
117	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115371911	1.5.0.0
118	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115370665	1.5.0.0
119	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0113350046	1.5.0.0
120	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0115341094	1.5.0.0
121	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340001	1.5.0.0
122	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340036	1.5.0.0
123	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340070	1.5.0.0
124	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340091	1.5.0.0
125	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340102	1.5.0.0
126	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340115	1.5.0.0
127	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340138	1.5.0.0
128	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340161	1.5.0.0
129	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340163	1.5.0.0
130	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340177	1.5.0.0
131	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116340180	1.5.0.0
132	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116350574	1.5.0.0
133	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116360874	1.5.0.0
134	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116360898	1.5.0.0
135	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116360906	1.5.0.0
136	Clay County, Texas	Clay	ExpressVote	EV0116360911	1.5.0.0
137	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380054	1.5.0.0
138	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380104	1.5.0.0
139	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380111	1.5.0.0
140	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380167	1.5.0.0
141	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380192	1.5.0.0
142	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380208	1.5.0.0
143	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380211	1.5.0.0
144	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380224	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
145	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380227	1.5.0.0
146	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380228	1.5.0.0
147	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380230	1.5.0.0
148	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380233	1.5.0.0
149	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380240	1.5.0.0
150	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380242	1.5.0.0
151	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380243	1.5.0.0
152	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380244	1.5.0.0
153	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380246	1.5.0.0
154	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380248	1.5.0.0
155	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380249	1.5.0.0
156	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380252	1.5.0.0
157	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380254	1.5.0.0
158	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380255	1.5.0.0
159	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380256	1.5.0.0
160	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380257	1.5.0.0
161	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380260	1.5.0.0
162	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380262	1.5.0.0
163	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380263	1.5.0.0
164	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380266	1.5.0.0
165	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380267	1.5.0.0
166	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380274	1.5.0.0
167	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380284	1.5.0.0
168	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380290	1.5.0.0
169	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380295	1.5.0.0
170	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380298	1.5.0.0
171	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380300	1.5.0.0
172	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380303	1.5.0.0
173	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380313	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
174	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380318	1.5.0.0
175	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380319	1.5.0.0
176	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380320	1.5.0.0
177	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380321	1.5.0.0
178	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380327	1.5.0.0
179	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380334	1.5.0.0
180	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380335	1.5.0.0
181	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380336	1.5.0.0
182	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380343	1.5.0.0
183	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380344	1.5.0.0
184	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380348	1.5.0.0
185	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380350	1.5.0.0
186	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380352	1.5.0.0
187	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380353	1.5.0.0
188	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380355	1.5.0.0
189	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380357	1.5.0.0
190	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380365	1.5.0.0
191	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380409	1.5.0.0
192	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380445	1.5.0.0
193	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380449	1.5.0.0
194	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380452	1.5.0.0
195	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380453	1.5.0.0
196	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380454	1.5.0.0
197	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380456	1.5.0.0
198	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380457	1.5.0.0
199	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380458	1.5.0.0
200	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380459	1.5.0.0
201	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380460	1.5.0.0
202	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380465	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
203	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380466	1.5.0.0
204	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380467	1.5.0.0
205	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380469	1.5.0.0
206	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380472	1.5.0.0
207	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380473	1.5.0.0
208	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380477	1.5.0.0
209	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380478	1.5.0.0
210	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380480	1.5.0.0
211	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380482	1.5.0.0
212	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380484	1.5.0.0
213	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380487	1.5.0.0
214	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380488	1.5.0.0
215	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380489	1.5.0.0
216	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380490	1.5.0.0
217	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380492	1.5.0.0
218	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380495	1.5.0.0
219	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380496	1.5.0.0
220	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380499	1.5.0.0
221	Erath County, Texas	Erath County	ExpressVote	EV0117380510	1.5.0.0
222	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117380714	1.5.0.0
223	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117380725	1.5.0.0
224	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117380958	1.5.0.0
225	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117380964	1.5.0.0
226	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117381050	1.5.0.0
227	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117381133	1.5.0.0
228	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117381137	1.5.0.0
229	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117381154	1.5.0.0
230	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117381162	1.5.0.0
231	Franklin County, Texas	Franklin	ExpressVote	EV0117381227	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
232	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390117	1.5.0.0
233	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390202	1.5.0.0
234	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390204	1.5.0.0
235	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390262	1.5.0.0
236	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390265	1.5.0.0
237	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390270	1.5.0.0
238	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390278	1.5.0.0
239	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390283	1.5.0.0
240	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390305	1.5.0.0
241	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390316	1.5.0.0
242	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390321	1.5.0.0
243	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116390328	1.5.0.0
244	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116391026	1.5.0.0
245	Hemphill County, Texas	Hemphill	ExpressVote	EV0116391028	1.5.0.0
246	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360394	1.5.0.0
247	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360401	1.5.0.0
248	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360497	1.5.0.0
249	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360577	1.5.0.0
250	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360618	1.5.0.0
251	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360655	1.5.0.0
252	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360682	1.5.0.0
253	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360699	1.5.0.0
254	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360755	1.5.0.0
255	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360764	1.5.0.0
256	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360766	1.5.0.0
257	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360774	1.5.0.0
258	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360801	1.5.0.0
259	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360807	1.5.0.0
260	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116360811	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
261	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116400043	1.5.0.0
262	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0116400479	1.5.0.0
263	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0117381413	1.5.0.0
264	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0117390399	1.5.0.0
265	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0117390574	1.5.0.0
266	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0117390685	1.5.0.0
267	Hockley County, Texas	Hockley	ExpressVote	EV0117390903	1.5.0.0
268	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380117	1.5.0.0
269	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380140	1.5.0.0
270	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380164	1.5.0.0
271	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380171	1.5.0.0
272	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380183	1.5.0.0
273	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380187	1.5.0.0
274	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380213	1.5.0.0
275	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380214	1.5.0.0
276	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380216	1.5.0.0
277	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380220	1.5.0.0
278	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380229	1.5.0.0
279	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380238	1.5.0.0
280	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380239	1.5.0.0
281	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380258	1.5.0.0
282	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380268	1.5.0.0
283	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117380278	1.5.0.0
284	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390506	1.5.0.0
285	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390663	1.5.0.0
286	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390772	1.5.0.0
287	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390889	1.5.0.0
288	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390890	1.5.0.0
289	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390892	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
290	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390894	1.5.0.0
291	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390896	1.5.0.0
292	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390905	1.5.0.0
293	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390908	1.5.0.0
294	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390914	1.5.0.0
295	Jackson County, Texas	Jackson	ExpressVote	EV0117390922	1.5.0.0
296	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380081	1.5.0.0
297	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380112	1.5.0.0
298	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380128	1.5.0.0
299	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380133	1.5.0.0
300	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380137	1.5.0.0
301	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380231	1.5.0.0
302	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380237	1.5.0.0
303	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380271	1.5.0.0
304	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380273	1.5.0.0
305	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380282	1.5.0.0
306	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380296	1.5.0.0
307	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380299	1.5.0.0
308	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380310	1.5.0.0
309	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380312	1.5.0.0
310	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380315	1.5.0.0
311	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380317	1.5.0.0
312	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380324	1.5.0.0
313	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380328	1.5.0.0
314	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380329	1.5.0.0
315	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380332	1.5.0.0
316	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380333	1.5.0.0
317	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380337	1.5.0.0
318	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380338	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
319	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380341	1.5.0.0
320	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380349	1.5.0.0
321	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380354	1.5.0.0
322	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380356	1.5.0.0
323	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380358	1.5.0.0
324	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380360	1.5.0.0
325	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380363	1.5.0.0
326	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380364	1.5.0.0
327	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380366	1.5.0.0
328	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380368	1.5.0.0
329	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380369	1.5.0.0
330	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380370	1.5.0.0
331	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380372	1.5.0.0
332	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380373	1.5.0.0
333	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380374	1.5.0.0
334	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380375	1.5.0.0
335	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380376	1.5.0.0
336	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380377	1.5.0.0
337	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380378	1.5.0.0
338	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380379	1.5.0.0
339	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380380	1.5.0.0
340	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380381	1.5.0.0
341	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380382	1.5.0.0
342	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380385	1.5.0.0
343	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380386	1.5.0.0
344	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380387	1.5.0.0
345	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380388	1.5.0.0
346	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380389	1.5.0.0
347	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380390	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
348	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380392	1.5.0.0
349	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380393	1.5.0.0
350	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380394	1.5.0.0
351	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380395	1.5.0.0
352	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380396	1.5.0.0
353	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380398	1.5.0.0
354	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380399	1.5.0.0
355	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380400	1.5.0.0
356	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380402	1.5.0.0
357	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380403	1.5.0.0
358	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380404	1.5.0.0
359	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380406	1.5.0.0
360	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380411	1.5.0.0
361	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380412	1.5.0.0
362	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380413	1.5.0.0
363	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380414	1.5.0.0
364	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380417	1.5.0.0
365	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380421	1.5.0.0
366	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380433	1.5.0.0
367	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380468	1.5.0.0
368	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380470	1.5.0.0
369	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380479	1.5.0.0
370	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380483	1.5.0.0
371	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380485	1.5.0.0
372	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380486	1.5.0.0
373	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380491	1.5.0.0
374	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380493	1.5.0.0
375	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380494	1.5.0.0
376	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380497	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
377	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380498	1.5.0.0
378	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380508	1.5.0.0
379	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380509	1.5.0.0
380	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380511	1.5.0.0
381	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380513	1.5.0.0
382	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380514	1.5.0.0
383	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380516	1.5.0.0
384	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380519	1.5.0.0
385	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380520	1.5.0.0
386	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380521	1.5.0.0
387	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380523	1.5.0.0
388	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380525	1.5.0.0
389	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380529	1.5.0.0
390	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380531	1.5.0.0
391	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380534	1.5.0.0
392	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380535	1.5.0.0
393	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380545	1.5.0.0
394	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380547	1.5.0.0
395	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380548	1.5.0.0
396	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380549	1.5.0.0
397	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380552	1.5.0.0
398	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380555	1.5.0.0
399	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380559	1.5.0.0
400	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380560	1.5.0.0
401	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380692	1.5.0.0
402	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380704	1.5.0.0
403	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380758	1.5.0.0
404	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380763	1.5.0.0
405	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380769	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
