

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MAINE**

DINNER TABLE ACTION, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WILLIAM J. SCHNEIDER, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Docket No. 1:24-cv-00430-KFW

**DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON  
(pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746)**

I, Christopher Robertson, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18 and reside in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
2. I am a social scientist. I hold a juris doctor degree (JD) from Harvard Law School and a doctorate (PhD) in Philosophy from Washington University in St. Louis. I have received training in social science research methodologies, including survey sampling, survey design, and statistical analysis. I have taught social science research methodologies and empirical legal research at the undergraduate and graduate levels at the University of Arizona, Boston University, and the London School of Economics. My research has been accepted through the peer review process in leading journals, conferences, and competitive grants, and I regularly serve as a peer reviewer for leading journals, conferences, and grant funders. While I am a Professor at Boston University School of Law, I worked in my individual capacity for this case.
3. In January 2025, I was retained by EqualCitizens to provide my expert opinion on the effects of campaign contributions of varying dollar amounts on perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption. To that end, I deployed two surveys that tested the perceptions of various campaign

contribution limits and measured the effects of a \$5,000 cap on contributions to independent expenditure committees (IECs). In both survey experiments, I used standard social science research methodologies, just as I use when conducting scholarly work for presentation, publication, or grant funding. I also retained a consulting expert in social science research methodologies, who holds a PhD in Sociology, to help me with the study. Together, we surveyed over 1100 respondents.

4. Exhibit 3-A is a preliminary, consolidated report of the methodology and findings, which we ultimately intend to compile into a scholarly manuscript for future publication. I have reviewed the information contained in the report and can confirm that it accurately reflects our findings. If called to testify, I could and would competently testify to the statements above and in the attached report.

5. Exhibit 3-B is my curriculum vitae.
6. Exhibit 3-C is a copy of my survey instrument.
7. Exhibit 3-D is a methodological appendix.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Executed on this 19th day of February 2025 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

/s/ Christopher Robertson  
Christopher Robertson

## Exhibit 3-A

# Expert Report of Christopher T. Robertson, JD, PhD

## Summary

I am a social scientist and used standard social science methodologies for two survey experiments, with over 1100 respondents. We designed the study to measure the effects of campaign contributions of varying dollar amounts on perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption. We also measured the effects of a \$5,000 cap on contributions to independent expenditure committees (IECs). Based on our findings, we concluded that larger financial contributions to committees supporting candidates increase perceptions that *quid pro quo* corruption is likely, and that the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption is substantially higher when contributions are above \$4,999 in particular. Further, we found that a \$5,000 cap on contributions to IECs has a substantial salutary effect by reducing perceptions that *quid pro quo* corruption is likely, and a \$5,000 cap increases broader confidence in the system of representative government, supporting perceptions of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of government to serve public interests.

## Literature Review

The empirical study of public perceptions of political corruption and the campaign finance system in the United States has not always narrowly focused on “*quid pro quo*” as the particular conception of corruption nor focused on the particular policy mechanism of capping contributions to IECs. We provide only a selective review here, with a focus on more recent and narrowly-relevant works.

In a 2004 study, Persily and Lammie analyzed several decades worth of survey data and found that while perceptions of corruption are widespread, campaign finance reforms did not make substantial impacts on those perceptions (Persily & Lammie 2004).

Nonetheless, such cross-sectional research does not support causal inference about the effect of discrete interventions, such as a particular policy change.

In a 2012 national opinion poll, the Brennan Center for Justice found that nearly 70% of Americans believe SuperPAC spending leads to corruption and that concerns over big donors reduce voter participation, particularly among low-income and minority groups Brennan Center for Justice (2012).

In a 2015 study, Brown and Martin used survey vignettes to systematically investigate the relationship between the amounts and types of contributions on the one hand and “faith in democracy” on the other (Brown & Martin 2015). They found that larger contributions had

more harmful effects on those attitudes.

In a 2015 study, Robertson et al. conducted a mock juror experiment and a grand jury simulation. Their findings indicate that people would be willing to indict and convict politicians and donors of bribery, which the authors operationalize as a definition of *quid pro quo* corruption, even when contributions are legal under extant campaign finance laws. This research shows that the extant policy regime is perceived to facilitate *quid pro quo* corruption in donor-candidate relationships (Robertson et al., 2015). Notably, Robertson and colleagues included a “dark money” condition where the recipient of the contribution is nominally independent from the candidate (like an IEC), and the respondents still frequently perceived *quid pro quo* corruption. However, the researchers did not specifically test the effect of a cap on contributions to IECs in particular.

In 2016, Bowler and Donovan also deployed survey experiments and found that both the amount of funding and the source of funds affected perceptions of corruption (Bowler & Donovan 2016). In this research, even “independent” expenditures could create coercive effects.

In a 2016 study, Kristin Kelly notes that the prior studies relied upon by the courts “indicate high levels of perceived governmental corruption among the public” (Kelly 2016). Relying on 2009 survey data, Kelly finds that two-thirds of respondents believe that *quid pro quo* corruption happens “all the time” or “often.”

In a 2016 study using survey experiments, Avkiran et al. manipulated whether respondents learned about campaign finance laws to determine whether that knowledge impacted citizens’ perceptions of corruption (Avkiran et al., 2016). They found a 7.48 percent higher concern for the corrupting effect of money in politics when campaign financing is not regulated. But respondents remained untrusting of politicians even with campaign finance regulations in place.

In a 2020 study, Spencer and Theodoridis conducted a nationally representative survey and conjoint experiment where participants identified which campaign finance practices seemed corrupt Spencer & Theodoridis (2020). They find that many common campaign finance practices (such as large donations and outside spending) were viewed as corrupt.

In a 2020 book, Primo and Milyo review extensive empirical evidence from 2015-2016 that supports the proposition that the American public views corruption as rampant (Primo & Milyo 2020). In their surveys, however, respondents do not correctly understand the complexities of the extant campaign finance system, and in any case, they express skepticism that reforms will make substantial impact.

In a 2021 book, Shaw, et al. analyzed public opinion data on corruption and campaign finance reforms, finding that most Americans believe corruption is widespread despite little empirical evidence of systematic *quid pro quo* corruption (Shaw et al., 2021). Their study also suggests that disclosure laws have minimal impact on altering corruption perceptions.

In a 2021 study reporting a series of survey experiments, DeBell and Iyengar find that even “independent” contributions can give rise to perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption (DeBella & Iyengar 2021). Larger contributions raise greater concerns.

In a 2024 study, Goodliffe and Townsend analyze survey data from 2012 to 2020 to track shifts in public attitudes toward campaign finance laws Goodliffe & Townsend (2024). The study finds that Americans consistently view SuperPACs and large campaign donations as corrupting but remain largely resistant to changes in their views even when presented with additional information on regulations.

## Overall Research Method

The literature suggests that there are open questions regarding the effects of contributions to IECs on perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption and the effects of a \$5,000 cap in particular. Accordingly, we conducted two randomized survey experiments. The full survey instrument is attached as Exhibit C. A methodological appendix is attached as Exhibit D.

As shown in Table 1, we used an online population to recruit and secure the informed consent of n=1144 Americans, a sample that was selected to be representative of the U.S. population by age and gender. To avoid a selection bias related to our primary hypotheses, we described the survey task generally as about “perceptions of government.” We collected standard demographic covariates. The sample had reasonable geographic representation (spanning 49 states) and with reasonable racial, ethnic, educational, income, and political representation for the United States population.

We understand that this litigation involves the State of Maine, and the perspectives of Mainers may be especially interesting. We therefore over-sampled respondents from Maine (n=115), as shown in Table 1. We do not have any particular hypotheses that Mainers might respond differently, but rather consider this enriched subsample a robustness check, to confirm that our national sample is broadly applicable to this setting. To maximize our statistical power, our primary analyses use the full dataset, but as shown in the appendix, we get similar results when focusing only on the subset of Mainers.

**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Sample and Maine Sample

	U.S. Sample	Maine Subsample
<u>Age</u>		
18-34	21%	15%
35-54	57%	61%
65+	22%	24%
<u>Male</u>		
Always Vote	61%	59%
<u>Education</u>		
HS Grad or Less	16%	27%
Some College/Associate	35%	40%
Bachelor's Degree	30%	22%
Post-Graduate	19%	11%
<u>White</u>		
Democrat	32%	30%
Independent	40%	43%
Republican	27%	27%
<u>Income</u>		
\$49,999 or less	36%	53%
\$50,000-\$99,999	36%	34%
\$100,000 or more	28%	13%
<i>N</i>	1144	115

As shown in Exhibit C, we used a vignette-based survey research methodology, a standard approach that has been shown to produce valid findings. Vignettes ask respondents to imagine themselves in a setting, and then ask respondents questions about that their attitudes or opinions relating to that vignette setting. Vignettes allow the researcher to systematically manipulate factors about the setting in order to measure the impact of those factors on respondent attitudes and opinions. Among other advantages, this approach allows the researcher to make counterfactual comparisons (i.e., the same policy regime with and without a certain feature), which is almost never directly feasible in the real world, without creating confounds.

One challenge of online survey research is to ensure respondent engagement. We included two attention-check questions (simply asking them to mark a certain response in a Likert-matrix), and in two places during the survey also asked respondents to type out their responses, which allows us to check for junk responses (e.g., mashed keys, irrelevant text copy-and-pasted in, refusal to engage with material). In this report, the data (n=1144) is screened to exclude those who failed the two attention check questions, and to exclude those who provided junk qualitative responses. We conducted these screens

without regard to the respondents' experimental conditions or their responses to our primary quantitative dependent variables (DVs).

We used standard bivariate and multivariate statistics. We consider  $p < .05$  as the threshold for statistical significance, and display 95% confidence intervals (similar to a "margin of error"). Our randomized design supports causal inference, by holding observable and unobservable factors constant across conditions, even in bivariate comparisons. In the Appendix, we also use multivariate statistics for robustness, and find no substantial changes to our findings.

We conducted two experiments with each respondent. Experiment 1 looks at the relationship between the dollar-amount of financial contributions to political committees and the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption on officials. Experiment 2 looks at the relationship between a law that caps IEC contributions at \$5,000 and the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption. Experiment 2 also looks at perceptions of government legitimacy more broadly, including other conceptions of corruptions that are potentially more capacious than *quid pro quo*.

## Experiment 1 Design

Experiment 1 was designed to assess the relationship between the dollar-amounts of financial contributions and the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption on officials.

As shown below, the vignette was very brief, asking the respondent to consider the likelihood that an elected official would sell a policy outcome in exchange for a contribution to a committee supporting his or her election.

### **Experiment 1. Stimulus for All Respondents**

"Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$X."

We then manipulated the amount of the contribution [X] from \$5 to \$50 million dollars in a logarithmic scale (\$5, \$50, \$5,000, \$50,000, \$500,000, \$5,000,000 or \$50,000,000). Each respondent saw one amount of money as the contribution, making this a 1x7 randomized experiment in between-subjects design.

The outcome was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (from "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely"). For simplicity of presentation, in the figure for this report, we compress the scale, and report the proportion finding that a sale of the policy outcome was likely, including extremely, very, or somewhat likely. Our regressions utilize the full scale data.




In this first experiment, we wanted to capture at a basic level how people think about this general situation. We had not yet laid out the full legal regime, explaining the difference between direct contributions, independent expenditures, and defining independent expenditure committees. We expect that many Americans are unaware of the legal complexities of campaign finance law, and Experiment 1 arguably has the advantage of being more realistic for low-information voters' attitudes, even if it is not robust in terms of legal technicalities.

