Building off of momentum from our filing of the FEC complaint to end super PACs, we launched a campaign in St. Petersburg, Florida, that could create another test case to challenge big money in our elections. On July 21, 2016, City Councilwoman Darden Rice of St. Petersburg introduced our proposed ordinance before the St. Petersburg City Council to abolish super PACs and limit spending by foreign-influenced corporations in city elections.
The proposed ordinance, the first of its kind in the nation, will establish limits on contributions to “independent-expenditure only” political action committees, known as super PACs, effectively abolishing super PACs in St. Petersburg elections. It will also require corporations that spend $5,000 or more on St. Petersburg elections to certify they are not owned or controlled in significant part by foreign entities.
A “Committee of the Whole” meeting took place on Thursday, October 27,2016 with testimony and written letters of support presented to the City Council. A final vote passing the ordinance (6-2) happened on Thursday, October 5, 2017.
- Ordinance Summary
- Statutes Referenced
- FAQ (One-Pager)
- FAQ (Detailed)
- Press Release (7/20/2016)
- Press Release (10/5/2017)
II. In the News
- Tampa Bay Times, “Council will look at limiting big money in St. Pete Elections” (10/5/2017)
- Bill Moyers & Co. , “The Long Path to Reversing Citizens United” (10/27/2016)
- The Hill, “Local Leaders Turning Up the Heat on Citizens United” (10/27/2016)
- WMNF Radio, “How St. Pete Could Play a role in overturning Citizens United” (10/27/2016)
- The Weekly Challenger, “St. Pete, Let’s Take a Bite Out of Citizens United” (9/16/2016)
- Boston Globe, “Get Foreign Political Money Out of US Elections” (7/22/2016)
- The American Prospect, “Plotting the End of Super PACs” (7/21/2016)
- YES! Magazine, “Florida Town Proposes a Ban on Super PACs—What Could Happen?” (7/21/2016)
- Tampa Bay Times, “Keep Super PAC Cash out of St. Petersburg Elections” (7/15/2016)
Read letters in Support of the St. Petersburg Ordinance:
- FEC Commissioner Ellen Weintraub, Letter of Support
- University of Chicago Law School Professor Al Alschuler, Letter of Support
- Harvard Law Professor John C. Coates, Letter of Support & Report
- Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe, Letter of Support
- Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe, Letter Addressing Legislative Immunity
- Harvard Law Professor Charles Fried, Letter of Support
- Stetson University School of Law Professor Joseph Morrissey, Letter of Support
- Stephen R. Weissman, Ph.D. Letter of Support
Quantifying Foreign Institutional Block Ownership at Publicly Traded U.S. Corporations
Since the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision invalidated restrictions on corporate political spending, considerable public and policymaker interest has developed in the potential for U.S. elections to be influenced by foreign interests through U.S. corporations. On the one hand, existing federal law (the Federal Election Campaign Act) already prohibits political spending in federal, state, or local elections by corporations that are incorporated outside the U.S., or which have their principal place of business abroad. On the other hand, current law still allows substantial avenues for foreign influence over corporate political spending by U.S.-incorporated and -based corporations.
Lawmakers in Congress and members of the Federal Election Commission have expressed interest in addressing this phenomenon. As of yet, federal reform proposals have failed to advance. A more likely near-term prospect for new policy measures is at the state and local level. Local governments (notably in St. Petersburg, Florida) are now contemplating measures to address this concern.
This paper focuses on ownership of significant blocks of stock as a potential mechanism for foreign influence over corporate political spending. We found that roughly one in eleven (9%) companies in the S&P 500 has one or more foreign institutions each owning five percent or more blocks of stock, nine have foreign institutions with ten percent or more blocks, five have a foreign institution with more than fifteen percent, and three have foreign institutions with more than 20% blocks. Three firms have multiple foreign institutional blockholders. This is the first recent empirical analysis of the level of foreign institutional blockholder ownership of publicly traded corporations.
The SpeechNow Case and the Real World of Campaign Finance
Thus, while independent spending groups are legally restrained from coordinating with their beneficiaries, donors to such groups are legally permitted to financially coordinate with these same candidates within certain contribution limits. When donors amplify their legally limited direct contributions to candidates with unlimited indirect support via independent spending groups, an “anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to an independent expenditure group” certainly arises. These unlimited contributions intensify the dangers of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance that contribution limits were established to prevent.