406	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380780	1.5.0.0
407	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380794	1.5.0.0
408	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380813	1.5.0.0
409	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380814	1.5.0.0
410	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380826	1.5.0.0
411	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380829	1.5.0.0
412	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380844	1.5.0.0
413	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380855	1.5.0.0
414	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380859	1.5.0.0
415	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380865	1.5.0.0
416	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380894	1.5.0.0
417	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380897	1.5.0.0
418	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380912	1.5.0.0
419	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380914	1.5.0.0
420	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380916	1.5.0.0
421	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380921	1.5.0.0
422	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380926	1.5.0.0
423	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380927	1.5.0.0
424	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380940	1.5.0.0
425	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380949	1.5.0.0
426	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380951	1.5.0.0
427	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380960	1.5.0.0
428	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380972	1.5.0.0
429	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380974	1.5.0.0
430	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380979	1.5.0.0
431	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380983	1.5.0.0
432	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380989	1.5.0.0
433	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380993	1.5.0.0
434	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117380994	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
435	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381007	1.5.0.0
436	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381024	1.5.0.0
437	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381027	1.5.0.0
438	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381033	1.5.0.0
439	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381035	1.5.0.0
440	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381043	1.5.0.0
441	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381060	1.5.0.0
442	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381061	1.5.0.0
443	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117381098	1.5.0.0
444	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117390652	1.5.0.0
445	Kaufman County, Texas	Kaufman	ExpressVote	EV0117390660	1.5.0.0
446	Kinney County, Texas	Kinney	ExpressVote	EV0116350060	1.5.0.0
447	Kinney County, Texas	Kinney	ExpressVote	EV0116350063	1.5.0.0
448	Kinney County, Texas	Kinney	ExpressVote	EV0116350085	1.5.0.0
449	Kinney County, Texas	Kinney	ExpressVote	EV0116350181	1.5.0.0
450	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380022	1.5.0.0
451	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380026	1.5.0.0
452	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380038	1.5.0.0
453	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380057	1.5.0.0
454	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380072	1.5.0.0
455	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380079	1.5.0.0
456	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380083	1.5.0.0
457	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380084	1.5.0.0
458	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380085	1.5.0.0
459	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380086	1.5.0.0
460	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380087	1.5.0.0
461	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380089	1.5.0.0
462	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380091	1.5.0.0
463	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380092	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
464	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380093	1.5.0.0
465	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380101	1.5.0.0
466	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380107	1.5.0.0
467	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380109	1.5.0.0
468	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380110	1.5.0.0
469	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380113	1.5.0.0
470	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380119	1.5.0.0
471	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380122	1.5.0.0
472	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380124	1.5.0.0
473	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380125	1.5.0.0
474	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380126	1.5.0.0
475	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380127	1.5.0.0
476	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380132	1.5.0.0
477	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380136	1.5.0.0
478	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380141	1.5.0.0
479	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380147	1.5.0.0
480	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380154	1.5.0.0
481	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380156	1.5.0.0
482	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380158	1.5.0.0
483	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380159	1.5.0.0
484	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380166	1.5.0.0
485	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380170	1.5.0.0
486	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380174	1.5.0.0
487	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380199	1.5.0.0
488	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380226	1.5.0.0
489	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380276	1.5.0.0
490	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380291	1.5.0.0
491	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380297	1.5.0.0
492	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380306	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
493	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380326	1.5.0.0
494	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380339	1.5.0.0
495	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380340	1.5.0.0
496	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380342	1.5.0.0
497	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380346	1.5.0.0
498	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380347	1.5.0.0
499	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380351	1.5.0.0
500	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380359	1.5.0.0
501	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380361	1.5.0.0
502	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380367	1.5.0.0
503	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380397	1.5.0.0
504	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380419	1.5.0.0
505	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380422	1.5.0.0
506	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380461	1.5.0.0
507	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380474	1.5.0.0
508	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380501	1.5.0.0
509	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380502	1.5.0.0
510	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380503	1.5.0.0
511	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380507	1.5.0.0
512	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380517	1.5.0.0
513	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380518	1.5.0.0
514	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380524	1.5.0.0
515	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380528	1.5.0.0
516	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380530	1.5.0.0
517	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380532	1.5.0.0
518	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380536	1.5.0.0
519	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380539	1.5.0.0
520	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380543	1.5.0.0
521	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380544	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
522	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380546	1.5.0.0
523	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380550	1.5.0.0
524	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380551	1.5.0.0
525	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380553	1.5.0.0
526	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380554	1.5.0.0
527	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380556	1.5.0.0
528	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380558	1.5.0.0
529	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380561	1.5.0.0
530	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380562	1.5.0.0
531	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380563	1.5.0.0
532	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380564	1.5.0.0
533	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380565	1.5.0.0
534	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380567	1.5.0.0
535	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380568	1.5.0.0
536	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380569	1.5.0.0
537	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380571	1.5.0.0
538	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380573	1.5.0.0
539	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380574	1.5.0.0
540	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380575	1.5.0.0
541	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380576	1.5.0.0
542	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380577	1.5.0.0
543	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380578	1.5.0.0
544	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380579	1.5.0.0
545	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380580	1.5.0.0
546	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380581	1.5.0.0
547	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380582	1.5.0.0
548	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380584	1.5.0.0
549	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380585	1.5.0.0
550	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380587	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
551	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380589	1.5.0.0
552	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380593	1.5.0.0
553	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380594	1.5.0.0
554	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380595	1.5.0.0
555	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380597	1.5.0.0
556	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380599	1.5.0.0
557	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380601	1.5.0.0
558	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380602	1.5.0.0
559	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380606	1.5.0.0
560	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380608	1.5.0.0
561	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380609	1.5.0.0
562	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380611	1.5.0.0
563	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380612	1.5.0.0
564	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380613	1.5.0.0
565	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380614	1.5.0.0
566	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380615	1.5.0.0
567	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380616	1.5.0.0
568	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380617	1.5.0.0
569	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380619	1.5.0.0
570	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380621	1.5.0.0
571	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380625	1.5.0.0
572	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380627	1.5.0.0
573	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380640	1.5.0.0
574	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380642	1.5.0.0
575	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380647	1.5.0.0
576	Navarro County, Texas	Navarro	ExpressVote	EV0117380648	1.5.0.0
577	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390264	1.5.0.0
578	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390353	1.5.0.0
579	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390392	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
580	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390447	1.5.0.0
581	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390459	1.5.0.0
582	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390466	1.5.0.0
583	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390473	1.5.0.0
584	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390474	1.5.0.0
585	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390532	1.5.0.0
586	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390542	1.5.0.0
587	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390557	1.5.0.0
588	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390558	1.5.0.0
589	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390582	1.5.0.0
590	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390589	1.5.0.0
591	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390594	1.5.0.0
592	Nolan County, Texas	Nolan	ExpressVote	EV0116390602	1.5.0.0
593	Presidio County, Texas	Presidio	ExpressVote	EV0116390182	1.5.0.0
594	Presidio County, Texas	Presidio	ExpressVote	EV0116390383	1.5.0.0
595	Presidio County, Texas	Presidio	ExpressVote	EV0116390462	1.5.0.0
596	Presidio County, Texas	Presidio	ExpressVote	EV0116390476	1.5.0.0
597	Presidio County, Texas	Presidio	ExpressVote	EV0116390507	1.5.0.0
598	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0115341055	1.5.0.0
599	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0115410046	1.5.0.0
600	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340082	1.5.0.0
601	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340093	1.5.0.0
602	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340310	1.5.0.0
603	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340432	1.5.0.0
604	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340477	1.5.0.0
605	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340495	1.5.0.0
606	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116340524	1.5.0.0
607	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350064	1.5.0.0
608	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350259	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
609	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350374	1.5.0.0
610	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350490	1.5.0.0
611	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350545	1.5.0.0
612	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350586	1.5.0.0
613	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116350611	1.5.0.0
614	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116360627	1.5.0.0
615	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116360925	1.5.0.0
616	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116361136	1.5.0.0
617	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116361145	1.5.0.0
618	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116361187	1.5.0.0
619	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116361221	1.5.0.0
620	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116361230	1.5.0.0
621	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370105	1.5.0.0
622	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370109	1.5.0.0
623	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370186	1.5.0.0
624	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370219	1.5.0.0
625	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370315	1.5.0.0
626	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370417	1.5.0.0
627	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370427	1.5.0.0
628	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370436	1.5.0.0
629	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370467	1.5.0.0
630	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370472	1.5.0.0
631	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116370600	1.5.0.0
632	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380207	1.5.0.0
633	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380286	1.5.0.0
634	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380312	1.5.0.0
635	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380315	1.5.0.0
636	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380329	1.5.0.0
637	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380340	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
638	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380409	1.5.0.0
639	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380456	1.5.0.0
640	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380535	1.5.0.0
641	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380552	1.5.0.0
642	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380561	1.5.0.0
643	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380565	1.5.0.0
644	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380570	1.5.0.0
645	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380572	1.5.0.0
646	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380578	1.5.0.0
647	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380583	1.5.0.0
648	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380587	1.5.0.0
649	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380679	1.5.0.0
650	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380694	1.5.0.0
651	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380715	1.5.0.0
652	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380781	1.5.0.0
653	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380875	1.5.0.0
654	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116380895	1.5.0.0
655	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116381211	1.5.0.0
656	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390349	1.5.0.0
657	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390380	1.5.0.0
658	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390713	1.5.0.0
659	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390716	1.5.0.0
660	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390735	1.5.0.0
661	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390751	1.5.0.0
662	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390787	1.5.0.0
663	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390797	1.5.0.0
664	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390801	1.5.0.0
665	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390805	1.5.0.0
666	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390806	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
667	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390807	1.5.0.0
668	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390809	1.5.0.0
669	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390811	1.5.0.0
670	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390814	1.5.0.0
671	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390817	1.5.0.0
672	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390818	1.5.0.0
673	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390819	1.5.0.0
674	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390820	1.5.0.0
675	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390825	1.5.0.0
676	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390830	1.5.0.0
677	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390832	1.5.0.0
678	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390836	1.5.0.0
679	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390844	1.5.0.0
680	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390848	1.5.0.0
681	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390849	1.5.0.0
682	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390850	1.5.0.0
683	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390851	1.5.0.0
684	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390853	1.5.0.0
685	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116390996	1.5.0.0
686	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116391019	1.5.0.0
687	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116391107	1.5.0.0
688	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116391197	1.5.0.0
689	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116391198	1.5.0.0
690	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400126	1.5.0.0
691	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400133	1.5.0.0
692	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400137	1.5.0.0
693	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400138	1.5.0.0
694	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400140	1.5.0.0
695	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400149	1.5.0.0