## Experiment 1 Results

In Experiment 1, we found a clear relationship between the amount of money contributed and perceived likelihood that the elected official would sell a policy outcome. See Figure 1. This finding is consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Brown & Martin 2015).

**Figure 1.** Percent of Respondents Viewing Sale of Policy Outcomes to be Likely by Level of Contribution to Committee (Experiment 1, n=1144, 95% confidence intervals shown).



The amount of money matters. We can reject the null hypothesis that the amount of money makes no difference to perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption. Table 2 presents an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression showing that the slope of these points (coefficient of 0.24) is significantly different than zero ( $p < .001$ ), while controlling for key covariates. The subset of Mainers presents substantially similar results.

**Table 2.** OLS Regression on Perception That Politicians Will Sell Policy Outcomes

	U.S. Sample		Maine Subsample	
Amount of Money	0.24***	(0.02)	0.18**	(0.07)
Age	-0.03	(0.03)	-0.07	(0.10)
Gender	0.27**	(0.09)	0.60*	(0.29)
Education	-0.03	(0.03)	-0.01	(0.10)
Politics	-0.07**	(0.03)	-0.17*	(0.09)
Income	-0.00	(0.01)	-0.04	(0.05)
Vote	-0.07+	(0.04)	0.01	(0.13)
White	-0.00	(0.11)	0.62	(1.08)
Constant	2.94***	(0.30)	2.67+	(1.39)
<i>N</i>	1144		115	
Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.134		0.084	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 +  $p < .10$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

As Figure 1 displays, the relationship between size of contribution and likelihood of selling a policy outcome has a clear discontinuity around \$5,000, meaning that respondents perceive contributions below \$5,000 to be qualitatively different than contributions at or above that amount. Specifically, below \$5,000 about 40% of respondents thought it would be likely for a candidate to sell a policy outcome, while above \$5,000 this number rises to about 70% of the respondents. This change is qualitatively dramatic.

Note that at this stage in the survey, respondents were not primed to focus on the \$5,000 threshold. That was only mentioned in Experiment 2, and respondents were unable to go back and revisit Experiment 1. Further, the blinded between-subjects design means that each respondent was only presented with one of these dollar amounts; they were not asked to compare or contrast that amount with \$5,000. We make such comparisons only in the aggregate data.

In conclusion, Experiment 1 shows that larger financial contributions cause greater perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption, and that perceived risk is greater and stable above \$4,999. To put it another way, \$5,000 appears to be an inflection point in perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption.

## Experiment 2 Design

Experiment 2 was designed to assess the relationship between a state law that imposed a \$5,000 cap on contributions to IECs and the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption, as well as other attitudes about the state government. In contrast to Experiment 1, we introduced the \$5,000 level for half of the respondents, while the other half were assigned to a control condition with no cap on contributions.

In Experiment 2, the vignette provided a set of policies in a given fictional state (“Ames”), which at baseline explained the difference between direct campaign fundraising and spending, versus “independent” expenditures and defined IEPs with reference to SuperPACs.

### **Experiment 2. Base Stimulus for All Respondents**

Please consider the following scenario, and then we will ask you about how you feel about it. This scenario involves money and politics. Imagine this scenario, regardless of whatever you may believe about your own state or federal or constitutional law.

**Suppose you live in a U.S. state called "Ames" with the following rules:**

1. Candidates for public office, such as state representative and governor, need lots of money to support their elections and re-elections. They raise and spend money to support their campaigns.
2. Separate from the candidates’ own fundraising and spending, individuals and corporations can also spend unlimited amounts of money independently to support or oppose candidates. This spending must be “independent” of the candidate’s campaign, not coordinated with any candidate’s campaign.
3. Individuals and corporations can also organize their independent spending through entities sometimes called SuperPACs but which we will refer to as “independent expenditure committees,” or IECs.
4. Contributions to these IECs may come from major donors who want official actions from elected officials, such as having the state government spend money to support a particular industry or de-regulate a particular industry.
5. IECs may not necessarily know if a candidate directed a donor to make a contribution to the IEC or made any agreement with a donor in exchange for the contribution.

In this between-subjects randomized experiment, we manipulated whether the state had a \$5000 cap (“Cap”) on contributions to independent expenditure committees (IECs).

### **Experiment 2. \$5k Cap Condition**

6. The state of Ames has a **cap of \$5,000** in contributions to IECs. It is **illegal** for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state.

### **Experiment 2. No Cap Condition**

6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. Persons or corporations can contribute any amount of money to IECs in this state.

Given that the respondents are not lawyers trained to analyze policy regimes, in designing the survey materials, the vignettes could be too dense and complex. It could help to provide examples, though we also sought generalizability beyond any particular example. Thus, for each of the two legal regimes (Cap and No Cap), we offered two different examples focusing on officials asking for \$1 million or donors offering to give it, as well as conditions with no example, in factorial design. The appendix presents the detailed results, separating out respondent attitudes by presence or absence of example. In our analyses comparing the examples and no-example conditions, we found that the examples did not make a substantial difference in our overall findings. So, for simplicity of presentation, the results presented here aggregate across the example and non-example conditions. We treat this as a background covariate, fully randomized across experimental conditions to avoid confounds.

To improve engagement with the vignette in Experiment 2, we asked all respondents to paraphrase the vignette in their own words and to reflect on the likely impact thereof.

The outcomes were measured as 15 questions in two sets of six-point Likert-scale matrices (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). For ease of presentation in the figure, we again bifurcate the scale to present the percent disagreeing, regardless of how strong that disagreement may be. The appendix presents the detailed results, and our regressions utilize the full scale data.


Three of these questions were narrowly focused on the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption, while others asked about the perceived legitimacy of the government more generally. The order of the questions (including two attention checks) was randomly assigned.

## Experiment 2 Results

We found that a \$5,000 cap on contributions to IECs has a salutary effect on perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption as well as our other measures of political legitimacy.

Figure 2 focuses on three of our questions that asked more narrowly about *quid pro quo* corruption. We focus on *disagreement*, because we are looking for the frequency that respondents reject perceptions of corruption. We note that at baseline respondents are very cynical about the government, with less than 10% rejecting perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption. They seem to generally see politics, at least as presented in the vignettes, as being rife with exchanges of value. Such high levels of perceived corruption are consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Kelly 2016).

**Figure 2.** Percent of Respondents Who Disagree with Statement by Experimental Condition (Experiment 2, n=1144, with 95% confidence intervals shown)



As for the first such question, Figure 2 shows that with a \$5,000 cap on committee contributions in place, respondents were more likely to disagree that elected officials will provide policy outcomes in exchange for money given to IECs. The chance of disagreeing with the statement more than doubles, from less than 10% with no cap to more than 25%, with a cap in place.

Likewise, Figure 2 shows that with a cap in place, respondents more often disagree that donors would be likely to get policy outcomes in exchange for contributions to their committees. Here again, the chance of disagreeing more than doubles (from less than 10% to more than 20%) once a cap is in place.

Although all three of these questions get to the concept of an exchange of one thing of value for another, in the third question, the phrase “*quid pro quo*” is actually used explicitly. As shown in Figure 2, we see a tripling of the likelihood that respondents will disagree with the claim that *quid pro quo* exchanges are likely in the world they read about (from 9% to 27%) with a cap in place.

For all three of these comparisons, as shown in Table 3, the differences are highly significant statistically ( $p < .001$ ). Table 4 finds similar results for the Maine subsample, also all three statistically significant.

**Table 3.** OLS Regression on Perceptions of *Quid Pro Quo* Corruption (U.S. Sample)

	Provide Policy Outcomes		Facilitates “ <i>Quid Pro Quos</i> ”		Get Policy Outcomes	
5K Cap	-0.75***	(0.07)	-0.63***	(0.07)	-0.68***	(0.07)
Age	0.04 <sup>+</sup>	(0.02)	0.04	(0.02)	0.07**	(0.02)
Gender	0.03	(0.07)	0.04	(0.07)	0.05	(0.07)
Education	0.05 <sup>+</sup>	(0.03)	0.04	(0.02)	0.04	(0.03)
Politics	-0.06**	(0.02)	-0.07***	(0.02)	-0.05**	(0.02)
Income	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Vote	-0.06 <sup>+</sup>	(0.03)	-0.02	(0.03)	-0.06 <sup>+</sup>	(0.03)
White	0.29**	(0.10)	0.37***	(0.09)	0.14	(0.10)
Constant	4.70***	(0.25)	4.58***	(0.23)	4.68***	(0.24)
<i>N</i>	1144		1144		1144	
Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.112		0.105		0.098	

Standard errors in parentheses. <sup>+</sup> *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

**Table 4.** OLS Regression on Perceptions of *Quid Pro Quo* Corruption (Maine Subsample)

	Provide Policy Outcomes		Facilitates “ <i>Quid Pro Quos</i> ”		Get Policy Outcomes	
5K Cap	-0.75**	(0.26)	-0.61 <sup>+</sup>	(0.27)	-0.71**	(0.26)
Age	0.17 <sup>+</sup>	(0.09)	0.05	(0.10)	0.15	(0.09)
Gender	0.09	(0.26)	0.13	(0.27)	0.23	(0.26)
Education	0.06	(0.09)	0.08	(0.10)	0.17 <sup>+</sup>	(0.09)
Politics	-0.06	(0.08)	-0.03	(0.08)	-0.00	(0.08)
Income	0.03	(0.05)	0.04	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)
Vote	-0.05	(0.11)	0.00	(0.12)	-0.03	(0.11)
White	0.93	(0.97)	1.43	(1.01)	-0.09	(0.97)
Constant	2.99 <sup>+</sup>	(1.22)	2.67 <sup>+</sup>	(1.27)	3.28**	(1.22)
<i>N</i>	115		115		115	
Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.091		0.037		0.100	

Standard errors in parentheses. <sup>+</sup> *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

Across these three questions, the \$5,000 cap on contributions to IECs reduces perceptions that *quid pro quo* corruption is likely to plague the state government. To put the observations another way, the cap substantially and significantly reduces perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption.

We also asked a range of other questions about perceptions of government legitimacy, democratic representativeness, and effectiveness, using language from leading U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such as *Buckley v. Valeo*. In all these questions, we found that the cap had a salutary, prophylactic effect. See the appendix. For example, with a \$5,000 cap in place, respondents were significantly *more likely* to agree that “people like me are likely to have strong voice in government” (Table A1) and that “government is likely to be effective” (Table A3). And respondents were significantly *less likely* to agree that “government will be controlled by special interests” (Table A4) and “many elected officials will be ‘crooked’” (Table A7).

For Experiment 2, we conclude that a \$5,000 cap on IEC committee contributions has a significant and substantial effect on perceptions of *quid pro quo* corruption and that the cap supports broader perceptions of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness.

## Qualitative Findings

Twice during the survey experience, we asked respondents to answer open-ended questions. In addition to improving engagement with the vignettes, and allowing us to detect junk data, these answers also provide qualitative data that can supplement the quantitative data analyzed above. We provide a few examples from Mainers in particular, to add color. We did not systematically analyze these responses for themes but exhibit several here. These respondents speak for themselves.