	Client	County	Model Description	Serial Number	Firmware
696	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400153	1.5.0.0
697	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400157	1.5.0.0
698	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400159	1.5.0.0
699	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400165	1.5.0.0
700	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400166	1.5.0.0
701	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400170	1.5.0.0
702	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400171	1.5.0.0
703	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400172	1.5.0.0
704	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400186	1.5.0.0
705	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400187	1.5.0.0
706	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400189	1.5.0.0
707	Rockwall County, Texas	Rockwall	ExpressVote	EV0116400193	1.5.0.0
708	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116380037	1.5.0.0
709	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116380080	1.5.0.0
710	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116380092	1.5.0.0
711	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116380154	1.5.0.0
712	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116380157	1.5.0.0
713	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116380281	1.5.0.0
714	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116390348	1.5.0.0
715	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116390374	1.5.0.0
716	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116390375	1.5.0.0
717	Sutton County, Texas	Sutton	ExpressVote	EV0116390408	1.5.0.0

**From:** [Pearson, Steve](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Cc:** [Keith Ingram](#); [Adam Bitter](#); [Parmer, Susan](#); [Rogers, Kathy](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Letter  
**Date:** Thursday, September 24, 2020 3:36:46 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

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Christina,

Thank you Christina. We are making every effort to fully comply to the concerns raised in Mr. Ingram's letter. All of the actions discussed in our call yesterday and memorialized in Mr. Ingram's letter are underway as promised. As of 2:45 pm today, we have been in contact with 15 of the 18 counties and are waiting on call backs on the others. At this point, those that we have been able to talk to are supportive and expecting our team to be onsite to perform the reinstallations next week. As soon as the final plan is in place, your office will be notified. Steps are also underway with EAC accredited Pro V&V, Inc. to perform the independent assessment of the two methods of upgrading firmware on the ExpressVote v1.0 systems with the EVS 6.0.2.0 release. We are confident their assessment will be complete and their findings available for your office by the end of next week as well.

Finally, we will forward a copy of Mr. Ingram's letter to each of the affected counties as requested. Please let me know if we can be of further assistance.

Thank you,

Steve

**Steve Pearson**

**Sr. Vice President, Certification**

**Election Systems & Software | 11208 John Galt Blvd | Omaha, NE 68137**

**Direct: 402-970-1225 | Cell: 402-212-4660 | [REDACTED]**

[www.essvote.com](http://www.essvote.com)

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, September 24, 2020 2:39 PM

**To:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** Keith Ingram <KIngram@sos.texas.gov>; Adam Bitter <ABitter@sos.texas.gov>; Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Letter

**Sensitivity:** Personal

Steve,

Please see the attached letter. Let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701  
[1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)  
[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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**From:** [Pearson, Steve](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Meeting Today  
**Date:** Wednesday, September 23, 2020 11:08:07 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.png  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

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Doing it now. Thank you.

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 23, 2020 11:05 AM  
**To:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Meeting Today  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

That would be great. Please include the following individuals –  
[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov) - Keith Ingram  
[jesparza@sos.texas.gov](mailto:jesparza@sos.texas.gov) – Joe Esparza (DSOS)  
[abitter@sos.texas.gov](mailto:abitter@sos.texas.gov) - Adam Bitter (General Counsel)

---

**From:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 23, 2020 11:00 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Meeting Today  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

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We're available at 3p Christina. Would you like for us to send out a Teams meeting invite?

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 23, 2020 10:22 AM  
**To:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Meeting Today  
**Sensitivity:** Personal

Steve,

As we discussed yesterday, Keith Ingram along with our Deputy Secretary, General Counsel would like to meet with you and your folks sometime today. What is your availability this afternoon? Would you all have time around 3:00 pm for this meeting?  
Let me know what you all think.

Thanks,

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

[1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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**From:** [Mona Harrington](#)  
**To:** [REDACTED]; [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); [Linda Lamone](#); [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); [Kai Schon](#); [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); [King, Brad](#); [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); [Keith Ingram](#); [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); [Mark Goins](#); [Michael Amanda](#); [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); [Wayne Thorley](#); [Lori Augino](#); [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); [Reynolds, Leslie](#)  
**Cc:** [Kevin Rayburn](#); [Jerome Lovato](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report  
**Date:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 4:28:15 PM

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Please treat this as notification that the message below serves to inform you that one lab confirmed to the EAC verbally that the circumstances regarding this situation are in fact considered de minimis, we are awaiting the second lab to verify.  
We will notify you as soon as we have more.

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 5:18 PM  
**To:** 'Mona Harrington' <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>; [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); 'Linda Lamone' <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); 'King, Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micmoser@pa.gov)>; 'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); 'Wayne Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); 'Reynolds, Leslie' <[REDACTED]>  
**Cc:** 'Kevin Rayburn' <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; 'Jerome Lovato' <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report

Thanks, Mona, this is great! Does this email serve as the formal determination from the EAC that this is de minimis, or will you be sending something else?

Amy

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**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 2:46 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]; [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); Linda Lamone <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); Kai Schon <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); King, Brad <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); Keith Ingram <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov);

[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); Mark Goins <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; Michael <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>; Amanda <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); Wayne Thorley <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; Lori Augino <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); Reynolds, Leslie [REDACTED] >

**Cc:** Kevin Rayburn <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; Jerome Lovato <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report

Good afternoon,

I'm pleased to report that to date one laboratory has completed significant work regarding the verification we requested. They have determined that this request qualifies as a de minimus change for all the versions. They have also verified that the updates from all the versions matched the Prod release files and the hashes matched what was expected. The laboratory has also completed installing all the updates to verify the software as it is loaded. They are ahead of schedule and are drafting reports, they feel they have all the data necessary. The other lab is still working on verification. I haven't received any reports yet but was provided this information and wanted to get it to you asap.

Best,

Mona

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 1:12 PM

**To:** 'Mona Harrington' <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>; [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); 'Linda Lamone' <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); 'King, Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>; 'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); 'Wayne Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); 'Reynolds, Leslie' [REDACTED] >

**Cc:** 'Kevin Rayburn' <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; 'Jerome' <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report

Mona,

Will you be sharing the lab reports on a rolling basis, or the de minimis determinations? Or both?

Thanks,

Amy

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---

**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 2:30 PM

**To:** [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); Linda Lamone <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); Kai Schon <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>;

[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); King, Brad <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov);  
[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); Keith Ingram <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov);  
[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); Mark Goins <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; Michael <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>; Amanda  
<[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); Amy Cohen <[REDACTED]>;  
[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); Wayne Thorley <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; Lori Augino  
<[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov);  
[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov);  
[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); Reynolds, Leslie  
[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** Kevin Rayburn <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; Jerome <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report

**Importance:** High

Good afternoon,

I wanted to follow up and let you all know where we are as of today. The testing phase of the process outlined in my last letter has begun by the laboratories. The approach we took was to have one lab perform testing initially then have the other lab verify the results. We have also asked the labs to provide us with reports as they become available. I plan on sharing these reports to all of you as I receive them. We are told by the labs that the entire process will take approximately two weeks in duration. We have emphasized to the labs the importance of them performing the work as quickly as possible. Thank you again for your patience regarding this important matter, as we learn more you most certainly will too. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Best,

Mona

---

**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>

**Sent:** Friday, October 2, 2020 2:55 PM

**To:** 'kea.warne@state.sd.us' <[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)>; 'Linda Lamone'

<[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; 'meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov' <[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)>;  
'ssandvoss@elections.il.gov' <[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)>; 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>;  
'chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov' <[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)>; 'King, Brad'  
<[bking@iec.IN.gov](mailto:bking@iec.IN.gov)>; 'Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; 'bdul@azsos.gov' <[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)>;  
'braterj@michigan.gov' <[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)>; 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>;  
'anthony.albence@delaware.gov' <[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)>; 'apmiller@dcboe.org'  
<[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)>; 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>;  
'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; 'jared.dearing@ky.gov' <[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)>;  
'Amy Cohen' <[REDACTED]>; 'bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov' <[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)>; 'Wayne  
Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>;  
'maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com' <[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)>;  
'kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov' <[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)>; 'clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov'  
<[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)>; 'heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov' <[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)>;  
'hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov' <[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)>; 'leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov'  
<[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)>; 'jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov'  
<[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)>; 'Reynolds, Leslie' <[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** 'Kevin Rayburn' <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; 'Jerome' (<[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>) <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report

Good afternoon everyone,

Attached is the lab report mentioned in my letter.

Best,

Mona

---

**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>

**Sent:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 7:40 PM

**To:** '[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)' <[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)>; 'Linda Lamone' <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; '[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)' <[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)>; '[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)' <[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)>; 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; '[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)' <[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)>; King, Brad <[bking@iec.IN.gov](mailto:bking@iec.IN.gov)>; 'Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; '[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)' <[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)>; '[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)' <[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)>; 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; '[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)' <[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)>; '[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)' <[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)>; 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>; 'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; '[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)' <[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)>; 'Amy Cohen' <[REDACTED]>; '[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)' <[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)>; 'Wayne Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; '[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)' <[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)>; '[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)' <[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)>; '[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)' <[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)>; '[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)' <[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)>; '[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)' <[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)>; '[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)' <[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)>; '[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)' <[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)>; 'Reynolds, Leslie' <[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** Kevin Rayburn <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; Jerome ([jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)) <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** Notification to States- ES&S update and proposed plan

Please let me know if you have any concerns with the proposed plan. Also don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Respectfully Yours,

Mona Harrington

Mona Harrington

Executive Director

[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)

Mobile: (202)641-1346

United States Election Assistance Commission

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**From:** [Mona Harrington](#)  
**To:** [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); [Linda Lamone](#); [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); [Kai Schon](#); [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); [King, Brad](#); [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); [Keith Ingram](#); [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); [Mark Goins](#); [Michael](#); [Amanda](#); [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [Amy Cohen](#); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); [Wayne Thorley](#); [Lori Augino](mailto:Lori Augino); [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); [Reynolds, Leslie](#)  
**Cc:** [Kevin Rayburn](#); [Jerome](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report  
**Date:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 1:24:11 PM  
**Importance:** High

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Good afternoon,

I wanted to follow up and let you all know where we are as of today. The testing phase of the process outlined in my last letter has begun by the laboratories. The approach we took was to have one lab perform testing initially then have the other lab verify the results. We have also asked the labs to provide us with reports as they become available. I plan on sharing these reports to all of you as I receive them. We are told by the labs that the entire process will take approximately two weeks in duration. We have emphasized to the labs the importance of them performing the work as quickly as possible. Thank you again for your patience regarding this important matter, as we learn more you most certainly will too. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Best,

Mona

**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>

**Sent:** Friday, October 2, 2020 2:55 PM

**To:** '[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)' <[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)>; 'Linda Lamone' <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; '[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)' <[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)>; '[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)' <[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)>; 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; '[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)' <[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)>; 'King, Brad' <[bking@iec.IN.gov](mailto:bking@iec.IN.gov)>; 'Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; '[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)' <[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)>; '[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)' <[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)>; 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; '[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)' <[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)>; '[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)' <[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)>; 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micmoser@pa.gov)>; 'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; '[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)' <[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)>; 'Amy Cohen' <[REDACTED]>; '[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)' <[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)>; 'Wayne Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; '[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)' <[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)>; '[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)' <[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)>; '[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)' <[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)>; '[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)' <[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)>; '[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)' <[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)>; '[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)' <[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)>; '[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)' <[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)>; 'Reynolds, Leslie' <[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** 'Kevin Rayburn' <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; 'Jerome' ([jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov))' <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report

Good afternoon everyone,  
Attached is the lab report mentioned in my letter.  
Best,  
Mona

---

**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>

**Sent:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 7:40 PM

**To:** 'kea.warne@state.sd.us' <[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)>; 'Linda Lamone' <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; 'meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov' <[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)>; 'ssandvoss@elections.il.gov' <[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)>; 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; 'chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov' <[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)>; King, Brad <[bking@iec.IN.gov](mailto:bking@iec.IN.gov)>; 'Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; 'bdul@azsos.gov' <[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)>; 'braterj@michigan.gov' <[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)>; 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; 'anthony.albence@delaware.gov' <[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)>; 'apmiller@dcboe.org' <[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)>; 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micmoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>; 'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; 'jared.dearing@ky.gov' <[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)>; 'Amy Cohen' <[REDACTED]>; 'bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov' <[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)>; 'Wayne Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; 'maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com' <[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)>; 'kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov' <[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)>; 'clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov' <[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)>; 'heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov' <[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)>; 'hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov' <[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)>; 'leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov' <[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)>; 'jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov' <[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)>; 'Reynolds, Leslie' <[REDACTED]>

**Cc:** Kevin Rayburn <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; Jerome (jlovato@eac.gov) <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>

**Subject:** Notification to States- ES&S update and proposed plan

Please let me know if you have any concerns with the proposed plan. Also don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Respectfully Yours,

Mona Harrington

Mona Harrington

Executive Director

[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)

Mobile: (202)641-1346

United States Election Assistance Commission

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**From:** [Mona Harrington](#)  
**To:** [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); [Linda Lamone](#); [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); [Kai Schon](#); [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); [King, Brad](#); [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); [Keith Ingram](#); [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); [Mark Goins](#); [Michael](#); [Amanda](#); [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [Amy Cohen](#); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); [Wayne Thorley](#); [Lori Augino](mailto:Lori Augino); [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); [Reynolds, Leslie](#)  
**Cc:** [Kevin Rayburn](#); [Jerome](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Notification to States- ES&S- Lab report  
**Date:** Friday, October 2, 2020 1:50:00 PM  
**Attachments:** ESS EV Letter Report-FINAL.pdf

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Good afternoon everyone,  
Attached is the lab report mentioned in my letter.  
Best,  
Mona

**From:** Mona Harrington <[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 1, 2020 7:40 PM  
**To:** 'kea.warne@state.sd.us' <[kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us)>; 'Linda Lamone' <[linda.lamone@maryland.gov](mailto:linda.lamone@maryland.gov)>; 'meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov' <[meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov)>; 'ssandvoss@elections.il.gov' <[ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov)>; 'Kai Schon' <[kai.schon@wyo.gov](mailto:kai.schon@wyo.gov)>; 'chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov' <[chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov)>; King, Brad <[bking@iec.IN.gov](mailto:bking@iec.IN.gov)>; 'Brad' <[bking@iec.in.gov](mailto:bking@iec.in.gov)>; 'bdul@azsos.gov' <[bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov)>; 'braterj@michigan.gov' <[braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov)>; 'Keith Ingram' <[kingram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kingram@sos.texas.gov)>; 'anthony.albence@delaware.gov' <[anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov)>; 'apmiller@dcboe.org' <[apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org)>; 'Mark Goins' <[mark.goins@tn.gov](mailto:mark.goins@tn.gov)>; 'Michael' <[micoser@pa.gov](mailto:micoser@pa.gov)>; 'Amanda' <[agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov](mailto:agrandjean@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov)>; 'jared.dearing@ky.gov' <[jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov)>; 'Amy Cohen' <[REDACTED]>; 'bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov' <[bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov)>; 'Wayne Thorley' <[wthorley@sos.nv.gov](mailto:wthorley@sos.nv.gov)>; 'Lori Augino' <[lori.augino@sos.wa.gov](mailto:lori.augino@sos.wa.gov)>; 'maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com' <[maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com)>; 'kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov' <[kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov)>; 'clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov' <[clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov)>; 'heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov' <[heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov)>; 'hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov' <[hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov)>; 'leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov' <[leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov)>; 'jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov' <[jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov)>; 'Reynolds, Leslie' <[REDACTED]>  
**Cc:** Kevin Rayburn <[krayburn@eac.gov](mailto:krayburn@eac.gov)>; Jerome (<[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)> <[jlovato@eac.gov](mailto:jlovato@eac.gov)>  
**Subject:** Notification to States- ES&S update and proposed plan  
Please let me know if you have any concerns with the proposed plan. Also don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.  
Respectfully Yours,  
Mona Harrington  
Mona Harrington  
Executive Director  
[mharrington@eac.gov](mailto:mharrington@eac.gov)

Mobile: (202)641-1346

United States Election Assistance Commission

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# Letter Report



To: Steve Pearson, Sue McKay – Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S)  
From: Wendy Owens - Pro V&V, Inc.  
CC: Jack Cobb, Stephen Han - Pro V&V, Inc.  
Date: October 1, 2020  
Subject: ES&S ExpressVote Hardware Version 1.0, Firmware Version 1.5.0.0 Update Process

---

Dear ES&S:

Pro V&V is providing this letter to report the results of the evaluation effort on the ES&S ExpressVote<sup>®</sup> hardware version 1.0, (ExpressVote HW1.0) firmware version 1.5.0.0 update process. An examination was performed to confirm that the update process utilized during the state evaluation contains identical executable files as those found in the trusted build and the process does not add any additional software to the ExpressVote HW1.0.

## Background

Pro V&V was contacted by ES&S to analyze an anomaly that occurred during a Texas state evaluation of the ExpressVote HW1.0 running firmware version 1.5.0.0. Pro V&V has also been in contact with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and Texas Secretary of State regarding this evaluation. During the evaluation, the “Update” process was attempted and a hash value mismatch error was displayed for the sysload.bmp file.

## Test Summary

Pro V&V compared the update disk image file to the prod\_release disk image file from the Trusted Build to ensure the update disk image file contained the same files from the Trusted Build. Pro V&V used the ExamDiff Pro application with the PESnoop 2.0 plug-in to compare all files. Three files were found to be in the update disk image that were not in the prod\_release disk image file. These files are listed below:

- InputOutputBoard.S19
- ScannerPrinterEngine.S19
- startup.exe

Pro V&V then compared the InputOutputBoard.S19 and ScannerPrinterEngine.S19 to the Trusted Build for EVS 6.0.0.0 where these artifacts were originally created. The SHA-256 hash values were the same as the files in the update disk image file. The startup.exe file was also hashed from EVS 6.0.0.0 and produced the following SHA-256 hash value:

startup.exe - 85f8d210ca9ad2433c4dbe154aee31f9d75968f908dc114e91adc26fd0f85731

Pro V&V then retrieved the sysload.bmp from EVS 5.2.2.0, as presented in Photograph 1.



Photograph 1: EVS 5.2.2.0 sysload.bmp

This file produces a SHA-256 value of the following:

sysload.bmp - b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3

The sysload.bmp file from EVS 6.0.2.0 was retrieved, as depicted in Photograph 2.



Photograph 2: EVS 6.0.2.0 sysload.bmp

This file produces a SHA-256 value of the following:

sysload.bmp - 07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12

In addition, Pro V&V upgraded a production EVS 5.2.2.0 ExpressVote HW1.0 device using an EVS 6.0.2.0 USB update image. Pro V&V followed the validation procedures detailed in the *Verification Procedure: ExpressVote Hardware 1.0* document to verify the hash values of all software on the device, noting the sysload.bmp verification was a mismatch. It was observed to have no impact on functionality.

After conducting this verification, Pro V&V loaded the EVS 6.0.2.0 prod\_release image onto an additional ExpressVote HW1.0 device via an Innodisk. Pro V&V then performed the same validation procedures outlined previously and noted there were no verification discrepancies.