### **Mainers in \$5,000 Cap Conditions**

- I believe there should be a cap on donations so that people running in elections are not able to be bought
- This system for the State of Ames seems legit. That most candidates will have to fund their own campaigns with private funding. And, that the cap for SuperPac's ensures that. Making it harder for a politician to be [bought] off.
- The state of Ames has an effective cap on political funding contributions from private entities presuming this law is followed. Ames' political candidates are likely more genuine to their constituents rather than business oligarchs. In Ames, elections cannot be bought by the millionaire class and that is better for their society as a whole.
- I feel the government of Ames is what all towns should be like. nobody should be able to buy their seat doesn't matter what position they are going for. its consequences should be removal from that position and not be able to run again.

### **Mainers in No-Cap Conditions**

- It sounds like people can buy policy changes. It makes me not trust Ames politicians.
- Elections and policies are being bought in a highly corrupt election system
- This system for the state of Ames would indicate that large corporations can create super Pacs or eics to donate large amounts of money to get government officials to vote or spend money in certain areas for the benefit of their company. This makes me feel that the rich and wealthy are able to manipulate their politicians to do what they want them to do and not necessarily do what's in the best interest of the people of the state.
- It feels like they're corrupt and all about money. It feels like oligarchy.
- Makes me feel disappointed and worried about the future of Ames and the effect it would have on the people

These qualitative comments broadly track the quantitative findings we observe above.

## Strengths and Limitations

Our research study had several strengths as well as limitations. First, to be clear, we measured perceptions of the risk of *quid pro quo* corruption. We do not measure the prevalence of *quid pro quo* corruption itself.

Ours is not a probability-based survey with random selection, which is increasingly difficult and rare in the modern era of survey research, where people do not have land-line

phones but do screen their calls. Instead, we constructed a sample that was appropriate for the task, selected to be nationally-representative on two key demographic targets (age and gender), which can be otherwise skewed in online convenience samples. We also oversampled in a relevant sub-population of interest (Mainers).

With this sample size ( $n=1144$ ), we had sufficient statistical power to detect effects that would have real-world interest. Our  $p$ -values and confidence intervals create no difficulty in ruling out the null hypotheses at standard levels used in social science, even in the smaller subset of Mainers ( $n=115$ ).

Our randomized experimental design allows us to make valid within-sample comparisons, avoiding confounds with observable and unobservable covariates. Even if, for example, some respondents might have very strong views about political corruption regardless of our manipulation, randomization distributed such people to each experimental condition, washing out such background factors.

Our two experiments complement each other. Experiment 1 allowed respondents to engage broadly with the idea of corruption, before being educated on the specifics of the campaign finance regime. This experiment also allowed us to identify whether the amount of contributions to committees caused changes in the perception of *quid pro quo* corruption, without focusing respondents on any particular threshold amount. This minimal experimental design avoided demand effects, which can plague other sorts of surveys (“push polls”).

Experiment 2 is, in contrast, legally-situated. It provided more details about the legal regime in which a \$5,000 cap would be implemented, allowing the possibility that a respondent might see such a cap as being superfluous if they perceived the background policies to be sufficient, or immaterial if they perceived the sum of all such laws to be futile. Against this background, our manipulation allows assessment as to whether this one discrete policy change (a \$5,000 cap on IEC contributions) makes a difference on the margin.

Together our findings in these two experiments provide convergent validity. Likewise, our qualitative data provides further evidence that coheres with our quantitative findings.

One limitation of our methodology is that it is difficult to theorize exactly what level of real-world respondent attention should be appropriately simulated to answer the relevant legal question. Of course, Americans worry about all sorts of things (e.g., prices, jobs, health, children), and rationally may not spend much time thinking about campaign finance. At any given time, their likelihood of doing so is likely affected by all sorts of cultural, economic, and other situational factors (e.g., whether there is an election pending or a



relevant scandal in the media). Rather than serving as a generalizable public opinion poll, our research project is best understood at a micro, psychological level, exploring how people would react once confronted by the issue either generally (in Experiment 1) or more specifically (in Experiment 2). Contingent on having a certain level of attention and information, how do people think about their government's legitimacy and effectiveness? Our approach might be broadly analogous to the way jurors are selected from the broad population, but then asked to focus their attention on a particular case and to render a verdict thereon, drawing from their background experience and common sense.

Still, even while we designed our study to engage the attention of respondents and took several precautions in designing the study and reviewing the data, with any online research project, a substantial number of respondents may still not be fully attentive. In our final question, we asked respondents to recall the legal regime they read about and answer a question as to whether a given behavior involving a \$1.5M contribution to an IEC would be legal or illegal. The correct answer varied, depending on whether the respondent had been assigned to the \$5,000 cap or the no-cap control condition. This question can be labelled a "manipulation check" as distinct from the "attention checks" described above, and it must be handled carefully as it begs the question of how important or memorable the manipulation *should* be to the respondent.

In fact, substantial numbers (394) of respondents failed this manipulation check, suggesting that they were inattentive, forgetful, simply did not understand the complex legal regime, or perhaps just did not believe this variation was important. We nonetheless have *not* screened these incorrect respondents out for the purposes of the primary analyses reported above (n=1,144). Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we did also exclude those respondents who failed the manipulation check, and in the reduced sample (n=750), we found even stronger effects, as would be expected. See Table A16 in the appendix.

## Conclusions

Based on my scientific training, my review of the social science literature, and my own standard social science methods detailed herein, I am able to render opinions in this report with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Accordingly, it is my opinion to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that

- a. larger financial contributions to committees supporting candidates increase perceptions that *quid pro quo* corruption is likely,
- b. the perceived risk of *quid pro quo* corruption is substantially higher when contributions are above \$4,999 in particular,
- c. a \$5,000 cap on contributions to IECs has a substantial salutary effect by reducing perceptions that *quid pro quo* corruption is likely,
- d. a \$5,000 cap also increases broader confidence in the system of representative government, supporting perceptions of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of government to serve public interests.

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## Exhibit 3-B

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### I. EDUCATION

**J.D., Harvard Law School, *magna cum laude* (2007)**

Petrie-Flom Student Fellow in Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics  
Hewlett Research Fellow in Law and Negotiation  
Oberman Prize for Health Law and Bioethics  
Health Law Scholar Award

**Ph.D. & M.A., Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy (2003)**

Graduate Fellowship and Dissertation Fellowship  
Research assistantship with Social Norms Marketing Research Project (EDC)

**B.A., Southeast Missouri State University, Philosophy, *summa cum laude* (4.0 GPA) (1997)**

National Merit, Governor's, and Bright Flight Scholarships  
White House Chief of Staff's Office Internship

### II. ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS AND TEACHING

**Professor with Tenure and N. Neal Pike Scholar, Boston University School of Law (2020-),**

**Associate Dean for Strategic Initiatives (2022-present).** Secondary appointment at School of Public Health (2022-), Faculty Affiliate within the Center for Innovation in Social Science (CISS) (2021-). Formerly: Associate Dean for Graduate and International Programs (interim, 2021-2022). Teaching: Health Law; Bioethics and Healthcare Decision Making; Torts; Law and Science, with Kevin Outterson.

**Visiting Scholar (JD-Next) (2020-), James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.**

Formerly: Associate Professor (2010-2015), Professor with Tenure (2015-2020), Associate Dean for Research & Innovation (2015-2020). Teaching: Torts; Bioethics and the Law; Health Law; Regulatory Science Colloquium; Distinguished Scholars Colloquium; Law and Behavior Research Lab, with David Yokum; Sex, Drugs, Race, and Power in the Supreme Court; Masters Seminar in Cognitive Science, Ethics, & Law, with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini.

**Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, Law Department (2018).** Teaching: Graduate workshop on empirical methods.

**Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law (2016).** Teaching: Torts.

**Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School (2013-2014).** Teaching: Torts; Health Law; Workshop in Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics, with I. Glenn Cohen.

**Academic Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics, Harvard Law School (2008-2010).** Teaching: Empirical Approaches to Health Policy Reading Group; Healthcare Reform Seminar, with Allison Hoffman.

**Teaching Fellow, Harvard College Department of Government (2006).** Teaching: Justice (under Michael Sandel); Biotech and Our Genetic Future (under Sandel and Doug Melton).

**Visiting Lecturer, Washington University Philosophy Department (2004).** Teaching: Bioethics; Introduction to Philosophy.

**Adjunct Instructor, Webster University Philosophy Department (2001-2003).** Teaching: Bioethics; Philosophy of War and Terror; Philosophy of Leadership.

### III. SCHOLARSHIP

#### Authored Books

Christopher T. Robertson, EXPOSED: WHY OUR HEALTH INSURANCE IS INCOMPLETE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (Harvard University Press, 2019) ([press page](#), introduction on [SSRN](#)). reviewed: David Orentlicher, *The Failure of Patient Cost Sharing*, JOTWELL (2020) ([site](#)); reviewed: Karen Posner, 131 ANESTHESIA AND ANALGESIA, e214-e215 (2020) ([journal](#)); reviewed: Isaac Buck, 40 JOURNAL LEGAL MEDICINE, 283-284 (2020) ([journal](#)).

#### Edited Books

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Christopher T. Robertson and Aaron S. Kesselheim, Eds., BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Elsevier, 2016) (foreword, introduction, and TOC on [SSRN](#)).

I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, and Christopher Robertson, Eds. NUDGING HEALTH: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH LAW (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016, second printing 2020) (introduction on [SSRN](#)). reviewed: Shlomo Cohen, *On Nudging Health*, 48 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 45 (2018) ([journal](#)); reviewed: Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, *A Must-Read on Health Care Nudges*, JOTWELL (2017) ([site](#)); reviewed: Yaniv Hanoch, *Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics*, 44 HEALTH POLITICS POLICY LAW 80 (2019) ([journal](#)).

#### Chapters and Parts of Books

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- Christopher T. Robertson, Mark Rukavina, Erin Fuse Brown, *New State Consumer Protections Against Medical Debt*. 327 JAMA 121 (2022) ([journal](#)).
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- Jonathan D. Loe, D. Alex Winkelman, and Christopher T. Robertson, *An Assessment of the Human Subjects Protection Review Process for Exempt Research*, 44 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE AND ETHICS 481 (2016) ([journal](#)).
- Jonathan Loe and Christopher Robertson, *Federal Government’s Proposed Expansion of Regulation of Biospecimen Research Should Be Reconsidered*, 14 BIOPRESERVATION AND BIOBANKING 447 (2016) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher Robertson, Alex Winkelman, Kelly Bergstrand, and Darren Modzelewski, *The Appearance and Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation*, 8 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 375 (2016) ([SSRN](#)).
- Christopher Robertson, *Vaccinations and Airline Travel: A Federal Role to Protect the Public Health*, 42 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE 543 (symposium, 2016) ([SSRN](#)).
- Christina Cutshaw, Christopher T. Robertson, Steffie Woolhandler, and David Himmelstein, *Medical Causes and Consequences of Home Foreclosures*, 46 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH SERVICES 36 (2016) ([journal](#)).
- Sunita Sah, Christopher Robertson, and Shima Baradaran, *Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System*, 1:2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND POLICY 69 (2015) ([SSRN](#)). reprinted in: LEE E. ROSS, Ed., READINGS IN CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, (Cognella Academic Publishing, 2020).
- Athan Papaïliou, David Yokum, & Christopher T. Robertson, *The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness Instruction Induces Skepticism But Not Sensitivity*, 10 (12) PLOS ONE e0142695 (2015) ([SSRN](#)).
- Christopher Robertson, *New DTCA Guidance — Enough to Empower Consumers?* 373 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1085 (Sept 17, 2015) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Scaling Cost-Sharing to Income: How Employers Can Reduce Healthcare Spending and Provide Greater Economic Security*, 14 YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 239 (2014) ([SSRN](#)). reviewed: David Orentlicher, *Making Cost Sharing Fairer and More Effective*, JOTWELL (2015) ([site](#)).
- Dan Durand, Christopher Robertson, Gautam Agarwal, Richard Duczak, Elizabeth Krupinski, Jason Itri, Anthony Fotenos, Brent Savoie, Alexander Ding, & Jonathan Lewin, *Expert Witness Blinding Strategies to Mitigate Bias in Radiology Malpractice Cases: A Review of the Relevant Scientific, Professional and Legal Literature*, 11 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF RADIOLOGY 868 (2014) ([journal](#)).
- Megan S. Wright and Christopher T. Robertson, *Heterogeneity in IRB Policies with Regard to Disclosures about Payment for Participation in Recruitment Materials*, 42 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE, & ETHICS 375 (2014) ([SSRN](#)).