### Conclusion

Based on the testing performed and the results obtained, it was verified that the only difference in the two products was the sysload.bmp file and no additional software was placed on the devices during the update process.

Should you require additional information or would like to discuss this matter further, please contact me at 256-713-1111.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Wendy Owens". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Wendy Owens  
VSTL Program Manager

A solid black rectangular redaction box covering the contact information.

**From:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**To:** "Parmer, Susan"; [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:49:26 PM

---

9:30 would work best for me.

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:42 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS

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Absolutely. Does 9:30 or 10:00 am work?

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:39 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS

I don't have any availability this afternoon. Could you do tomorrow morning instead?

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:31 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED] >; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Texas EVS [6.0.3.0](#)

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Hi Christina,

Steve has asked me to set up another short call with you this afternoon if at all possible. Can you send me any available times you may have? Thank you!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:42:37 PM

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Absolutely. Does 9:30 or 10:00 am work?

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

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**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS

I don't have any availability this afternoon. Could you do tomorrow morning instead?

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**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:31 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Texas EVS [6.0.3.0](#)

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Hi Christina,

Steve has asked me to set up another short call with you this afternoon if at all possible. Can you send me any available times you may have? Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)  
[REDACTED]

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**From:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**To:** ["Parmer, Susan"](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS 6.0.3.0  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:39:28 PM

---

I don't have any availability this afternoon. Could you do tomorrow morning instead?

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:31 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>; Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Texas EVS 6.0.3.0

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[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
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[REDACTED]

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:51:59 PM

---

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Thanks Christina. I will send a Teams invite for that time. Appreciate your quick response. Talk to you tomorrow.

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:49 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS  
9:30 would work best for me.

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:42 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS

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Absolutely. Does 9:30 or 10:00 am work?

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:39 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas EVS  
I don't have any availability this afternoon. Could you do tomorrow morning instead?

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:31 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Texas EVS [6.0.3.0](#)

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[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

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O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

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**From:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**To:** "Parmer, Susan"; [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Thursday, September 17, 2020 12:29:18 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

---

Do you have time to talk at 1:30?

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 17, 2020 10:42 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED] >; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED] >; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Good morning Christina,

Would it be possible to get you on a call today to discuss the documentation you are requesting? Please let me know if you have any availability for a short call. Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](tel:4029381305) | [F: 402 970-1275](tel:4029701275) | [C: 712-310-2586](tel:7123102586)  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 4:05 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan <[\[REDACTED\]@sos.texas.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED] >; Hallett, Tim <[\[REDACTED\]@sos.texas.gov](mailto:[REDACTED]@sos.texas.gov)>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response does not adequately acknowledge the issue we raised or provide the information we requested.

In your response you've stated that the hash verification here did not fail, but rather that because the mismatch is expected, this is considered a match. This is not an acceptable method of hash verification. The only thing that the jurisdiction has to go on here is your word that this mismatch is the expected result. They have no way of knowing whether the mismatch occurred because it is the expected mismatch, or because the mismatched file was somehow altered or manipulated. The hash verification process does not distinguish between "expected" mismatches and malicious mismatches, it simply identifies that a mismatch occurred.

Regardless of whether ES&S considers this to be a successful hash verification and a successful match, our office does not consider that verification process to be successful under those conditions.

Furthermore, you have failed to provide us with any documentation from you or from the VSTL detailing the fact that this mismatch is actually an expected result, though you informed us that ES&S Account Managers had already discussed this with Texas jurisdictions when performing the update process for [6.0.2.0](#). If you have any such documentation, we need to see it.

As I said in the previous email, we need you to provide us with a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue, as well as information regarding any other versions or equipment that would be experiencing a similar kind of issue.

We can address the long-term issues in a future conversation, but we will need you to provide us with that information in the short-term. I would recommend doing so before the examiners complete their reports for this system.

Thank you,

Christina

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 9:51 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Christina,

It appears there has been some misunderstanding over this particular matter, specifically the hash verification procedure for the ExpressVote 1.0 units in the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release. The hash validation process for the ExpressVote 1.0 units with this release did not fail. On the contrary, the software did exactly what we expected it to do when a stick update is used on an ExpressVote 1.0, and verified the SYSLOAD.BMP file was not present. This was the expected result, and, as such, is considered a match. This specific SYSLOAD.BMP file verification only occurred on ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade via USB stick in EVS [6.0.2.0](#). I apologize if this was not clearly conveyed in my previous communications. There has never been an issue to report and it is disheartening to think your team would doubt our integrity regarding this matter. ES&S has always been forthcoming with your office at all times about all things tested and discussed.

ES&S takes our verification procedures very seriously and though the examiners expressed some concern that our current procedures are too complicated in nature, ES&S specifically developed the procedures to be very thorough and detailed so that the jurisdictions would be able to ensure and confirm that the correct firmware was loaded. We agree with you that the procedures can be tedious and that is why we have worked so hard to provide the detailed responses and explanations you have requested on each and every question raised over this particular matter. We further acknowledge the importance of these procedures in order to validate that the software and firmware received and loaded is identical to the certified version(s) approved for use in Texas jurisdictions.

We are more than happy to work with the SOS and the Texas examiners in an attempt to design specific verification procedures and specific documentation for use in future releases that would be less tedious and possibly a better fit to Texas jurisdictions; however, the verification procedures and documentation we currently have in place are both EAC certified and proven reliable and accurate throughout the United States.

With regard to upgrades, all software and firmware upgrades are performed by ES&S Technicians, and, as stated in our previous response, those Technicians then verify that the software and/or firmware loaded is, in fact, the correct certified version. ES&S' technicians do not complete hash verifications once the voting system has been upgraded. ES&S' Technicians run a system readiness comparison to confirm that the version that was installed is the correct certified version that was approved by the Secretary of State. The Texas customers are then encouraged to perform the hash verification procedures on the software and/or firmware that was installed, so, in essence, verification procedures are performed twice. The hash verification procedures given to the Texas customers are the exact same verification procedures which we provide in the TDP documentation submitted with our voting system certification application(s).

I hope this better clarifies this matter and alleviates your concerns with regard to the verification procedures for the ExpressVote 1.0 specific to the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release. Please let me know if you or any of the examiners have any additional questions or concerns.

Thank you.

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response is very troubling. Essentially, what you've told us over the last couple weeks is that there are Texas customers who received software upgrades that failed the hash validation process, and that although you informed those customers of that fact, you did not inform our office of a known issue with an important procedure on a certified system. This is very concerning and raises doubts about our ability to trust your team to report and address these issues with us.

We also have concerns about the fact that it sounds like your field technicians are the ones who are performing the hash validation process on behalf of the customers. The acceptance testing should be performed by the jurisdiction itself as a way of verifying that the software they have received from the vendor is identical to the version of the system that has been certified by our office. If the hash validation process is performed by the same vendor technician who performed the installation, then that validation process loses one of its major purposes, which is to keep the vendor honest and ensure that the vendor has complied with the certification requirements imposed by the state.

In the short-term, we need a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue. We also need to know if there are any other versions of EVS or other hardware models that have similar issues with the hash validation process, and which customers may be affected by those issues.

In the long-term, we need to have a discussion regarding how this hash validation process will be handled by your Texas customers going forward. This will include additional procedures being provided by our office to those jurisdictions, but going forward with future applications for certification we will also need much more detail from you regarding the instructions and procedures for hash validation that you provide for your customers.

I look forward to your response on those short-term issues. We would like to be able to provide your follow-up response to the examiners so they can consider that response before their reports are submitted in the next few days before their Monday deadline.

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512.463.9859 (direct) | [1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM  
**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hi Chuck,

After checking with our Texas Field Services Manager it appears there were some Texas jurisdiction ExpressVote 1.0 units that received USB stick upgrades as opposed to full Inno burn upgrades, so I cannot say that all upgrades to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) on the ExpressVote 1.0 units were done by full Inno burn. What I can say is that on all ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade either via a full Inno burn or via a USB stick were performed by ES&S Field Services Technicians and with each upgrade the firmware was verified by that Technician(s) at the time they performed the upgrade(s).

As a reminder, none of the firmware or hardware versions changed from EVS [6.0.0.0](#) to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) to EVS [6.0.3.0](#) and at the time the firmware was installed on all of the Texas ExpressVote 1.0 units by

ES&S Technicians it was verified and confirmed to be the trusted firmware. As a further reminder, with the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) Electionware software only upgrade there is absolutely no firmware upgrades or installs involved so no hash verification is involved for any of the hardware for this release (or the EVS [6.1.1.0](#) release).

Please forward this information to Christina and the Examiners per their request.

Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



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**From:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**To:** [Charles Pinney](#); "[Parmer, Susan](#)"  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]; [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41:14 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Susan,

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We also have concerns about the fact that it sounds like your field technicians are the ones who are performing the hash validation process on behalf of the customers. The acceptance testing should be performed by the jurisdiction itself as a way of verifying that the software they have received from the vendor is identical to the version of the system that has been certified by our office. If the hash validation process is performed by the same vendor technician who performed the installation, then that validation process loses one of its major purposes, which is to keep the vendor honest and ensure that the vendor has complied with the certification requirements imposed by the state. In the short-term, we need a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue. We also need to know if there are any other versions of EVS or other hardware models that have similar issues with the hash validation process, and which customers may be affected by those issues.

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**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512.463.9859 (direct) | 1.800.252.VOTE (8683)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hi Chuck,

After checking with our Texas Field Services Manager it appears there were some Texas jurisdiction ExpressVote 1.0 units that received USB stick upgrades as opposed to full Inno burn upgrades, so I cannot say that all upgrades to EVS 6.0.2.0 on the ExpressVote 1.0 units were done by full Inno burn. What I can say is that on all ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade either via a full Inno burn or via a USB stick were performed by ES&S Field Services Technicians and with each upgrade the firmware was verified by that Technician(s) at the time they performed the upgrade(s). As a reminder, none of the firmware or hardware versions changed from EVS 6.0.0.0 to EVS 6.0.2.0 to EVS 6.0.3.0 and at the time the firmware was installed on all of the Texas ExpressVote 1.0 units by ES&S Technicians it was verified and confirmed to be the trusted firmware. As a further reminder, with the EVS 6.0.3.0 Electionware software only upgrade there is absolutely no firmware upgrades or installs involved so no hash verification is involved for any of the hardware for this release (or the EVS 6.1.1.0 release).