- Christopher T. Robertson, David Yokum, Nimish Sheth, & Keith Joiner, *A Randomized Experiment of the Split Benefit Health Insurance Reform To Reduce High-Cost, Low-Value Consumption*, 1 INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN HEALTH 5 (2014) ([SSRN](#)).
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Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, *The Burden of Deciding for Yourself: The Disutility Caused by Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Spending*, 11 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW 609 (2014) ([SSRN](#)).

Christopher T. Robertson, *The Presumption Against Expensive Healthcare Consumption*, 49 TULSA LAW REVIEW 627 (2014) ([SSRN](#)).

Christopher T. Robertson, *Contingent Compensation of Post-Conviction Counsel: A Modest Proposal to Identify Meritorious Claims and Reduce Wasteful Government Spending*, 64 MAINE LAW REVIEW 513 (2012) ([SSRN](#)).

Christopher T. Robertson, *The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in Biomedical Science, Without Violating the First Amendment*, 37 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE 358 (2011) ([SSRN](#)).

### **Comments, Replies, Dissemination, and Other Works**

Christopher Robertson and Tara Sklar, *The States' Hodgepodge of Physician Licensure Regulations*, 52 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE, AND ETHICS 419 (2004) ([SSRN](#)).

Christopher Robertson, *Harm-Prevention Arguments are Easier to Confuse Than to Rebut*, 24 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 100 (2024) ([journal](#)).

Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum, *The Case for Scientific Jury Experiments*, 66 FOR THE DEFENSE 6 (Feb. 2024), syndicated at JDSUPRA ([full text](#)).

Annabel Kupke, Christopher T. Robertson, and Carmel Shachar, *Pulse Oximeters and Federal Antidiscrimination Law—Reply*, 321 JAMA 1884 (2023) ([journal](#)).

Jess Findley, Andrew Woods, Christopher Robertson, & Marv Slepian, *Keeping the Patient at the Center of Machine Learning in Healthcare*, 20 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 54 (2020) ([journal](#)).

Victor Laurion and Christopher Robertson, *Why the Duty to Research Falls on Institutions Rather than Individuals*, 19 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 44 (2019) ([journal](#)).

Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, and David Yokum, *Crowdsourcing & Data Analytics: The New Settlement Tools*, 102 JUDICATURE 63 (2018) ([journal](#)).

Christopher Robertson and Jamie Cox Robertson, *Reducing Wasteful Incarcerations*, 39:2 REGULATION 20 (2016) ([journal](#)).

Sarah Malanga, Ryan Sprissler, Christopher Robertson, & Keith Joiner, *A Problem Not Yet Manifest: Gaps in Insurance Coverage of Medical Interventions After Genetic Testing*, 2 JOURNAL OF LAW AND BIOSCIENCES 1 (2015), doi:10.1093/jlb/lsv043 ([journal](#)).

Christopher T. Robertson and Keith A. Joiner, *Scaling and Splitting, New Approaches to Health Insurance*, 38 REGULATION 40 (2015) ([journal](#)).

Jonathan Loe, Christopher Robertson, & Alex Winkelman, *Cascading Consent for Research on Biobank Specimens*, 15 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 68 (2015) ([journal](#)).

Roger Koppl, David Charlton, Irving Kornfield, Dan Krane, Michael Risinger, Christopher Robertson, Michael Saks, & William Thompson, *Do Observer Effects Matter? A Comment on Langenburg, Bochet, and Ford*, 6 FORENSIC SCIENCE POLICY & MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 1 (2015) ([journal](#)).

Christopher T. Robertson, *The Problem of Biased Experts, and Blinding as a Solution: A Response to Professor Gelbach*, 81 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW DIALOGUE 61 (2014) ([SSRN](#)).

Ameet Sarpatwari, Christopher T. Robertson, David V. Yokum & Keith Joiner, *Crowdsourcing Public Health Experiments: A Response To Jonathan Darrow's "Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials"*, 98 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 2326 (2014) ([SSRN](#)).

- Christopher T. Robertson, *Why Intuitionism and Metaphysics Are Wrong for Health Law*, 11 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 18 (2009) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Making Pragmatism Practicable for the Institutional Review Board*, 8 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 49 (2008) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *A Reply to David Undis*, 49 JURIMETRICS 3 (2008) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *The Consequences of Qualified Confidentiality*, 6 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 31 (2006) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Who is Really Hurt Anyway? The Problem of Organ Solicitation*, 5 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 15 (2005) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Recent Developments in Embryonic Stem Cell Policy: Can Science Resolve The Ethical Problems It Creates?* 33 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 384 (2005).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Organ Advertising: Desperate Patients Solicit Volunteers*, 33 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 170 (2005) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Framing the Organ Issue: Altruism or Cooperation*, 4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS 46 (2004) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *The Notion of Sovereign Exclusive Dominion for Global Political Justice*, 20 SOUTHWEST PHILOSOPHY REVIEW 231 (2004) ([journal](#)).
- Christopher T. Robertson, *Slote on Ordinary Moral Thought and Theorization*, 19 SOUTHWEST PHILOSOPHY REVIEW 190 (2003) ([journal](#)).

### **Grants and Support**

- Co-Investigator, *'Generosity Framing' to Encourage Young and Healthy Individuals to Purchase Health Insurance*, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Evidence for Action Program (2021).
- Principal Investigator, *JD-Next*, AccessLex Institute (2020, 2021), Co-Investigator, ETS (2021, 2022).
- Co-Principal Investigator, *Perspectives of Diverse Patient Populations on AI and Big Data*, National Institute for Heart, Lung, & Blood Disorders (NIH) (2019).
- Co-Principal Investigator, *A Randomized Trial of the Novel JD-Exposure, Assessment, Preparation Program*; AccessLex Institute (2019).
- Co-Principal Investigator, *Evaluation of the BA in Law and an Intervention for Latinas*, AccessLex Institute (2019).
- Co-Principal Investigator, *A Randomized Field Experiment of the Effect of Physician Conflicts of Interest Disclosure on Patient Trust and Reliance*, Greenwall Foundation (via the Cleveland Clinic) (2014).
- Principal Investigator, *Experimental Investigations into Institutional Corruption (aka "535 Felons")*, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, collaborative research project (2014).
- Consulting Investigator, *Experimental Jury Research on Patent Litigation*, Hughes Program, Denver University (2014).
- Consulting Investigator, *Countering the Plaintiff's Anchor: Jury Simulations to Assess Damages Arguments*, Hughes Pilot Project Grant Program, Denver University (2013).
- Co-Principal Investigator, *Blinding Science*, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, collaborative research project (2012).

Co-Principal Investigator, *The Impact of Home Foreclosures on Public Health*, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (2012).

Principal Investigator, *Law and Behavior Research Lab*, University of Arizona Honors College, (2012).

Co-Principal Investigator, *Empirical Research on Physician's Responses to Conflict of Interest Disclosures*, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University (2010).

Principal Investigator, *Empirical Research on Juror Decisions in Medical Malpractice Cases*, Petrie Flom Center of Harvard Law School (2009).

Principal Investigator, *Empirical Research on Causes of Home Foreclosures*, Harvard Law School Office of the Dean (2006).

### **Working Papers**

Jacqueline Salwa, Matt Charles, Jessica Findley, Adriana Cimetta, Heidi Legg Burross, & Christopher Robertson, *Interventions to Increase Adherence in an Academic Support Program: A Randomized Controlled Experiment*.

Bernard Chao and Christopher Robertson, *Law's Punishment Divide*.

### **International Presentations**

Conference on Experimental Methods in Legal Research, Jerusalem, Israel (2023)

Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, Fontainebleau, France (2023)

Experimental Methods in Economics Research, Santiago, Chile (2016)

Institutional Corruption Conference, Mexico City, Mexico (2013)

Conference on Ethical, Social, and Legal Implications of Human Research, Cambridge, UK (2012)

### **Competitive Peer Reviewed Paper Presentations and Scientific Posters**

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Chicago (two presentations, 2023)

American Law and Economics Association, Boston (presentation, 2023)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Charlottesville (presentation, 2022)

American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, Columbia (presentation and poster, 2022)

Academy Health, New Orleans (poster, 2022)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Toronto (presentation, 2022)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Claremont McKenna (presentation, 2019)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Michigan (presentation, 2018)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell (poster, 2017)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell (presentation, 2017)

Academy Health, New Orleans (poster, 2017)

American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, Yale Law School (2017)

American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, Harvard Law School (2016)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Washington University in St. Louis (2015)

American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, University of Chicago (2014)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Pennsylvania (2013)

Junior Faculty Forum, sponsored by Yale, Stanford, and Harvard, at Yale (2013)

Junior Faculty Forum, sponsored by Yale, Stanford, and Harvard, at HLS (2012)

American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, Stanford (poster, 2012)

Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Stanford (2012)

New Voices in Civil Justice Workshop, Vanderbilt Law School (2012)  
Conflicts of Interest in the Practice of Medicine, ASLME National Conference at U. of Pittsburgh (2011)  
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Northwestern University Law School (2011)  
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Southern California (poster, 2009)

### **Recorded Talks and Appearances (selected)**

*Vertical Integration in GLP-1 Promotion and Off-Label Use*, Loyola Chicago Symposium (2025) ([video](#)).

*JD-Next: A Valid and Reliable Tool to Predict Diverse Students' Success in Law School*, Faculti.net (2024) ([video](#)).

*Robophobia: How Aversion to AI Creates Health Risks*, Boston University Research on Tap (2023) ([video](#)).

*Moral Framing of Health Insurance*, New Ideas in Health Insurance Series, University of Connecticut Insurance Law Center (2023) ([video](#)).

*Mitigating Conflicts of Interest in Healthcare*, New York Academy of Sciences and NYU Grossman School of Medicine (2021) ([video](#)).

*Telehealth: How Law Can Spur Its Adoption*, presentation to UNLV Health Law Program (2020) ([video](#)).

*Potential Solutions for Reducing Racial Disparities in Attorney Discipline*, presentation to California State Bar Board of Trustees (2020) ([video](#), session IV.A).

*Covid-19 and Preapproval Access to Drugs* (2020) ([video](#), starting at 34:29 on off-label and intended uses).

*Ethical and Regulatory Implications of Recent Events in COVID-19* (2020) ([video](#)).

Book talk on *Exposed*, Petrie Flom Center at Harvard Law School (2020) ([video](#)).

*If We Cannot Live with the Individual Mandate, Can We Cover Enough Lives Without It?* American Enterprise Institute (2019) ([video](#)).

*Driving Value in the U.S. Healthcare System*, University of Nevada Las Vegas (2019) ([video](#)).

*Ordeals in Health Care: Ethics & Efficient Delivery*, Harvard Law School – Distributive Ethics Panel ([video](#)) and Practical Implications Panel (2019) ([video](#)).

*Obviousness and Hindsight Bias in Patent Law*, London School of Economics Department of Law (2019) ([audio and slides](#)).

*Corruption in Chains of Epistemic Reliance: The Cases of Doctors and Witnesses*, Edmond J. Safra Center at Harvard University (2017) ([video](#)).

*The Need to Accelerate Therapeutic Development — Must Randomized Controlled Trials Give Way?* The New York Academy of Sciences (2017) ([video](#)).

*Medical Innovation and the Law*, Classical Liberal Institute, NYU School of Law (2017) ([video](#)).

## **V. MEDIA**

### **Essays and Opinion Pieces**

*The Best Way to Convince Healthy People to Get Insurance is Not 'Because It's in Your Financial Interest'*, STAT NEWS, November 3, 2023 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Wendy Netter Epstein).



January 2025

- Trump's Special Treatment in the Courts Highlights Failings in our Legal System*, THE HILL, August 17, 2023 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Russell Gold).
- Donald Trump's Right – He is Getting Special Treatment, Far Better than Most Other Criminal Defendants*, THE CONVERSATION (syndicated in SALON and elsewhere), August 9, 2023 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Russell Gold).
- A Simple Solution to Regulate AI*, THE HILL, July 21, 2023 ([text](#)).
- Arizona's Debt Collection Reform—A Small Step Towards Health Justice*, BMJ, November 23, 2022 ([text](#)) (co-authored with David Himmelstein and Steffie Woolhandler).
- It's Time to Repeal the ABA's Law School Testing Mandate*, BLOOMBERG LAW, August 16, 2022 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Marc Miller, Robert Williams, John Pierre).
- A New Alzheimer's Drug Shows Why the FDA's Speedy Approval Process is Broken*, WASHINGTON POST, January 10, 2022 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Holly Fernandez Lynch).
- Constitution allows Biden to mandate COVID vaccine. Federal government can do even more.* USA TODAY, September 19, 2021 (reprinted on MSN) ([text](#)).
- Is it a Crime to Forge a Vaccine Card? And What's the Penalty for Using a Fake?* THE CONVERSATION (reprinted in QUARTZ, SALON, etc), August 30, 2021 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Wes Oliver).
- Cruise Ship Vaccine Mandates are Great. The Latest Ruling for Them Wasn't.* WASHINGTON POST, August 11, 2021 ([text](#)) (co-authored with I. Glenn Cohen).
- Paying People to Get Vaccinated Might Work – but is it Ethical?* THE CONVERSATION, May 19, 2021 ([text](#)).
- Biden's Attempts to Diversify Federal Courts Can't Come Fast Enough*, THE HILL, April 6, 2021 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Robert Tsai).
- What are Emergency Use Authorizations, and Do They Guarantee that a Vaccine or Drug is Safe?* THE CONVERSATION, December 3, 2020 ([text](#)); also republished on MARKETPLACE ([text](#)) as *What you need to know about an emergency use authorization for a COVID-19 vaccine* (co-authored with Jeremy Greene).
- Conservatives Backed the Ideas behind Obamacare, So How Did They Come to Hate It?* THE CONVERSATION, November 10, 2020 ([text](#)); also republished on SALON ([text](#)), and on NATIONAL INTEREST as *Obamacare Has Republican DNA: So Why the War to Kill It?* ([text](#)) (co-authored with Wendy Epstein).
- We Need an Independent Public Health Agency*, THE HILL, July 27, 2020 ([text](#)) (co-authored with former Surgeon General Richard Carmona).
- In the Rush to Innovate for COVID-19 Drugs, Sound Science Is Still Essential*, THE CONVERSATION, April 8, 2020 ([text](#)); also republished on CBS NEWS as *Scientists weigh in on coronavirus drugs: What we know, what we don't* ([text](#)) (co-authored with Alison Bateman House, Holly Fernandez Lynch, and Keith Joiner).
- Without Obamacare, the COVID-19 Crisis Would Be Far Worse*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 1, 2020 ([text](#)) (co-authored with Wendy Epstein).
- Airplanes Spread Diseases Quickly – so Maybe Unvaccinated People Shouldn't be Allowed to Fly*, THE CONVERSATION February 26, 2020 ([text](#)); also republished in CHICAGO SUN TIMES ([text](#)) and translated to Finnish, Japanese, and Indonesian (co-authored with Keith Joiner).
- Does 'No More Copays, No More Deductibles' Really Represent Radical Health Care Reform?* STAT (Boston Globe Media) January 20, 2020 ([text](#)).

*Politicians are Missing the Big Point on Health Care*, CNN ONLINE, January 17, 2020 ([text](#)).

*It's Hard to be Economically Rational When You're Sick*, THE HILL, March 21, 2018 (co-authored with Victor Laurion, [text](#)).

*Police Shouldn't Access Your Phone's Data Without a Court Order*, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (co-authored with Bernard Chao and Ian Farrell, [text](#)).

*It's Time to Rethink the Law School Entrance Exam Monopoly*, THE HILL, October 25, 2017 (co-authored with Marc Miller, [text](#)).

*Behavioral Science Suggests that Obamacare May Survive*, co-authored with Holly Fernandez Lynch and Glenn Cohen, STAT (Boston Globe Media) (2017) ([text](#)).

*For Fairer Courts, Address Prosecutor Bias*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 2016 (co-authored with Shima Baughman and Sunita Sah, [text](#)); also republished on PBS NEWSHOUR as *Training Police is Not Enough to Eliminate Racial Bias* ([text](#)).

*Wrongful Incarceration*, USA TODAY (MAGAZINE) 262016 WLNR 36854856, January 11, 2016 (co-authored with Jamie Robertson).

*Learning the Wrong Lesson on Privacy from Henrietta Lacks*, WASHINGTON POST, January 8, 2016 (co-authored with Jonathan Loe [text](#)).

### **Selected Press Coverage**

Katie Palmer, *Senators demand answers on telehealth platforms from Pfizer and Eli Lilly*, STAT+ (October 22, 2024) ([interviewed](#)).

Theresa Schliep, *Gov't Looks to High Court To Preserve Free Preventive Care*, LAW360.COM (October 1, 2024) ([interviewed](#)).

Maia Anderson, *General Catalyst's healthcare plans raise concerns over patient safety*, HEALTHCARE BREW, November 17, 2023 ([interviewed](#)).

Elizabeth Lopatto, *Who Wins When Telehealth Companies Push Weight Loss Drugs?* THE VERGE, October 2, 2023 ([interviewed](#)).

Adam Reilly, *How Should Media Cover the Trump Indictment?* WGBH NEWS, August 18, 2023 ([interviewed in studio](#)).

Jessica Hamzelou, *Who gets to decide who receives experimental medical treatments?* MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, August 10, 2023 ([quoted](#)).

Mike Sullivan, *'Gave the world a gift': Henrietta Lacks' family gets justice 70 years after cells taken without consent*, CBS NEWS BOSTON, August 2, 2023 ([interviewed on camera](#)).

Joseph Choi, *Drug industry launches furious legal fight against Medicare negotiating powers*, THE HILL, June 23, 2023 ([quoted](#)).

Christine Charnofsky, *ABA Approves 'JD-Next' as Admissions Test for UArizona Law, Other Schools With Variance*, ALM LAW.COM, June 7, 2023 ([quoted](#)).

Por Felipe Gutierrez, *Nos EUA, falsificação de prova de vacina pode ser punida com até 20 anos de prisão*, G1, May 3, 2023 ([quoted](#)).

Shannon Larson, *'Abortionists.' 'Unborn human.' Legal experts blast 'incendiary' rhetoric of Texas ruling on abortion pill*, BOSTON GLOBE, April 10, 2023 ([quoted](#)).

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- Nancy Kisicki, CONFERENCE REPORT: *California Addresses Racial Disparity in Attorney Discipline*, *Bloomberg News*, June 7 2022 ([text](#)).
- Claire Savage, *Social media posts push unproven and 'dangerous' Covid-19 treatments*, AFP FACT CHECK, October 25, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- Dora Mekour, *Mandates Give Rise to Booming Black Market for Fake Vaccine Cards*, VOICE OF AMERICA (VOA) NEWS, September 23, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- John Howell Show* on WLS-AM 890 in Chicago, September 21, 2021.
- Peter Grier, *Vaccines, mandates, and backlash: The long US history*, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, September 14, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- Sarah Wood, *An Increasing Number of Higher Ed Institutions Mandating COVID-19 Vaccinations*, DIVERSE: ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, September 14, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- Amanda Kaufman, *A Supreme Court case that originated in Mass. could provide a legal precedent for President Biden's vaccine mandates, experts say*, BOSTON GLOBE, September 10, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- Jay Hancock, *Pfizer court fight could legalize Medicare copays and unleash 'gold rush' in sales*, FORTUNE, July 2, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- Kat Eschner, *After 600 emergency use authorizations for COVID, experts worry the FDA has gone too far*, FORTUNE, June 7, 2021 ([quoted](#)).
- Amanda Beland Arun Rath, *Answering Questions About Vaccine Passports, Mandates, Incentives, And More*, WBUR IN IT TOGETHER, May 20, 2021 ([text and audio](#)).
- "Receta para el Caos": Falta de un Plan Federal Sobre Tests de Detección Puede Retrasar la Vuelta a la Normalidad*, UNIVISION, April 18, 2020 ([quoted](#)).
- Entrepreneurs Trying to Make up For Lost Time in COVID-19 Testing*, VICE NEWS, April 15, 2020 ([featured on camera](#), at 2:50).
- Cómo Afecta la Crisis del Doronavirus la Supervivencia de Obamacare*, UNIVISION, April 1, 2020 ([quoted](#)).
- Health Policy in the Presidential Primary*, SKYNEWS (UK), March 2, 2020.
- Trump's Phoenix Rally: What Were the Facts Behind his Major Claims?* USA TODAY, February 20, 2020 ([quoted](#)).
- Does Racial Bias Drive Prosecutors to Punish Blacks More Harshly? Top of Mind with Julie Rose*, SIRIUSXM, February 10, 2020 ([feature segment](#)).
- Obamacare is Turning 10. But its Cheerleaders are Focused on the Problems it Didn't Fix*, WASHINGTON POST (HEALTH 202), January 6, 2020 ([quoted](#)).
- Bad Medicine?* NEW SCIENTIST, November 30, 2019 ([quoted](#)).
- Arizona Sues Maker of Oxycontin*, AZPM NEWS, September 20, 2018 ([audio](#)).
- Clean Break: Kennedy Supreme Court Exit Could Upend Environmental Safeguards*, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, July 3, 2018 ([quoted](#))([text](#)).
- Libertarian Groups Eye Off-Label Drug Promotion Laws*, BLOOMBERGLAW, May 31, 2018 ([quoted](#))([text](#)).
- New Efforts Taking Root to Ease Off-Label Promotion*, MEDSCAPE, May 16, 2018 ([quoted](#))([text](#)).
- House Passes Right-to-Try on Second Try*, POLITICO, March 21, 2018 ([text](#)).