Please forward this information to Christina and the Examiners per their request.

Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 9:51:24 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Christina,

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ES&S takes our verification procedures very seriously and though the examiners expressed some concern that our current procedures are too complicated in nature, ES&S specifically developed the procedures to be very thorough and detailed so that the jurisdictions would be able to ensure and confirm that the correct firmware was loaded. We agree with you that the procedures can be tedious and that is why we have worked so hard to provide the detailed responses and explanations you have requested on each and every question raised over this particular matter. We further acknowledge the importance of these procedures in order to validate that the software and firmware received and loaded is identical to the certified version(s) approved for use in Texas jurisdictions.

We are more than happy to work with the SOS and the Texas examiners in an attempt to design specific verification procedures and specific documentation for use in future releases that would be less tedious and possibly a better fit to Texas jurisdictions; however, the verification procedures and documentation we currently have in place are both EAC certified and proven reliable and accurate throughout the United States.

With regard to upgrades, all software and firmware upgrades are performed by ES&S Technicians, and, as stated in our previous response, those Technicians then verify that the software and/or firmware loaded is, in fact, the correct certified version. ES&S' technicians do not complete hash verifications once the voting system has been upgraded. ES&S' Technicians run a system readiness comparison to confirm that the version that was installed is the correct certified version that was approved by the Secretary of State. The Texas customers are then encouraged to perform the hash

verification procedures on the software and/or firmware that was installed, so, in essence, verification procedures are performed twice. The hash verification procedures given to the Texas customers are the exact same verification procedures which we provide in the TDP documentation submitted with our voting system certification application(s).

I hope this better clarifies this matter and alleviates your concerns with regard to the verification procedures for the ExpressVote 1.0 specific to the EVS 6.0.3.0 release. Please let me know if you or any of the examiners have any additional questions or concerns.

Thank you.

[Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram <KIngram@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response is very troubling. Essentially, what you've told us over the last couple weeks is that there are Texas customers who received software upgrades that failed the hash validation process, and that although you informed those customers of that fact, you did not inform our office of a known issue with an important procedure on a certified system. This is very concerning and raises doubts about our ability to trust your team to report and address these issues with us.

We also have concerns about the fact that it sounds like your field technicians are the ones who are performing the hash validation process on behalf of the customers. The acceptance testing should be performed by the jurisdiction itself as a way of verifying that the software they have received from the vendor is identical to the version of the system that has been certified by our office. If the hash validation process is performed by the same vendor technician who performed the installation, then that validation process loses one of its major purposes, which is to keep the vendor honest and ensure that the vendor has complied with the certification requirements imposed by the state.

In the short-term, we need a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue. We also need to know if there are any other versions of EVS or other hardware models that have similar issues with the hash validation process, and which customers may be affected by those issues.

In the long-term, we need to have a discussion regarding how this hash validation process will be handled by your Texas customers going forward. This will include additional procedures being provided by our office to those jurisdictions, but going forward with future applications for certification we will also need much more detail from you regarding the instructions and procedures for hash validation that you provide for your customers.

I look forward to your response on those short-term issues. We would like to be able to provide your follow-up response to the examiners so they can consider that response before their reports are submitted in the next few days before their Monday deadline.

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701  
512.463.9859 (direct) | [1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)  
[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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*The information contained in this email is intended to provide advice and assistance in election matters per §31.004 of the Texas Election Code. It is not intended to serve as a legal opinion for any matter. Please review the law yourself, and consult with an attorney when your legal rights are involved.*

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]

**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

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O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

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**From:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**To:** ["Parmer, Susan"; Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 4:05:10 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Susan,

This response does not adequately acknowledge the issue we raised or provide the information we requested.

In your response you've stated that the hash verification here did not fail, but rather that because the mismatch is expected, this is considered a match. This is not an acceptable method of hash verification. The only thing that the jurisdiction has to go on here is your word that this mismatch is the expected result. They have no way of knowing whether the mismatch occurred because it is the expected mismatch, or because the mismatched file was somehow altered or manipulated. The hash verification process does not distinguish between "expected" mismatches and malicious mismatches, it simply identifies that a mismatch occurred.

Regardless of whether ES&S considers this to be a successful hash verification and a successful match, our office does not consider that verification process to be successful under those conditions.

Furthermore, you have failed to provide us with any documentation from you or from the VSTL detailing the fact that this mismatch is actually an expected result, though you informed us that ES&S Account Managers had already discussed this with Texas jurisdictions when performing the update process for 6.0.2.0. If you have any such documentation, we need to see it.

As I said in the previous email, we need you to provide us with a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue, as well as information regarding any other versions or equipment that would be experiencing a similar kind of issue.

We can address the long-term issues in a future conversation, but we will need you to provide us with that information in the short-term. I would recommend doing so before the examiners complete their reports for this system.

Thank you,  
Christina

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 9:51 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>; Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <KIngram@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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We are more than happy to work with the SOS and the Texas examiners in an attempt to design specific verification procedures and specific documentation for use in future releases that would be less tedious and possibly a better fit to Texas jurisdictions; however, the verification procedures and documentation we currently have in place are both EAC certified and proven reliable and accurate throughout the United States.

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Thank you.

[Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram  
<[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

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**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512.463.9859 (direct) | [1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]

**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 5:48:50 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Hi Christina,

Let me reach out to our team and see what additional information I can get for you. I will provide responses as quickly as possible.

Have a great evening!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <CAkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 4:05 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram <KIngram@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

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Thank you,  
Christina

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 9:51 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED] >; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED] >; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
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ES&S takes our verification procedures very seriously and though the examiners expressed some concern that our current procedures are too complicated in nature, ES&S specifically developed the procedures to be very thorough and detailed so that the jurisdictions would be able to ensure and confirm that the correct firmware was loaded. We agree with you that the procedures can be tedious and that is why we have worked so hard to provide the detailed responses and explanations you have requested on each and every question raised over this particular matter. We further acknowledge the importance of these procedures in order to validate that the software and firmware received and loaded is identical to the certified version(s) approved for use in Texas jurisdictions.

We are more than happy to work with the SOS and the Texas examiners in an attempt to design specific verification procedures and specific documentation for use in future releases that would be less tedious and possibly a better fit to Texas jurisdictions; however, the verification procedures and documentation we currently have in place are both EAC certified and proven reliable and accurate throughout the United States.

With regard to upgrades, all software and firmware upgrades are performed by ES&S Technicians, and, as stated in our previous response, those Technicians then verify that the software and/or

firmware loaded is, in fact, the correct certified version. ES&S' technicians do not complete hash verifications once the voting system has been upgraded. ES&S' Technicians run a system readiness comparison to confirm that the version that was installed is the correct certified version that was approved by the Secretary of State. The Texas customers are then encouraged to perform the hash verification procedures on the software and/or firmware that was installed, so, in essence, verification procedures are performed twice. The hash verification procedures given to the Texas customers are the exact same verification procedures which we provide in the TDP documentation submitted with our voting system certification application(s).

I hope this better clarifies this matter and alleviates your concerns with regard to the verification procedures for the ExpressVote 1.0 specific to the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release. Please let me know if you or any of the examiners have any additional questions or concerns.

Thank you.

[Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response is very troubling. Essentially, what you've told us over the last couple weeks is that there are Texas customers who received software upgrades that failed the hash validation process, and that although you informed those customers of that fact, you did not inform our office of a known issue with an important procedure on a certified system. This is very concerning and raises doubts about our ability to trust your team to report and address these issues with us.

We also have concerns about the fact that it sounds like your field technicians are the ones who are performing the hash validation process on behalf of the customers. The acceptance testing should be performed by the jurisdiction itself as a way of verifying that the software they have received from the vendor is identical to the version of the system that has been certified by our office. If the hash validation process is performed by the same vendor technician who performed the installation, then that validation process loses one of its major purposes, which is to keep the vendor honest and ensure that the vendor has complied with the certification requirements imposed by the state.

In the short-term, we need a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue. We also need to know if there are any other versions of EVS or other hardware models that have similar issues with the hash validation process, and which customers may be affected by those issues.

In the long-term, we need to have a discussion regarding how this hash validation process will be handled by your Texas customers going forward. This will include additional procedures being provided by our office to those jurisdictions, but going forward with future applications for certification we will also need much more detail from you regarding the instructions and procedures for hash validation that you provide for your customers.

I look forward to your response on those short-term issues. We would like to be able to provide your

follow-up response to the examiners so they can consider that response before their reports are submitted in the next few days before their Monday deadline.

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512.463.9859 (direct) | [1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hi Chuck,

After checking with our Texas Field Services Manager it appears there were some Texas jurisdiction ExpressVote 1.0 units that received USB stick upgrades as opposed to full Inno burn upgrades, so I cannot say that all upgrades to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) on the ExpressVote 1.0 units were done by full Inno burn. What I can say is that on all ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade either via a full Inno burn or via a USB stick were performed by ES&S Field Services Technicians and with each upgrade the firmware was verified by that Technician(s) at the time they performed the upgrade(s). As a reminder, none of the firmware or hardware versions changed from EVS [6.0.0.0](#) to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) to EVS [6.0.3.0](#) and at the time the firmware was installed on all of the Texas ExpressVote 1.0 units by ES&S Technicians it was verified and confirmed to be the trusted firmware. As a further reminder, with the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) Electionware software only upgrade there is absolutely no firmware upgrades or installs involved so no hash verification is involved for any of the hardware for this release (or the EVS [6.1.1.0](#) release).

Please forward this information to Christina and the Examiners per their request.

Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Thursday, September 17, 2020 10:42:35 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Good morning Christina,

Would it be possible to get you on a call today to discuss the documentation you are requesting?

Please let me know if you have any availability for a short call. Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <CAkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 4:05 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>; Charles Pinney <CPinney@sos.texas.gov>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <KIngram@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response does not adequately acknowledge the issue we raised or provide the information we requested.