*A Big Pharma-funded Charity that Helps Patients Pay for Drugs Just Sued the Government*, WASHINGTON POST, January 8, 2018 ([text](#)).

*'Right to Try' Won't Lead to Miracle Cures*, BLOOMBERG VIEW, February 2, 2018 ([text](#)).

*How Drug Manufacturers are Fighting to Push Their Drugs for Unapproved Purposes*, SALON.COM October 23, 2017 ([text](#)).

*The Case for Giving Health-Care Consumers a 'Nudge' -- A law professor argues that people will make better choices if they're asked the right way*, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 25, 2017 ([text](#)).

*Cosby Trial Gears Up with Jury Selection in Pennsylvania*, NBC NEWS, May 19, 2017 ([text](#)).

*Department of Justice Decision to Allow National Forensic Sciences Commission to Expire*, BLOOMBERG LAW RADIO SHOW AND PODCAST 2017 ([audio](#)).

*The Power of Superdelegates and Campaign Contributions*, NPR MARKETPLACE, March 1, 2016 ([audio](#)).

*A Judge's Guidance Makes Jurors Suspicious of Any Eyewitness*, NPR MORNING EDITION, January 26, 2016 (research featured, [audio](#)).

*The Magic Question: Judges Trust Jurors to Assess Their Own Biases. That Might Not Be Such a Good Idea*, SLATE.COM, January 22, 2015 (research featured, [text](#)).

*California Counties Accuse Opioid Makers of Deceptive Marketing*, REUTERS LEGAL, May 23, 2014 ([text](#)).

*Lawyers Say Drugmakers May Follow GSK Marketing Overhaul*, REUTERS LEGAL, December 18, 2013.

*Q&A: Off-label drug promotion and the First Amendment*, REUTERS LEGAL, October 1, 2013.

*Foreclosure: Its Not Just About the Money*, CBS NEWS, January 15, 2010 ([text](#)).

### **Podcasts**

*Structural Sex Discrimination in Gynecology and the Law*, JUST ACCESS (2024) ([interview](#)).

*RVUs in Gynecologic Surgery: Equity & Reform*, BACKTABLE (2024) ([interview](#)).

*Interview on When Desperate Patients Go to Court for Unproven Treatments — The Battle for Hospital Independence*, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (2022) ([interview](#)).

MONEYLIFE WITH CHUCK JAFFE, June 1, 2020 ([interview](#) at 16:08).

*Overexposure*, PEERSPECTRUM, April 27, 2020 ([interview](#)).

*Christopher Robertson on Health Insurance*, FREEDOM CENTER TODAY 2:09, March 31, 2020 ([interview](#)).

*A True Outlook on American Health Insurance*, HEALTH CARE ROUNDS, Episode 93, March 19, 2020 ([interview](#)).

*Why is Getting Sick in the US Financially Toxic for Many People?* FACES OF DIGITAL HEALTH, March 14, 2020 ([interview](#)).

*Actuarial Value: From Moral Hazard to Cost-Shifting*, THE WEEK IN HEALTH LAW, February 20, 2020 ([interview](#)).

*Can They Freaking Do That?* ARM AND A LEG SHOW, Season 3 Episode 5, December 2019 ([interview](#)).

*Interview on whether the First Amendment should protect sales pitches by pharmaceutical representatives*, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (2016) 375:2313-2315 ([interview](#)).

*Blinding Experts to Reduce Bias*, JURISDICTION – THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PODCAST (2016) ([interview](#)).

*The Double Blind*, THE WEEK IN HEALTH LAW, March 2016 ([interview](#)).

*Interview on the FDA's new draft guidelines on direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising*, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 2015; 373:1085-1087 ([interview](#)).

*The Mind and the Law*, co-convenor of lecture series and podcast, 2014 ([audio](#)).

*When Less Information is Better: Blinding in Medicine*, Harvard Safra Center podcast, 2013 ([interview](#)).

### **Selected Blogposts and Other Media**

*Liability versus Full Coverage Car Insurance, Ask the Experts*, WalletHub, 2022 ([text](#)).

*In-Flight COVID Transmission: Surveying the Liability Landscape*, Bill of Health Blog (Harvard Law), 2022 ([text](#)).

*Liability Car Insurance, Ask the Experts*, WalletHub, 2021 ([text](#)).

*Webinar on Pre-Approval Access to Drugs*, Vox Advisors and Compassionate Use and Pre-Approval Access Working Group, 2021 ([video](#)).

*Video Explainers on Law in Time of Pandemic: Access to Drugs Before FDA Approval* ([video](#)), *Drug Shortages* ([video](#)); *Ethical Duty of Care* ([video](#)); *Constitutional Law* ([video](#), [video](#), [video](#)), 2020.

*Low Rates, Auto-Enroll: What Will Make People Ante Up for Coverage? -- Experts consider new strategies to replace ACA's abolished penalty*, MEDPAGETODAY, September 17, 2019 ([text](#)).

*House Right To Try Bill Wouldn't Preempt State Laws' Insurance Limits, Would Expand Liability Shield*, INSIDEHEALTHPOLICY, March 16, 2018 ([text](#)).

*Medical Bills are Open-Price Contracts: A Victory for the Little Guy*, Bill of Health Blog (Harvard Law), 2017 ([text](#)).

*Is it Legal for Trump to Punish Health Insurers That Do Not Support Repeal of Obamacare?* Bill of Health Blog (Harvard Law), 2017 ([text](#)).

*National Survey Suggests that Off-Label Status is Material to Informed Consent*, Bill of Health Blog (Harvard Law), 2017 ([text](#)).

*Conflict of Interest Disclosures Come to Pub Med*, Bill of Health Blog (Harvard Law), 2017, ([text](#)).

*Open Payments: Early Impact and the Next Wave of Reform*, Health Affairs Forefront, co-authored with Tony Caldwell, 2015 ([text](#)).

*To Support Physician Decision-Making, Re-Evaluate Industry Funding of Science*, Health Affairs Forefront, 2015 ([text](#)).

*Can Proportionality Distinguish Quid Pro Quo Corruption?* Institutional Corruption Blog, 2015 ([text](#)).

*Mello's Medmal 2.0 Study Documents Discordant Outcomes in the Communication-and-Resolution Programs*, Jotwell, 2014 ([text](#)).

## VI. SERVICE AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY

### Amicus Briefs and Regulatory Comments

Letter of Health Law Scholars on the Standard of Care for Medical Malpractice Restatement Project, Council of the American Law Institute (primary drafter) (2023).

Brief of Law Scholars, *Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Becerra*, District Court for the District of New Jersey, 3:23-cv-3335-ZNQ-JBD (as amicus) (2023).

Comment by Scholars, *AI Accountability Project*, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Docket No. 230407-0093 (2023).

Brief of Health Law Scholars, *Food and Drug Administration, et al., v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al.*, filed in District, Fifth Circuit, and United States Supreme Court, 23-10362 (2023) (as amicus).

Brief of Empirical Corruption Scholars, *Lieu v. Federal Election Commission*, filed in Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 19-502 (2019), filed in United States Supreme Court 19-1398 (2020) (as amicus).

Brief of Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars, *Carpenter v. United States*, United States Supreme Court, 16-402 (2017) (as amicus).

Brief of Forensic Science Experts, *Wisconsin v. Brian Avery*, Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2010AP1952 (2012) (as amicus).

Brief for New England Journal of Medicine et al, *IMS v. Sorrell*, United States Supreme Court, 10-779 (2010-11) (as co-counsel).

### Peer Reviewer, Referee, or Commentator

2024: JAMA (twice), New England Journal of Medicine, Israel Science Foundation, PLoS One, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Journal of Law & Biosciences (twice)

2023: Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Current Medical Research & Opinion, PLoS One, New England Journal of Medicine (2x), Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, JAMA, American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting

2022: BMJ Open, Bioethics, Journal of Pediatrics, Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA); American Journal of Public Health (AJPH); National Science Foundation Law & Science Program

2021: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS); Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA); American Journal of Public Health (AJPH); Journal of Law and Biosciences.

2020: JAMA; Health Affairs; Journal of Law & Biosciences; Behavioral Public Policy; Milbank Quarterly

2019 and prior: University of Arizona Foundation Small Grants Program (six); Journal of General Internal Medicine; American Journal of Public Health; JAMA Network Open; Social Philosophy & Policy (project editor); American Journal of Law & Medicine; New England Journal of Medicine; Stanford Law Review; National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program; Conference on Empirical Legal Studies; Journal of Law and the Biosciences (twice); JAMA Internal Medicine; Journal of General Internal Medicine; American Psychology-Law Society Grant Program; National Science Center, Poland; PLoS One; Health Affairs; BMJ;

Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics; University of Houston Health Law Center Scholars Workshop; Journal of Bioethical Inquiry; Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Public Health Law Research Program; American Society for Bioethics & Humanities Annual Meeting; HLS Petrie Flom Center Annual Conference; BMC Medical Ethics; Review of Law and Economics; Journal of Empirical Legal Studies; Conference on Empirical Legal Studies; Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO); Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ); Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Public Health Law Research Program; Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Public Health Law Research Program; Wellcome Trust (UK) Fellowship Program (twice); Journal of Social Psychological and Personality Science; Oxford University Press; Blackwell Press.

### **Outside Service (selected)**

Science & Technology Entry Program, NYU Langone School of Medicine (2024).

Elected Member, American Law Institute (2023-present), Advisor to the Project on Medical Liability (2023-present).

Affiliated Member, NYU Grossman School of Medicine Working Group on Compassionate Use and Pre-Approval Access (CUPA) (2016-present).

Academic Program Review, University of California (2019, 2022).

Reporter, Committee to Monitor Developments in Health Law, Uniform Law Commission (2018-2020).

Clinical Bioethics Committee, Banner University Medical Center (2010-2020).

Methods Core, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Public Health Law Research Program (2013-2015).

### **College and University Service (selected, since 2020)**

Assessments and Outcomes Committee (2024); Co-Chair, College Governance Committee (2023-24); University Appointments, Promotions, and Tenure Committee (2023-24); Dean Search Committee, Sargent College of Health & Rehabilitation Sciences (2022-23); Co-Convenor, Law and Economics Workshop (2022); Graduate and Foreign Programs Committee Co-Chair (2022-23); Law Lateral Appointments Committee (2022-23); Health Law Program Co-Chair (2020-21); Law Joint Appointments Committee (2020-21, 2021-22); Graduate Programs Committee (2021-22); Pandemic Pedagogy Task Force (2020); Learn from Anywhere coach (2020-21). Philosophy Department Hiring Committee (2021-22).

### **Legal and Consulting Experience (selected)**

Consultant, Aspen Publishing (for JD-Next) (2024-present). Consultant, Themis Bar Review (data strategy) (2024-present). Equal Citizens (litigation expert) (2025). Consulting Advisor, California State Bar Board of Trustees (on disparities in attorney discipline, see review [here](#)) (2020-2022). Founding Partner, [HUGO Analytics](#) – provider of experimental jury research for litigators (2016-2024). Admitted to practice law in Mississippi and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (2007). Trial and appellate counsel in national mass torts litigation law firm consortia (2007-2012). Consultant for trial, appellate, and U.S. Supreme Court litigation teams in health care fraud, bribery, honest services fraud, mortgage fraud, First Amendment, *qui tam* (False Claims Act), white collar, stolen minerals, and post-conviction criminal cases (2010-present).