In your response you've stated that the hash verification here did not fail, but rather that because the mismatch is expected, this is considered a match. This is not an acceptable method of hash verification. The only thing that the jurisdiction has to go on here is your word that this mismatch is the expected result. They have no way of knowing whether the mismatch occurred because it is the expected mismatch, or because the mismatched file was somehow altered or manipulated. The hash verification process does not distinguish between "expected" mismatches and malicious mismatches, it simply identifies that a mismatch occurred.

Regardless of whether ES&S considers this to be a successful hash verification and a successful match, our office does not consider that verification process to be successful under those conditions.

Furthermore, you have failed to provide us with any documentation from you or from the VSTL detailing the fact that this mismatch is actually an expected result, though you informed us that ES&S Account Managers had already discussed this with Texas jurisdictions when performing the update process for [6.0.2.0](#). If you have any such documentation, we need to see it.

As I said in the previous email, we need you to provide us with a list of all Texas customers who may

be potentially affected by this issue, as well as information regarding any other versions or equipment that would be experiencing a similar kind of issue.

We can address the long-term issues in a future conversation, but we will need you to provide us with that information in the short-term. I would recommend doing so before the examiners complete their reports for this system.

Thank you,  
Christina

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 9:51 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Christina,

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ES&S takes our verification procedures very seriously and though the examiners expressed some concern that our current procedures are too complicated in nature, ES&S specifically developed the procedures to be very thorough and detailed so that the jurisdictions would be able to ensure and confirm that the correct firmware was loaded. We agree with you that the procedures can be tedious and that is why we have worked so hard to provide the detailed responses and explanations you have requested on each and every question raised over this particular matter. We further acknowledge the importance of these procedures in order to validate that the software and firmware received and loaded is identical to the certified version(s) approved for use in Texas jurisdictions.

We are more than happy to work with the SOS and the Texas examiners in an attempt to design specific verification procedures and specific documentation for use in future releases that would be less tedious and possibly a better fit to Texas jurisdictions; however, the verification procedures and documentation we currently have in place are both EAC certified and proven reliable and accurate

throughout the United States.

With regard to upgrades, all software and firmware upgrades are performed by ES&S Technicians, and, as stated in our previous response, those Technicians then verify that the software and/or firmware loaded is, in fact, the correct certified version. ES&S' technicians do not complete hash verifications once the voting system has been upgraded. ES&S' Technicians run a system readiness comparison to confirm that the version that was installed is the correct certified version that was approved by the Secretary of State. The Texas customers are then encouraged to perform the hash verification procedures on the software and/or firmware that was installed, so, in essence, verification procedures are performed twice. The hash verification procedures given to the Texas customers are the exact same verification procedures which we provide in the TDP documentation submitted with our voting system certification application(s).

I hope this better clarifies this matter and alleviates your concerns with regard to the verification procedures for the ExpressVote 1.0 specific to the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release. Please let me know if you or any of the examiners have any additional questions or concerns.

Thank you.

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response is very troubling. Essentially, what you've told us over the last couple weeks is that there are Texas customers who received software upgrades that failed the hash validation process, and that although you informed those customers of that fact, you did not inform our office of a known issue with an important procedure on a certified system. This is very concerning and raises doubts about our ability to trust your team to report and address these issues with us.

We also have concerns about the fact that it sounds like your field technicians are the ones who are performing the hash validation process on behalf of the customers. The acceptance testing should be performed by the jurisdiction itself as a way of verifying that the software they have received from the vendor is identical to the version of the system that has been certified by our office. If the hash validation process is performed by the same vendor technician who performed the installation, then that validation process loses one of its major purposes, which is to keep the vendor honest and ensure that the vendor has complied with the certification requirements imposed by the state.

In the short-term, we need a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue. We also need to know if there are any other versions of EVS or other hardware models that have similar issues with the hash validation process, and which customers may be affected by those issues.

In the long-term, we need to have a discussion regarding how this hash validation process will be handled by your Texas customers going forward. This will include additional procedures being provided by our office to those jurisdictions, but going forward with future applications for

certification we will also need much more detail from you regarding the instructions and procedures for hash validation that you provide for your customers.

I look forward to your response on those short-term issues. We would like to be able to provide your follow-up response to the examiners so they can consider that response before their reports are submitted in the next few days before their Monday deadline.

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

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[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]

**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hi Chuck,

After checking with our Texas Field Services Manager it appears there were some Texas jurisdiction ExpressVote 1.0 units that received USB stick upgrades as opposed to full Inno burn upgrades, so I cannot say that all upgrades to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) on the ExpressVote 1.0 units were done by full Inno burn. What I can say is that on all ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade either via a full Inno burn or via a USB stick were performed by ES&S Field Services Technicians and with each upgrade the firmware was verified by that Technician(s) at the time they performed the upgrade(s). As a reminder, none of the firmware or hardware versions changed from EVS [6.0.0.0](#) to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) to EVS [6.0.3.0](#) and at the time the firmware was installed on all of the Texas ExpressVote 1.0 units by ES&S Technicians it was verified and confirmed to be the trusted firmware. As a further reminder, with the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) Electionware software only upgrade there is absolutely no firmware upgrades or installs involved so no hash verification is involved for any of the hardware for this release (or the

EVS 6.1.1.0 release).

Please forward this information to Christina and the Examiners per their request.

Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

[Susan Parmer | State Certification Manager](#)

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#); [Keith Ingram](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
**Date:** Thursday, September 17, 2020 12:41:41 PM  
**Attachments:** image001.png

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Absolutely. I will send a Teams invite to all on this email. Thanks Christina!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 17, 2020 12:29 PM  
**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units  
Do you have time to talk at 1:30?

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 17, 2020 10:42 AM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Good morning Christina,

Would it be possible to get you on a call today to discuss the documentation you are requesting?

Please let me know if you have any availability for a short call. Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 4:05 PM

**To:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED]; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Pearson, Steve [REDACTED]; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

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In your response you've stated that the hash verification here did not fail, but rather that because the mismatch is expected, this is considered a match. This is not an acceptable method of hash verification. The only thing that the jurisdiction has to go on here is your word that this mismatch is the expected result. They have no way of knowing whether the mismatch occurred because it is the expected mismatch, or because the mismatched file was somehow altered or manipulated. The hash verification process does not distinguish between "expected" mismatches and malicious mismatches, it simply identifies that a mismatch occurred.

Regardless of whether ES&S considers this to be a successful hash verification and a successful match, our office does not consider that verification process to be successful under those conditions.

Furthermore, you have failed to provide us with any documentation from you or from the VSTL detailing the fact that this mismatch is actually an expected result, though you informed us that ES&S Account Managers had already discussed this with Texas jurisdictions when performing the update process for [6.0.2.0](#). If you have any such documentation, we need to see it.

As I said in the previous email, we need you to provide us with a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue, as well as information regarding any other versions or equipment that would be experiencing a similar kind of issue.

We can address the long-term issues in a future conversation, but we will need you to provide us with that information in the short-term. I would recommend doing so before the examiners complete their reports for this system.

Thank you,

Christina

---

**From:** Parmer, Susan <[REDACTED]>

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 16, 2020 9:51 AM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED]; Keith Ingram <[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Christina,

It appears there has been some misunderstanding over this particular matter, specifically the hash

verification procedure for the ExpressVote 1.0 units in the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release. The hash validation process for the ExpressVote 1.0 units with this release did not fail. On the contrary, the software did exactly what we expected it to do when a stick update is used on an ExpressVote 1.0, and verified the SYSLOAD.BMP file was not present. This was the expected result, and, as such, is considered a match. This specific SYSLOAD.BMP file verification only occurred on ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade via USB stick in EVS [6.0.2.0](#). I apologize if this was not clearly conveyed in my previous communications. There has never been an issue to report and it is disheartening to think your team would doubt our integrity regarding this matter. ES&S has always been forthcoming with your office at all times about all things tested and discussed.

ES&S takes our verification procedures very seriously and though the examiners expressed some concern that our current procedures are too complicated in nature, ES&S specifically developed the procedures to be very thorough and detailed so that the jurisdictions would be able to ensure and confirm that the correct firmware was loaded. We agree with you that the procedures can be tedious and that is why we have worked so hard to provide the detailed responses and explanations you have requested on each and every question raised over this particular matter. We further acknowledge the importance of these procedures in order to validate that the software and firmware received and loaded is identical to the certified version(s) approved for use in Texas jurisdictions.

We are more than happy to work with the SOS and the Texas examiners in an attempt to design specific verification procedures and specific documentation for use in future releases that would be less tedious and possibly a better fit to Texas jurisdictions; however, the verification procedures and documentation we currently have in place are both EAC certified and proven reliable and accurate throughout the United States.

With regard to upgrades, all software and firmware upgrades are performed by ES&S Technicians, and, as stated in our previous response, those Technicians then verify that the software and/or firmware loaded is, in fact, the correct certified version. ES&S' technicians do not complete hash verifications once the voting system has been upgraded. ES&S' Technicians run a system readiness comparison to confirm that the version that was installed is the correct certified version that was approved by the Secretary of State. The Texas customers are then encouraged to perform the hash verification procedures on the software and/or firmware that was installed, so, in essence, verification procedures are performed twice. The hash verification procedures given to the Texas customers are the exact same verification procedures which we provide in the TDP documentation submitted with our voting system certification application(s).

I hope this better clarifies this matter and alleviates your concerns with regard to the verification procedures for the ExpressVote 1.0 specific to the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) release. Please let me know if you or any of the examiners have any additional questions or concerns.

Thank you.

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 15, 2020 3:41 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>; Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim [REDACTED] >; Keith Ingram

<[KIngram@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KIngram@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

Susan,

This response is very troubling. Essentially, what you've told us over the last couple weeks is that there are Texas customers who received software upgrades that failed the hash validation process, and that although you informed those customers of that fact, you did not inform our office of a known issue with an important procedure on a certified system. This is very concerning and raises doubts about our ability to trust your team to report and address these issues with us.

We also have concerns about the fact that it sounds like your field technicians are the ones who are performing the hash validation process on behalf of the customers. The acceptance testing should be performed by the jurisdiction itself as a way of verifying that the software they have received from the vendor is identical to the version of the system that has been certified by our office. If the hash validation process is performed by the same vendor technician who performed the installation, then that validation process loses one of its major purposes, which is to keep the vendor honest and ensure that the vendor has complied with the certification requirements imposed by the state.

In the short-term, we need a list of all Texas customers who may be potentially affected by this issue. We also need to know if there are any other versions of EVS or other hardware models that have similar issues with the hash validation process, and which customers may be affected by those issues.

In the long-term, we need to have a discussion regarding how this hash validation process will be handled by your Texas customers going forward. This will include additional procedures being provided by our office to those jurisdictions, but going forward with future applications for certification we will also need much more detail from you regarding the instructions and procedures for hash validation that you provide for your customers.

I look forward to your response on those short-term issues. We would like to be able to provide your follow-up response to the examiners so they can consider that response before their reports are submitted in the next few days before their Monday deadline.

**Christina Worrell Adkins**

Legal Director – Elections Division

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor | Austin, Texas 78701

512.463.9859 (direct) | [1.800.252.VOTE](tel:1800252VOTE) (8683)

[elections@sos.texas.gov](mailto:elections@sos.texas.gov) | [www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

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---

**From:** Parmer, Susan [REDACTED] >

**Sent:** Friday, September 11, 2020 2:26:45 PM

**To:** Charles Pinney <[CPinney@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CPinney@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Pearson, Steve <[REDACTED]>; Hallett, Tim <[REDACTED]>

**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

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Hi Chuck,

After checking with our Texas Field Services Manager it appears there were some Texas jurisdiction ExpressVote 1.0 units that received USB stick upgrades as opposed to full Inno burn upgrades, so I cannot say that all upgrades to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) on the ExpressVote 1.0 units were done by full Inno burn. What I can say is that on all ExpressVote 1.0 units that received the firmware upgrade either via a full Inno burn or via a USB stick were performed by ES&S Field Services Technicians and with each upgrade the firmware was verified by that Technician(s) at the time they performed the upgrade(s). As a reminder, none of the firmware or hardware versions changed from EVS [6.0.0.0](#) to EVS [6.0.2.0](#) to EVS [6.0.3.0](#) and at the time the firmware was installed on all of the Texas ExpressVote 1.0 units by ES&S Technicians it was verified and confirmed to be the trusted firmware. As a further reminder, with the EVS [6.0.3.0](#) Electionware software only upgrade there is absolutely no firmware upgrades or installs involved so no hash verification is involved for any of the hardware for this release (or the EVS [6.1.1.0](#) release).

Please forward this information to Christina and the Examiners per their request.

Hope you have a great weekend! Thanks!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

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**From:** [Mona Harrington](#)  
**To:** [REDACTED] [kea.warne@state.sd.us](mailto:kea.warne@state.sd.us); [Linda Lamone](#); [meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov](mailto:meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov); [ssandvoss@elections.il.gov](mailto:ssandvoss@elections.il.gov); [Kai Schon](#); [chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov](mailto:chris.piper@elections.virginia.gov); [King, Brad](#); [bdul@azsos.gov](mailto:bdul@azsos.gov); [braterj@michigan.gov](mailto:braterj@michigan.gov); [Keith Ingram](#); [anthony.albence@delaware.gov](mailto:anthony.albence@delaware.gov); [apmiller@dcboe.org](mailto:apmiller@dcboe.org); [Mark Goins](#); [Michael Amanda](#); [jared.dearing@ky.gov](mailto:jared.dearing@ky.gov); [bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov](mailto:bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov); [Wayne Thorley](#); [Lori Augino](#); [maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com](mailto:maria.matthews@dos.myflorida.com); [kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov](mailto:kendra.lane@sos.mo.gov); [clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov](mailto:clay.helms@sos.alabama.gov); [heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov](mailto:heidi.burhans@sos.iowa.gov); [hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov](mailto:hawley.robertson@sos.ms.gov); [leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov](mailto:leslie.bellamy@sos.arkansas.gov); [jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov](mailto:jason.hancock@sos.idaho.gov); [Reynolds, Leslie](#)  
**Cc:** [Kevin Rayburn](#); [Jerome Lovato](#); [Kristen Muthig](#)  
**Subject:** Talking Points Re: ES&S  
**Date:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 4:10:11 PM

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**Talking Points Re: ES&S issue that may assist if you get inquiries:  
The EAC Notified Election Systems & Software Manufacturer of Necessary, Immediate Action in Response to Validation Error in Some Systems and has been verified by an EAC certified lab to qualify as a minor (de minimis) change.**

**Background:**

- The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) mandates the EAC accredit voting system test laboratories and certify voting equipment. As part of EAC certification, manufacturers are required to submit system identification tools and procedures that use hashes to prove that the applications installed on a voting system exactly match the certified versions.

**Action Initially Taken:**

- The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) requested immediate action from Election Systems & Software (ES&S) after being notified of a validation error during installation of one of their voting systems in one state. The EAC was notified of the issue on September 23, 2020 and has since notified impacted state election officials whose states use the machines.
- The EAC was under the initial impression that only EVS 6.0.2.0 systems in one state were impacted by the hash validation error, but that is not the case. The EAC has gathered relevant information from ES&S to understand all of the systems impacted, and to determine compliance with the EAC Testing and Certification Program. Due to Election Day quickly approaching, ES&S was requested to respond by October 1, and provided all the versions and states impacted. All states were notified via ES&S and the EAC, the EAC continues to notify the states.

**Issue Description:**

- As part of EAC certification, manufacturers are required to submit system identification tools and procedures that use hashes to prove that the applications installed on a voting system exactly match the certified versions. ES&S explained that only one file was causing the hash validation error, a bitmap image file (SYSLOAD.BMP) with a copyright date that displays on the ExpressVote while booting up.
- ES&S further explained that the issue occurs only if a USB update method is used to update the version of the ExpressVote unit from a previous version. The reason the

update method causes the issue is due to the fact that the USB drive is a quick installation method that is designed to ONLY update firmware, and because the bitmap file is not part of the firmware, the installation via the USB drive method didn't replace the bitmap file and left the old bitmap file on the system resulting in the hash discrepancy.

- The EAC has worked closely with both labs and ES&S in an expedited manner to understand the entirety of the issue. ES&S was asked to submit all relevant information and versions to the EAC as a de minimus request for testing by the labs.
- The EAC requested that ES&S work with the labs to provide the EAC complete test reports on each of the builds of different versions among the states that have an incorrect hash validation - so we have a complete record of testing results that confirms there is not any impact to accuracy, functionality, use, etc.

**Positive Outcome Reported By The EAC Certified Lab:**

- To date one laboratory has completed significant work regarding the verification we requested. They have determined that this request qualifies as a de minimus change for all the versions. They have also verified that the updates from all the versions matched the Prod\_release files and the hashes matched what was expected. The laboratory has also completed installing all the updates to verify the software as it is loaded. They are ahead of schedule and are drafting reports, they feel they have all the data necessary and have determined that no system functionality or accuracy etc. was impacted by the minor image discrepancy. As an additional measure for assurance the EAC has asked both labs to coordinate and ensure the accuracy of their results.

I hope this helps!

Best,

Mona

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Texas EVS 6.0.3.0  
**Date:** Monday, September 21, 2020 12:32:39 PM


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Hi Christina,

Steve has asked me to set up another short call with you this afternoon if at all possible. Can you send me any available times you may have? Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | [State Certification Manager](#)  
Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137  
[O: 402 938-1305](#) | [F: 402 970-1275](#) | [C: 712-310-2586](#)



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**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0 Units

**Start:** Tue 9/22/2020 9:30 AM  
**End:** Tue 9/22/2020 10:00 AM  
**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Organizer:** Parmer, Susan

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#); [Charles Pinney](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** Texas Expressvote 1.0 Units - EVS 6.0.3.0  
**Date:** Friday, September 18, 2020 8:05:55 AM

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Good morning Christina,

In follow up to our conversation yesterday, we have reached out to our Field Services Team to determine if ES&S would have the resources to perform a full Inno burn upgrade on all of the applicable EVS 6.0.2.0 Expressvote 1.0 units in Texas and complete this process in time for use in the November 2020 General election. Once I receive that final determination and list, I will share that information with you along with the complete listing of each applicable county broken down by unit. I am currently out of the office on PTO; however, if I receive any of the details to this information today, I will promptly forward it to you.

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. Thank you and have a great weekend!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

Election Systems & Software, LLC. | 11208 John Galt Blvd., Omaha, NE 68137

O: 402 938-1305 | F: 402 970-1275 | C: 712-310-2586



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**Subject:** Texas ExpressVote 1.0

**Start:** Tue 9/22/2020 3:00 PM  
**End:** Tue 9/22/2020 3:15 PM  
**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Organizer:** Parmer, Susan

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**From:** [Parmer, Susan](#)  
**To:** [Christina Adkins](#)  
**Cc:** [Pearson, Steve](#); [Hallett, Tim](#)  
**Subject:** TX ExpressVote 1.0  
**Date:** Thursday, September 24, 2020 5:46:46 PM  
**Attachments:** SYSLOAD.BMP Copyright Image.pdf

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Hi Christina,

I wanted to forward the final version of the document, which I provided you yesterday during our call, and which we plan to provide to the affected Texas customers. Please let me know if you have any questions. Thank you!

[Susan Parmer](#) | State Certification Manager

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## EXPRESSVOTE 1.0 SYSLOAD.BMP IMAGE UPDATE FOR EVS 6.0.2.0

The two photos below are bitmap images that represent the Splashscreen displayed on an ExpressVote when it is first turned on.

In Texas all units previously running on EVS 5.2.2.0 firmware contained the 2016 SYSLOAD.BMP copyright image which displays the copyright as seen in the screenshot below on the left.

When these units were updated to EVS 6.0.2.0 firmware via a USB upgrade procedure, the SYSLOAD.BMP copyright file was not updated to the most current 2018 copyright which is depicted on the right.

An update to the system is required in order for Texas units to display the correct copyright date on the splashscreen and subsequently produce a successful hash validation.

Please note: The update only changes the copyright image on the bootup screen as shown below and has zero impact on any other functionality of the system.