## Exhibit 3-C



## **INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH STUDY**

**We are conducting a research study to learn more about perceptions of government. If you choose to participate, we will ask some questions, and you will answer these questions via this website. You will not have any direct interactions with the researchers. If there is a question you do not want to answer, you may stop the study.**

**The study should take about 5-7 minutes to complete. Research data collected from you will be anonymous. Since your information is collected online in an anonymous way, we will not be able to link your responses back to you. So, your responses will remain confidential.**

**Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There will be no negative consequences if you decide not to participate or change your mind later after you begin the study. You can withdraw your participation at any time prior to submitting your survey. If you change your mind later while answering the survey, you may simply exit (or not hand in) the survey.**

**If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about this study or you want to get additional information or provide input about this research, please contact Professor Christopher Robertson ([ctr00@bu.edu](mailto:ctr00@bu.edu)). If you want to talk to someone besides the research team, you may also contact the Boston University IRB at [irb@bu.edu](mailto:irb@bu.edu). The IRB Office webpage has information where you can learn more about being a participant in research, and you can also complete a Participant Feedback Survey. You may print this information for your records.**

**Please note that twice during the survey, we will ask you to type out your thoughts.**

**By proceeding to complete the survey you are indicating your agreement to be in the research. If you do not consent, return your submission.**

\* What state do you reside in?

\* What is your age?

- Under 18
- 18-24
- 25-34
- 35-44
- 45-54
- 55-64
- 65+

\* What is your gender?

- Female
- Male
- Other (specify)

\* What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?


- Less than high school degree
- High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
- Some college but no degree
- Associate degree in college (2-year)
- Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
- Master's degree
- Doctoral degree
- Professional degree (JD, MD)

\* Please choose the racial/ethnic categories that you consider yourself to be (select all that apply):

- White
- Latino or Hispanic
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- Other

\* Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1 Liberal 7 Conservative



\* Information about income is very important to understand. Would you please give your best guess? Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in 2024, before taxes.

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 to \$19,999
- \$20,000 to \$29,999
- \$30,000 to \$39,999
- \$40,000 to \$49,999
- \$50,000 to \$59,999
- \$60,000 to \$69,999
- \$70,000 to \$79,999
- \$80,000 to \$89,999
- \$90,000 to \$99,999
- \$100,000 to \$149,999
- \$150,000 or more

\* How often do you vote in U.S. elections?

- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Never

\* Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?

- Strong Democrat
- Democrat
- Independent lean Democrat
- Independent
- Independent lean Republican
- Republican
- Strong Republican

A 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$5.

B 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$50.

C 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$500.

D 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$5000.

E 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$50,000.

F 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$500,000.

G 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$5,000,000.

H 12.5% Please think about the risk that a politician would sell a policy outcome, like a vote on a bill, in exchange for a financial contribution to a committee supporting his or her re-election. Doing so violates his or her oath and creates a risk of prosecution, if discovered. Suppose the contribution was \$50,000,000.

\* How likely do you think a politician would be to sell a policy outcome for that amount?

- Extremely Unlikely
- Very Unlikely
- Somewhat Unlikely
- Somewhat Likely
- Very Likely
- Extremely Likely

Please consider the following scenario, and then we will ask you about how you feel about it. This scenario involves money and politics. Imagine this scenario, regardless of whatever you may believe about your own state or federal or constitutional law.

**Suppose you live in a U.S. state called "Ames" with the following rules:**

1. Candidates for public office, such as state representative and governor, need lots of money to support their elections and re-elections. They raise and spend money to support their campaigns.
2. Separate from the candidates' own fundraising and spending, individuals and corporations can also spend unlimited amounts of money independently to support or oppose candidates. This spending must be "independent" of the candidate's campaign, not coordinated with any candidate's campaign.
3. Individuals and corporations can also organize their independent spending through entities sometimes called SuperPACs but which we will refer to as "independent expenditure committees," or IECs.
4. Contributions to these IECs may come from major donors who want official actions from elected officials, such as having the state government spend money to support a particular industry or de-regulate a particular industry.
5. IECs may not necessarily know if a candidate directed a donor to make a contribution to the IEC or made any agreement with a donor in exchange for the contribution.

A  
16.65%

6. The state of Ames has a **cap of \$5,000** in contributions to IECs. It is **illegal** for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state.

7. For example, in Ames, it is **NOT legal** for a sitting governor to tell a lobbyist requesting a policy change for a certain industry that the companies should contribute **\$1 million** dollars to a certain IEC that supports his re-election.

B  
16.67%

6. The state of Ames has a **cap of \$5,000** in contributions to IECs. It is **illegal** for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state.

7. For example, in Ames, it is **NOT legal** for a group of companies to contribute **\$1 million** to create an IEC and announce that it will be spent for whichever candidate for governor expresses the strongest support for eliminating safety regulations that impact those companies.

C  
16.67%

6. The state of Ames has a **cap of \$5,000** in contributions to IECs. It is **illegal** for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state.

D  
16.67%

6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. Persons or corporations can contribute any amount of money to IECs in this state.

7. For example, in Ames, it is **legal** for a sitting governor to tell a lobbyist requesting a policy change for a certain industry that the companies should contribute **\$1 million** dollars to a certain IEC that supports his re-election.

E  
16.67%

6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. Persons or corporations can contribute any amount of money to IECs in this state.

7. For example, in Ames, it is **legal** for a group of companies to contribute **\$1 million** to create an IEC and announce that it will be spent for whichever candidate for governor expresses the strongest support for eliminating safety regulations that impact those companies.

F  
16.67%

6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. Persons or corporations can contribute any amount of money to IECs in this state.

\* Please paraphrase in your own words, this system for the State of Ames. What are its likely consequences? How does it make you feel about the government of Ames?







\* On this question, "Elected officials are likely to provide policy outcomes in exchange for large contributions to the IECs that support them," you said "{{ Q12.R6 }}."

Could you please write a few sentences explaining why you answered in that way, with reference to the Ames scenario?

\* In Ames, would it have been legal or illegal for a billionaire to contribute \$1.5M to an IEC in support of the re-election of a legislator who chairs a key committee that will decide the future of his company in the state of Ames?

- It would be legal.
- It would NOT be legal.
- It is not clear from the prompt, or I do not recall.

Thank you for your participation!

## Exhibit 3-D

**METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX**

**Experiment 2: Definition of Experimental Condition Text Used in Random Assignments**

As shown in the main report and the instrument, the base case used five enumerated paragraphs. The following manipulations all start with enumerated paragraph #6, followed by paragraph #7 where applicable. The respondents did not see the condition-labels applied here.

"Cap-Ask" = "6. The state of Ames has a cap of \$5,000 in contributions to IECs. It is illegal for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state. ¶ 7. For example, in Ames, it is **NOT legal** for a sitting governor to tell a lobbyist requesting a policy change for a certain industry that the companies should contribute **\$1 million** dollars to a certain IEC that supports his re-election."

"Cap-Give" = "6. The state of Ames has a cap of \$5,000 in contributions to IECs. It is illegal for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state. ¶ 7. For example, in Ames, it is **NOT legal** for a group of companies to contribute **\$1 million** to create an IEC and announce that it will be spent for whichever candidate for governor expresses the strongest support for eliminating safety regulations that impact those companies.

"Cap" = "6. The state of Ames has a cap of \$5,000 in contributions to IECs. It is illegal for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state." [No example provided to respondents.]

"No Cap-Ask" = "6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. It is illegal for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state. ¶ 7. For example, in Ames, it is **legal** for a sitting governor to tell a lobbyist requesting a policy change for a certain industry that the companies should contribute **\$1 million** dollars to a certain IEC that supports his re-election."

"No Cap-Give" = "6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. It is illegal for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state. ¶ 7. For example, in Ames, it is **legal** for a group of companies to contribute **\$1 million** to create an IEC and announce that it will be spent for whichever candidate for governor expresses the strongest support for eliminating safety regulations that impact those companies.

"No Cap" = "6. The state of Ames has **no cap** on contributions to IECs. It is illegal for any person or corporation to contribute more than \$5,000 to IECs in this state." [No example provided to respondents.]

**Table A1. Crosstabulation of "People like me likely to have strong voice in government" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+
    
```

People's Voice	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	44 23.16	42 24.14	49 23.44	77 40.53	65 34.76	81 41.75	358 31.29
Disagree	32 16.84	40 22.99	43 20.57	44 23.16	50 26.74	52 26.80	261 22.81
Somewhat Disagree	43 22.63	27 15.52	48 22.97	33 17.37	30 16.04	25 12.89	206 18.01
Somewhat Agree	49 25.79	42 24.14	34 16.27	21 11.05	20 10.70	24 12.37	190 16.61
Agree	15 7.89	17 9.77	25 11.96	9 4.74	12 6.42	8 4.12	86 7.52
Strongly Agree	7 3.68	6 3.45	10 4.78	6 3.16	10 5.35	4 2.06	43 3.76
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 79.3403 p < 0.001

**Table A2. Crosstabulation of "Major donors likely to have a strong voice in government" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+
    
```

Donors' Voice	<u>Experimental Conditions</u>						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	6 3.16	8 4.60	8 3.83	2 1.05	2 1.07	4 2.06	30 2.62
Disagree	13 6.84	16 9.20	13 6.22	1 0.53	3 1.60	2 1.03	48 4.20
Somewhat Disagree	37 19.47	23 13.22	17 8.13	14 7.37	8 4.28	9 4.64	108 9.44
Somewhat Agree	49 25.79	38 21.84	45 21.53	17 8.95	25 13.37	32 16.49	206 18.01
Agree	36 18.95	48 27.59	61 29.19	49 25.79	54 28.88	41 21.13	289 25.26
Strongly Agree	49 25.79	41 23.56	65 31.10	107 56.32	95 50.80	106 54.64	463 40.47
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 151.7584 p < 0.001

**Table A3. Crosstabulation of "Government is likely to be effective" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Effective	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	27 14.21	14 8.05	24 11.48	45 23.68	48 25.67	50 25.77	208 18.18
Disagree	35 18.42	41 23.56	58 27.75	59 31.05	47 25.13	56 28.87	296 25.87
Somewhat Disagree	42 22.11	40 22.99	52 24.88	49 25.79	50 26.74	46 23.71	279 24.39
Somewhat Agree	60 31.58	49 28.16	41 19.62	25 13.16	24 12.83	27 13.92	226 19.76
Agree	20 10.53	19 10.92	26 12.44	7 3.68	11 5.88	10 5.15	93 8.13
Strongly Agree	6 3.16	11 6.32	8 3.83	5 2.63	7 3.74	5 2.58	42 3.67
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 92.3876 p < 0.001

**Table A4. Crosstabulation of "Government is likely to be controlled by special interests" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Interests	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	4 2.11	4 2.30	7 3.35	0 0.00	2 1.07	1 0.52	18 1.57
Disagree	14 7.37	15 8.62	7 3.35	2 1.05	5 2.67	3 1.55	46 4.02
Somewhat Disagree	24 12.63	26 14.94	25 11.96	10 5.26	10 5.35	13 6.70	108 9.44
Somewhat Agree	46 24.21	37 21.26	47 22.49	25 13.16	21 11.23	31 15.98	207 18.09
Agree	61 32.11	39 22.41	64 30.62	50 26.32	53 28.34	52 26.80	319 27.88
Strongly Agree	41 21.58	53 30.46	59 28.23	103 54.21	96 51.34	94 48.45	446 38.99
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 116.0651 p < 0.001



**Table A5. Crosstabulation of "Major donors to IECs likely to get policy outcomes from candidates in exchange for money" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key      |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+
    
```

Experimental Conditions

Get Policy	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	Total
Strongly Disagree	5 2.63	7 4.02	5 2.39	1 0.53	1 0.53	4 2.06	23 2.01
Disagree	15 7.89	14 8.05	9 4.31	3 1.58	6 3.21	5 2.58	52 4.55
Somewhat Disagree	28 14.74	23 13.22	27 12.92	11 5.79	9 4.81	9 4.64	107 9.35
Somewhat Agree	47 24.74	45 25.86	55 26.32	22 11.58	32 17.11	36 18.56	237 20.72
Agree	56 29.47	40 22.99	61 29.19	55 28.95	50 26.74	55 28.35	317 27.71
Strongly Agree	39 20.53	45 25.86	52 24.88	98 51.58	89 47.59	85 43.81	408 35.66
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 112.8129 p < 0.001

**Table A6. Crosstabulation of "Elected officials likely to provide policy outcomes in exchange for large contributions to the IECs that support them" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Provide Policy	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	12 6.32	5 2.87	7 3.35	0 0.00	1 0.53	3 1.55	28 2.45
Disagree	14 7.37	14 8.05	15 7.18	1 0.53	5 2.67	6 3.09	55 4.81
Somewhat Disagree	30 15.79	29 16.67	27 12.92	10 5.26	11 5.88	14 7.22	121 10.58
Somewhat Agree	45 23.68	42 24.14	43 20.57	29 15.26	27 14.44	38 19.59	224 19.58
Agree	56 29.47	39 22.41	62 29.67	55 28.95	50 26.74	54 27.84	316 27.62
Strongly Agree	33 17.37	45 25.86	55 26.32	95 50.00	93 49.73	79 40.72	400 34.97
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 124.2261 p < 0.001

**Table A7. Crosstabulation of "Many elected officials will be 'crooked'" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Crooked	<u>Experimental Conditions</u>						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	2 1.05	6 3.45	5 2.39	0 0.00	1 0.53	2 1.03	16 1.40
Disagree	12 6.32	20 11.49	11 5.26	3 1.58	3 1.60	3 1.55	52 4.55
Somewhat Disagree	38 20.00	26 14.94	31 14.83	10 5.26	7 3.74	14 7.22	126 11.01
Somewhat Agree	55 28.95	40 22.99	54 25.84	37 19.47	53 28.34	44 22.68	283 24.74
Agree	43 22.63	43 24.71	60 28.71	54 28.42	51 27.27	60 30.93	311 27.19
Strongly Agree	40 21.05	39 22.41	48 22.97	86 45.26	72 38.50	71 36.60	356 31.12
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 118.6665 p < 0.001

**Table A8. Crosstabulation of "Trust that the government will do what is right" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Trust	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	34 17.89	36 20.69	46 22.01	75 39.47	70 37.43	69 35.57	330 28.85
Disagree	39 20.53	38 21.84	49 23.44	52 27.37	56 29.95	59 30.41	293 25.61
Somewhat Disagree	43 22.63	35 20.11	47 22.49	35 18.42	35 18.72	36 18.56	231 20.19
Somewhat Agree	49 25.79	44 25.29	46 22.01	18 9.47	15 8.02	22 11.34	194 16.96
Agree	18 9.47	13 7.47	12 5.74	5 2.63	6 3.21	6 3.09	60 5.24
Strongly Agree	7 3.68	8 4.60	9 4.31	5 2.63	5 2.67	2 1.03	36 3.15
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 95.8976 p < 0.001

**Table A9. Crosstabulation of "Contributions to IECs likely have a coercive influence on candidates' positions and actions" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Experimental Conditions

Coercive	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	Total
Strongly Disagree	2 1.05	5 2.87	5 2.39	1 0.53	3 1.60	2 1.03	18 1.57
Disagree	15 7.89	13 7.47	15 7.18	3 1.58	3 1.60	6 3.09	55 4.81
Somewhat Disagree	22 11.58	29 16.67	21 10.05	8 4.21	12 6.42	14 7.22	106 9.27
Somewhat Agree	69 36.32	42 24.14	57 27.27	31 16.32	31 16.58	44 22.68	274 23.95
Agree	48 25.26	47 27.01	62 29.67	70 36.84	63 33.69	52 26.80	342 29.90
Strongly Agree	34 17.89	38 21.84	49 23.44	77 40.53	75 40.11	76 39.18	349 30.51
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 104.9479 p < 0.001

**Table A10. Crosstabulation of "Contributions to IECs likely facilitate political *quid pro quos* between donors and candidates" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key      |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

<i>Quid pro quo</i>	<u>Experimental Conditions</u>						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	1 0.53	6 3.45	3 1.44	2 1.05	1 0.53	1 0.52	14 1.22
Disagree	12 6.32	9 5.17	17 8.13	1 0.53	6 3.21	6 3.09	51 4.46
Somewhat Disagree	32 16.84	29 16.67	19 9.09	13 6.84	4 2.14	8 4.12	105 9.18
Somewhat Agree	60 31.58	40 22.99	62 29.67	30 15.79	34 18.18	43 22.16	269 23.51
Agree	50 26.32	48 27.59	61 29.19	57 30.00	65 34.76	64 32.99	345 30.16
Strongly Agree	35 18.42	42 24.14	47 22.49	87 45.79	77 41.18	72 37.11	360 31.47
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 122.5425 p < 0.001

**Table A11. Crosstabulation of "Likely to be corruption and opportunities for abuse" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Corruption	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	4 2.11	4 2.30	1 0.48	1 0.53	1 0.53	3 1.55	14 1.22
Disagree	11 5.79	10 5.75	12 5.74	3 1.58	4 2.14	4 2.06	44 3.85
Somewhat Disagree	27 14.21	25 14.37	23 11.00	11 5.79	2 1.07	10 5.15	98 8.57
Somewhat Agree	50 26.32	40 22.99	48 22.97	21 11.05	26 13.90	33 17.01	218 19.06
Agree	53 27.89	44 25.29	57 27.27	44 23.16	50 26.74	51 26.29	299 26.14
Strongly Agree	45 23.68	51 29.31	68 32.54	110 57.89	104 55.61	93 47.94	471 41.17
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 115.6198 p < 0.001

Table A12. Crosstabulation of "Likely to be improper influence on political officials" by Experimental Condition

```

+-----+
| Key |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Improper	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	4 2.11	4 2.30	5 2.39	0 0.00	2 1.07	3 1.55	18 1.57
Disagree	12 6.32	16 9.20	8 3.83	2 1.05	4 2.14	5 2.58	47 4.11
Somewhat Disagree	28 14.74	26 14.94	19 9.09	10 5.26	6 3.21	7 3.61	96 8.39
Somewhat Agree	58 30.53	41 23.56	51 24.40	23 12.11	27 14.44	36 18.56	236 20.63
Agree	43 22.63	38 21.84	69 33.01	58 30.53	61 32.62	59 30.41	328 28.67
Strongly Agree	45 23.68	49 28.16	57 27.27	97 51.05	87 46.52	84 43.30	419 36.63
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 122.2561 p < 0.001



**Table A13. Crosstabulation of "Have confidence in the integrity of system of representative government" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Integrity	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	37 19.47	39 22.41	44 21.05	88 46.32	82 43.85	79 40.72	369 32.26
Disagree	31 16.32	35 20.11	59 28.23	42 22.11	49 26.20	55 28.35	271 23.69
Somewhat Disagree	53 27.89	30 17.24	46 22.01	27 14.21	29 15.51	33 17.01	218 19.06
Somewhat Agree	44 23.16	38 21.84	34 16.27	19 10.00	15 8.02	18 9.28	168 14.69
Agree	16 8.42	25 14.37	22 10.53	6 3.16	6 3.21	7 3.61	82 7.17
Strongly Agree	9 4.74	7 4.02	4 1.91	8 4.21	6 3.21	2 1.03	36 3.15
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 131.9189 p < 0.001

**Table A14. Crosstabulation of "Elected officials likely to represent the interests of the voters" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
| frequency |
| column percentage |
+-----+

```

Interests Voters	Experimental Conditions						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	28 14.74	36 20.69	28 13.40	63 33.16	60 32.09	65 33.51	280 24.48
Disagree	41 21.58	30 17.24	57 27.27	59 31.05	52 27.81	44 22.68	283 24.74
Somewhat Disagree	33 17.37	36 20.69	52 24.88	29 15.26	35 18.72	41 21.13	226 19.76
Somewhat Agree	66 34.74	42 24.14	41 19.62	27 14.21	20 10.70	30 15.46	226 19.76
Agree	12 6.32	25 14.37	20 9.57	6 3.16	14 7.49	11 5.67	88 7.69
Strongly Agree	10 5.26	5 2.87	11 5.26	6 3.16	6 3.21	3 1.55	41 3.58
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 109.8458 p < 0.001

**Table A15. Crosstabulation of "Elected officials are likely to represent the interests of major donors" by Experimental Condition**

```

+-----+
| Key    |
+-----+
|   frequency   |
| column percentage |
+-----+
    
```

Interests Donors	<u>Experimental Conditions</u>						Total
	Cap-Ask	Cap-Give	Cap	No Cap-Ask	No Cap-Give	No Cap	
Strongly Disagree	3 1.58	5 2.87	6 2.87	1 0.53	2 1.07	3 1.55	20 1.75
Disagree	15 7.89	15 8.62	7 3.35	3 1.58	4 2.14	8 4.12	52 4.55
Somewhat Disagree	19 10.00	24 13.79	22 10.53	8 4.21	8 4.28	8 4.12	89 7.78
Somewhat Agree	56 29.47	39 22.41	51 24.40	31 16.32	25 13.37	29 14.95	231 20.19
Agree	56 29.47	46 26.44	66 31.58	45 23.68	61 32.62	56 28.87	330 28.85
Strongly Agree	41 21.58	45 25.86	57 27.27	102 53.68	87 46.52	90 46.39	422 36.89
Total	190 100.00	174 100.00	209 100.00	190 100.00	187 100.00	194 100.00	1,144 100.00

Pearson chi2(25) = 112.8703 p < 0.001

**Table A16. OLS Regression on Perceptions of *Quid pro quo* Corruption in Subsample Limited to Those Who Passed Manipulation Check (n=750).**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	750
Model	194.830882	8	24.3538603	F(8, 741)	=	20.77
Residual	869.035784	741	1.17278783	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.1831
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1743
Total	1063.86667	749	1.42038273	Root MSE	=	1.083

quid_pro_quo	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
NoCap	.9604038	.0801695	11.98	0.000	.8030174	1.11779
Age	-.0005958	.0268805	-0.02	0.982	-.0533668	.0521753
Gender	-.03931	.0806441	-0.49	0.626	-.1976281	.1190081
Education	.0068179	.0298422	0.23	0.819	-.0517674	.0654032
Politics	-.0618549	.02325	-2.66	0.008	-.1074986	-.0162112
Income	.0046701	.0135034	0.35	0.730	-.0218393	.0311794
Vote	-.0300923	.037562	-0.80	0.423	-.1038329	.0436482
White	.2305073	.1119215	2.06	0.040	.0107862	.4502283
_cons	4.421443	.2666564	16.58	0.000	3.897951	4.944935

Note: This robustness check uses CAP as the base case rather than NO-CAP. The contrast is highly significant, and the sign is opposite.